A report of the Ohio Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights prepared for the information and consideration of the Commission. This report will be considered by the Commission, and the Commission will make public its reaction. In the meantime, the findings and recommendations of this report should not be attributed to the Commission but only to the Ohio Advisory Committee.
THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
The United States Commission on Civil Rights, created by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, is an independent, bipartisan agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government. By the terms of the act, as amended, the Commission is charged with the following duties pertaining to discrimination or denials of the equal protection of the laws based on race, color, religion, sex, age, handicap, or national origin, or in the administration of justice: investigation of individual discriminatory denials of the right to vote; study of legal developments with respect to discrimination or denials of the equal protection of the law; appraisal of the laws and policies of the United States with respect to discrimination or denials of equal protection of the law; maintenance of a national clearinghouse for information respecting discrimination or denials of equal protection of the law; and investigation of patterns or practices of fraud or discrimination in the conduct of Federal elections. The Commission is also required to submit reports to the President and the Congress at such times as the Commission, the Congress, or the President shall deem desirable.

THE STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEES
An Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights has been established in each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia pursuant to section 105(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 as amended. The Advisory Committees are made up of responsible persons who serve without compensation. Their functions under their mandate from the Commission are to: advise the Commission of all relevant information concerning their respective States on matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission; advise the Commission on matters of mutual concern in the preparation of reports of the Commission to the President and the Congress; receive reports, suggestions, and recommendations from individuals, public and private organizations, and public officials upon matters pertinent to inquiries conducted by the State Advisory Committee; initiate and forward advice and recommendations to the Commission upon matters in which the Commission shall request the assistance of the State Advisory Committee; and attend, as observers, any open hearing or conference which the Commission may hold within the State.
Policing in Cincinnati, Ohio: Official Policy vs. Civilian Reality

—A report prepared by the Ohio Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights

ATTRIBUTION:
The findings and recommendations contained in this report are those of the Ohio Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights and, as such, are not attributable to the Commission. This report has been prepared by the Ohio Advisory Committee for submission to the Commission, and will be considered by the Commission in formulating its recommendations to the President and the Congress.

RIGHT OF RESPONSE:
Prior to the publication of this report and consistent with Commission policy, the Ohio Advisory Committee afforded to all individuals or organizations that may have been defamed, degraded, or incriminated by any material contained in the report an opportunity to respond in writing to such material. All responses have been incorporated, appended, or otherwise reflected in this publication.
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION
Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman
Mary F. Berry, Vice Chairman
Stephen Horn
Blandina C. Ramirez
Jill S. Ruckelshaus
Murray Saltzman

Louis Núñez, Staff Director

Dear Commissioners:

The Ohio Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights submits this report, *Policing in Cincinnati, Ohio: Official Policy and vs. Civilian Reality*, as part of its responsibility to advise the Commission about civil rights problems within this State. This report is a product of the continuing concern of the Ohio Advisory Committee with the administration of justice in Ohio. In particular, the Committee is concerned with how justice is administered to minorities, both racial and cultural, as well as to women and poor people.

The present study of the Cincinnati Police Division has focused on use of force, distribution of services, and employment of minorities and women. In addition, involvement of the State and Federal Government is reviewed along with selected national issues in policing and proposed solutions to current problems.

The Committee investigated the Cincinnati Police Division over an 18-month period. The Division itself provided a wealth of data covering official policies and procedures. In addition, the Committee held a two-day fact-finding meeting on June 28–29, 1979 at which civilians as individuals and as representatives of community organizations presented their concerns about police practices in Cincinnati. Police officials and officers, local and county enforcement personnel, city administrators and legislators, and the Mayor participated in the fact-finding meeting as well.

A review of all the data presented to the Committee leads inexorably to the conclusion that there exists a serious discrepancy between the official policy of the Cincinnati Police Division in regard to use of force, distribution of services, and nondiscrimination in employment and the experiences of minority civilians and police officers, including members of racial and cultural minorities, as well as poor people. A similar and equally serious discrepancy exists between official Federal policy in regard to nondiscrimination by recipients of Federal funds and the lack of action by Federal funding agencies to ensure compliance. One consequence of these discrepancies and the cynicism they engender will continue to exist as long as civilians are locked out of policy-making and review of police practices and procedures.

Based upon the extensive data available to the Committee, a number of findings have been drawn on which recommendations are made for closing the gap between official policy and actual practice, for increasing civilian participation in the
operation of the Cincinnati Police Division, and for eliminating unnecessary force. These recommendations are directed to local officials both within and without the Police Division, and to State and Federal officials.

The Committee is particularly concerned about the virtual lack of Federal efforts to ensure compliance of the Cincinnati Police Division with nondiscrimination requirements. In part, this problem exists because of a paucity of effective remedies available to the Federal funding agencies, in part, because of inadequate staff and data for monitoring the conduct of sub-grantees of Federal funds such as the Cincinnati Police Division, and in part, because Federal funding agencies have no jurisdiction over discrimination against the poor or against white Appalachians. As a result of these problems, the Committee has made specific recommendations directed to the Congress and to Federal funding and enforcement agencies to eliminate the gulf between declared national commitment to nondiscriminatory justice and the reality in minority and economically disadvantaged communities. The Ohio Advisory Committee requests that you support its recommendations by taking appropriate action toward the goal of ensuring the equitable and consensual administration of justice throughout the city of Cincinnati.

Sincerely,

Henrietta H. Looman
Chairperson
MEMBERSHIP
OHIO ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Ohio Advisory Committee wishes to thank the staff of the Commission’s Midwestern Regional Office in Chicago, Illinois, for coordinating the study and preparing this report on the problems of policing in Cincinnati.

The study was the principal staff assignment of Valeska S. Hinton equal opportunity specialist. The report was written by Valeska S. Hinton and Ruthanne DeWolfe, regional attorney, who also provided legal counsel throughout the project. Hinton and DeWolfe also served as principal investigators. Editorial assistance was provided by Gregory Squires, research writer. Assistance was also provided by Carmelo Melendez and Frank Alford, equal opportunity specialists. Valuable assistance was also provide throughout the study by Delores Miller, Ada Williams and Mary Davis, support staff. This project was carried out under the supervision of Clark G. Roberts, Regional Director.

The Staff of the Publications Support Center, Office of Management, was responsible for final preparation of the document for publication.
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Introduction

What brought the Ohio Advisory Committee to Cincinnati

The last two decades have seen unprecedented growth in the demands being made by minorities and women for their civil rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution. There is a marked difference, however, in establishing laws to ensure civil rights and the enforcement of those laws in such a way that true progress is made. In minority communities throughout the country, it is becoming increasingly evident that words on paper mean nothing if those words are not backed up by action.¹

This lack of equal rights or equal protection under the law was alleged in the many complaints received by the Ohio Advisory Committee and in the high degree of frustration of minorities being voiced by Cincinnatians. Those complaints which concerned the actions of police officers toward minorities have ranged from verbal abuse, harassment, false arrest, use of force, discrimination in hiring and promotions, to shootings which resulted in death.

The following excerpts from 1978 Cincinnati newspaper reports reveal the seriousness of problems which have occurred there:

A 44-year old Cincinnati highway maintenance employee, who officials later said was mentally disturbed, became upset at the city garage. Police were called and the man allegedly scuffled with one officer, taking his night stick from him. The officer then shot him in the stomach - he survived the shooting.

A 28-year old escaped mental patient from a hospital was confronted by an officer in a downtown Cincinnati hotel. When the man began to flee, the officer fired twice, hitting him in the head. The man survived.

An 18-year old wanted on theft and burglary charges was paralyzed from waist down when he was accidentally shot in the back by a pursuing officer. The officer said he slipped on the pavement and his gun discharged.

A recent incident involved a 17-year old Black car robbery suspect who was shot and killed while fleeing the police. This was the ninth person shot by local police officers in and around Cincinnati in 1978. This case is not the first to have caused questions about whether the police over reacted.²

Cincinnati, referred to as "the city of Seven Hills", the "Queen City" and the "Gateway to the South", was described by Sir Winston Churchill as "the most beautiful inland city in America".³ "Cincinnati is truly one of the most well-rounded, active, interesting and beautiful cities in the entire county!"⁴ states the Hello’ Welcome Magazine. Timothy Kincade, in the Ohio Magazine, says,

Cincinnatians unashamedly love their city; citizens and tycoons, politicians and bankers, all share equally in the feeling they have for their city and so they should. Life wouldn’t be more

⁴ Ibid.
enjoyable than in Cincinnati. If God made anything better he kept it for Himself.5

Cincinnati was founded in 1788, chartered as a village in 1892, and incorporated as a city in 1819. It adopted the Council Manager form of government in 1925.6 As Ohio Magazine stated:

Cincinnati makes the national press with some regularity but not on a daily basis. Normally, it's only to announce that another federal committee or national foundation has selected Cincinnati as one of the 10 most liveable cities in the country or that the Cincinnati Reds topped the major league road attendance records. Pretty dull stuff, really. People living in a captivating city, relishing the charm which surrounds them, nourished by a rich and healthy cultural tradition, people like this don't generate the kind of copy that sells newspapers.7

What could have happened to turn Cincinnati into a city facing a crisis in police-community relations? This is one of the questions that the Ohio Advisory Committee attempted to answer in its investigation of law enforcement activities in Cincinnati.

In the fall of 1978, the Committee received numerous complaints, newspaper clippings and reports of conflict and concern from citizens and community groups about deteriorating police community relations in Cincinnati. The Committee and U.S. Commission on Civil Rights staff members were invited to a meeting of the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission (CHRC) on November 9, 1978, to discuss the situation. Cincinnatians related their experiences with police harassment and verbal abuse. The Committee also heard reports of problems pertaining to police conduct in the city, including allegations of discrimination in employment and in the provision of police services.

After this dialogue, the CHRC joined by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Ohio Black Political Assembly, the Urban Appalachian Council and other community groups made a request of the Committee to investigate city procedure for handling complaints against police offices. As Michael E. Maloney, Director of the Urban Appalachian Council concluded:

The police image has been harmed by recent publicity about corrupt practices by command level officers. It has been further damaged on the streets by degenerating police-community relations, especially in poor Black and Appalachian neighborhoods. This degeneration has been caused by a few officers who persist in harassing and abusing citizens living in these neighborhoods. It is a dangerous and intolerable situation for neighborhood residents and for the public service mission of the police division. This volatile condition can be defused in part by giving citizens a more effective redress of their grievances than now exists. The complaint process, as it now exists, is secretive, biased in some instances, and less than helpful in dealing with the deeper issue of citizens feeling frustrated and helpless when confronted by police abuse.8

With this background information, the Ohio Advisory Committee decided to conduct a study of the administration of justice, focusing on the role of the police in Cincinnati. A statement by Clark Roberts Director of the Midwestern Regional Office, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, reflects the feelings of the Committee, “One measure of good police-citizen relationships is whether or not the police department provides a place where a person can go to solve a problem, not just file a complaint”.9

**Problems and Perceptions—Viewpoints of Community and Police**

The entire criminal justice system, including courts and corrections as well as the police, is charged with enforcing the law and maintaining order. What is distinctive about the responsibility of the police is that they are charged with performing these functions where all eyes are upon them and where the going is roughest, on the streets. Since this is a time of increasing crime, increasing social unrest and increasing public sensitivity to both, it is a time when police work is particularly important, complicated, conspicuous, and delicate.10

The police did not start and cannot stop the convulsive social changes that are taking place in America. They do not enact laws that they are required to enforce, nor do they dispose of the

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
9 Statement before the Ohio Advisory Committee and Cincinnati Human Relations Commission meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio, Nov. 9, 1978.
criminal they arrest. The police are only one part of the justice system, the justice system is only one part of the government, and the government is only one part of society.\(^{11}\)

It is when the police attempt to solve problems that arise from the community's social and economic failures that policing is least effective and most frustrating. On the whole, police must accept society as it is—a society in which many parents fail to raise their children as law-abiding citizens, in which schools fail to educate them to assume adult roles, and in which the economy is not geared to provide them with jobs.\(^{12}\)

This frustration was clearly expressed in the testimony of David D’Erminio, Police Specialist—Cincinnati Police Division:

> I think society demands too much of the policeman. Not only are we expected to enforce the law with restrictions, but we’re expected to be curbside psychiatrists, marriage counselors, social workers, even doctors and ministers—and those crucial choices and the time frame of seconds rather than days, to shoot or not to shoot, to arrest or not to arrest, to give chase or to let go.\(^{13}\)

Sgt. Danny O’Malley, who resigned in September 1979, told Jim Greenfield of the Cincinnati Enquirer:

> Things are as bad as they seem at the Cincinnati Police Division. There is no way my son will ever become a police officer if I have anything to say about it. I love this job but I feel I’ve outlived a lot of things. Times have changed, attitude have changed. I guess people have changed.\(^{14}\)

Jim Greenfield concluded: “So have the Cincinnati police changed from a proud, disciplined paramilitary force once recognized nationally for its quality, to a harried uncertain unit bludgeoned by history and labor strife and confronted by constant challenge—from within as well as from without”.\(^{15}\)

The rank and file morale is at its lowest ebb in memory, and police community relations is suffering as well. The prestige of the police division began to drop with the indictment of a former police chief in 1975 and plunged further down with the layoff of 94 officers during the city’s financial crisis of December 1976. Feeling protected by the civil service system, the police who thought they had a secure, prestigious career, found through the layoffs that their jobs were subject to municipal finance and political decisions. The long pay dispute between the Fraternal Order of Police and the city, with the officers having no contract for over a year, has not helped morale. The image cracked again when the Ohio 1st District Court of Appeals upheld the requirement that Cincinnati employees live within city limits.\(^{16}\)

The police feel that they are all alone and no one cares.\(^{17}\) The black police officers have the same problems as other officers but with an added dimension. In a city whose population is one-third black, the fact that only seven percent of the police force is black is a bone of contention with the black officers and members of the black community.\(^{18}\)

Wendell Young, Police officer and president of the Sentinels Police Association, testified that:

> Cincinnati has a problem because the Police Division in the black community isn’t viewed as an organization that protects people. It’s viewed as an organization that protects property, which is left behind by the white merchant when he goes home to another part of the city and must leave his place unguarded.

There is a double standard in policing. In the black community, policing attempts to control crime, in the white community, policing attempts to eradicate it. If we had a police department that was representative of all the people it served, I think that then the response to policing in the black community would be the kind of response that black people would feel they could trust. If we had at least one assistant police chief who was black, if we had several captains who were black, we would have black officers in the command making areas in the police division.\(^{19}\)

If these are adequate statements of the police’s perception of their own image, what does the community think of the police image? In the testimony of the Metropolitan Area Religious Coalition (MARC) of Cincinnati it was stated:

\(^{11}\) Ibid.
\(^{12}\) Task Force Report, p. 2.
\(^{13}\) Testimony before the Ohio Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Cincinnati, Ohio, June 28-29, 1979, Transcript (hereafter cited as Transcript), p. 608.
\(^{15}\) Ibid.
\(^{17}\) Greenfield Series.
\(^{18}\) Ibid.
\(^{19}\) Transcript, pp. 189-190.
We feel that perceptions of a large segment of the community are as important as what really exists. We do believe that underpolicing is as big of a problem as over-policing and we feel that one of the great problems is that many citizens in the poorer inner-city communities feel that they do not get adequate protection and there is as much need for improved policing as there is for less harassment.

Sentiment in the black community, today, closely parallels virulent anti-police feelings in the predominantly Appalachian community. Michael E. Maloney says, "It's the same problem, having some police officers who are either unqualified by reason of training or attitude and who commit acts of brutality. It's the same problem of the community not having an avenue of redress."

"All poor people are pretty much in the same powerless disadvantaged position", says University of Cincinnati Vice President Lawrence Hawkins, Chairman of the Mayor's Community Relations Panel. Present Mayor Kenneth Blackwell does not find surprising the antagonism that police say they encounter. This is an era in which those without power are challenging institutions, government, lawyers, and the press as well as police. Mayor Blackwell has also said that people who do not feel they share in the system view the policeman as the protector of the status quo. The policeman as the point man is the first to realize the challenge to authority, to the legitimacy of the system.

Mr. J.C. Johnson, President of the Cincinnati Chapter of the N.A.A.C.P. testified that:

When this situation started to unfold, I was under the impression that this was completely...a result of racism on behalf of members of the police division...after having sat through numerous nights of testimony from Cincinnati citizens, I no longer believe that is the only rationale...there is a very heavy degree of classism involved in the problem here...I say this because, I find that not only blacks are having problems when dealing with the Cincinnati police, there are certain members of the poor white community that are having these same types of problems. A two-fold problem has emerged in Cincinnati. First is a series of perceptions held by significant segments of the population that they are not adequately served by the police division, second is the fact that there is no mechanism in place to resolve police-community conflicts in which these segments have confidence.

Mr. Simon Leis, Hamilton County Prosecutor, offered a different opinion. He expressed his hope that the Commission not lose sight of the fact that many of the incidents being investigated in which police misconduct has been alleged would not have occurred in the first place if it were not for the crimes that were committed and which necessitated police action. It is clear that where people live or work and the nature of their personal involvement in the community have an effect on their perceptions of the police. Of the many people interviewed and the letters received, it became evident that something is wrong. The first question that arises is, what is the problem? The second is, what can we do about it?

Farnsley Peters, Executive Vice President, Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, stated:

There is no doubt about the fact that there is great uneasiness in Cincinnati today. Police officers and their families are frightened by the possibility of future killings. The minority community is concerned that they will bear the brunt of overreactions to the situation. And the community at large is dismayed at what appears to be the loss of the community safety in which they have so long taken for granted in Cincinnati.

Mr. Peters concluded:

We have to face the current situation with realism and understanding, we have to work together as a community to restore mutual confidence and trust between all elements of the community. It seems to me our immediate solution is twofold; first we must make sure that the Cincinnati Police is properly trained and equipped to carry out their mission; second, we must assure the minority community that justice will prevail in our city.

The heart of the law enforcement function, as experts are fond of pointing out, is one of legitimacy. To carry out effectively any of their various assignments, the authority of the police must be generally accepted by the public. The crux of the American
police problem has long been the fact that the legitimacy of the police is often challenged rather than accepted. From this issue alone stems some of the most serious and long-standing problems in American policing.

Precisely because they are essentially a political institutions, and have been perceived as such by the public, American police have not enjoyed widespread acceptance by the public. Police officers, have historically been subjected to an enormous amount of ridicule and outright hostility. The Cincinnati chief of police complained in 1887 that “a policeman’s life is one of continual danger. . . . He is considered fair sport for every gang of roughs and hoodlums who choose to assail him. . . .”

Former Police Commissioner of New York City, Patrick Murphy writes in his book, Commissioners:

Municipal politics and bad management are two main reasons why the struggle of the honest effective police officers to do good work in an heroic one. . . . The most honest television portrayal of police work is not perhaps “Kojak” or even “Police Story” but “Barney Miller”. . . . In its essential form, even without the debilitating and often demoralizing accoutrements of managerial stupidity, the job of the American police officer is a terribly emotional one. Nerves are on edge for very moment the officer is an display. . . . In the police role as a sort of grand mop-up operation, the police often see society for what it is at its worst—not as society likes to see itself.

Former Captain Anthony Bouza, 44th Precinct, Bronx, N.Y. in 1977 stated:

Aristotle did say 2500 years ago that poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. It is still true. . . . America attacks the problems that it sees. It doesn’t see these problems. They are now under the rug. They are being more ignored now than they ever have been. There hasn’t been a significant redistribution of income in this nation for 30 years. . . . To the degree that I succeed in keeping the ghetto cool—to the degree that I can be effective, to that degree, fundamentally, am I deflecting America’s attention from discovering this cancer? . . . Maybe I’d be better off not being as effective as I presume myself to be. . . . And that way American would be confronting the problem as it had to do during the urban riots of the ’60s and so on. The fact of the matter is that we are manufacturing criminals and brutality out there. We are very efficiently creating a very volatile and dangerous sub-element of our society.

We are doing it simply because we don’t want to face the burdens, the problems, and the responsibilities that their existence imposes on any society with conscience. So rather than awaken your conscience to the problem, you are far better off just ignoring it. And that’s what we are doing. I am very well paid, almost, to be the commander of an occupation in the ghetto. So that’s where my sense of defeat and frustration comes from.

All of these pressures and points of conflict no doubt contribute at least in part, to the problems in Cincinnati. In order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of police/community relations, the Ohio Advisory Committee launches an investigation, the findings of which are reported in the following pages. Interviews were conducted with the city officials and police administrative officials to gather information about their policies and procedures regarding use of force, employment and promotion, training and education, complaint processing, and related issues under their jurisdiction. Police, community groups, civic and religious organizations, civil rights leaders, and individuals were also interviewed to obtain a cross-sectional perspective of the police - community relations aspect of the crisis. A variety of documentation was collected and analyzed, including written policies, annual reports, previous studies, statistical data, and other relevant materials. The Committee held a fact-finding meeting in June 28, 29, 1979 to receive further data to be used to supplement that gathered through the preliminary investigative process.

This introductory chapter has given some background of incidents, complaints, and frustration that existed in Cincinnati as they relate to the Police Division and its operation. The following sections of the report will analyze the extensive materials submitted to the Ohio Advisory Committee and will offer recommendations to increase civilian participa-

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28 Excerpts from Patrick Murphy’s book, Commissioners as printed in the Chicago Tribune, Sunday, April 22, 1979. Murphy formerly was police commissioner in New York City, Detroit, Washington, D.C., and Syracuse. He now heads the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C.
29 Captain Bouza, 44th Precinct, Bronx, New York, excerpts from WNET/TV, The PoliceTapes, January 3, 1977. He is now police chief of Minneapolis, Minnesota.
tion in the development and review of police policies and practices in Cincinnati.
Chapter 1

Use of Force

Considerations of Law and Policy

What is Force?

Analyzing the use of force by police personnel against civilians involves three threshold considerations. First, what was the goal of the police officer and the perception of that goal by the civilian? Related to this first consideration are whether or not the goal was a legitimate goal of law enforcement, order maintenance, or service within the parameters of the officer's responsibilities and whether or not the goal was clearly communicated to the civilian. The Ohio Advisory Committee, for example, has received a number of complaints that Cincinnati police officers at time have advised civilians to do things for no legitimate or stated reason such as ordering a small and peaceful group of youngsters to disperse without explanation. Cincinnati residents have also stated that officers questioned as to their purposes in ordering civilians to do or refrain from doing something, frequently refuse to answer. The Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth of the Cincinnati Ministerial Coalition reported to the Ohio Advisory Committee that civilians, frequently ask police who arrest them "well, what have I done?" because they honestly do not know how their conduct has violated the law, only to receive no response or some high-handed answer such as "we'll think of something." Other civilians have alleged to the Committee, to the Mayor's Community Relations Panel, and to other community groups that police officers regularly refuse to explain their orders, inferring that they sometimes have no legitimate purpose for their orders. To civilians, this kind of police conduct reportedly constitutes abuse, harassment, and a misuse of force.

Secondly, in analyzing use of force by police, it is necessary to look at whether the civilian was resisting police orders. What was the nature of the perceived resistance? Was he or she physically or verbally refusing to obey the officer or was the civilian merely questioning the officer's conduct, asking for an explanation, or asserting his or her civil rights? It has often been pointed out that police officers may perceive such behavior as resistance, or even as a kind of assault, albeit a "symbolic As It Bashes Heads", (Chicago) Sun-Times, Oct. 8, 1979, p. 41. The former Mayor of Cincinnati, Bobbie Sterne, testified before the Ohio State Advisory Committee that there is some police brutality in Cincinnati but assessing the extent of that brutality is a very difficult problem. Transcript, p. 33.

The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has urged that a suspect's "lack of cooperation or antagonistic attitude" should not be a factor as such in a decision to arrest. Police, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (1973) (hereafter cited as Police) p. 24. The Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, Cincinnati Ministerial Coalition, reported to the Ohio Advisory Committee that civilians often do not know how or why their behavior constitutes resistance to a police officer. Transcript, p. 208–211.
assault”, requiring an aggressive response by the officer.8

         The Ohio State Advisory Committee has received a number of reports concerning civilians who have been physically restrained or threatened by officers where no actual resistance was offered. For example, the Assistant Director of the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, Virgil V. Ashley,9 reported an incident involving white officers and black civilian in which the arresting officers used “vile and abusive” language and threatened the civilians who were passively submitting to their arrests. The Reverend James W. Jones of the Cincinnati Ministerial Coalition10 stated that it is a common occurrence for police to use actual and threatened physical force and the threat of legal sanctions (usually for disorderly conduct) against civilian who questions the reasons for detaining them. The use of physical and other forms of force to overcome nonexistent or exaggerated resistance appears to civilians as abuse, harassment, and brutality.11

         Thirdly, and the issue on which the remainder of this section will focus, is the nature and extent of the force used by the police to overcome alleged civilian resistance. Was the kind of force appropriate? In addition, was the amount of force reasonable? The term “force” is often limited to the actual application of physical coercion or restraint. That is how the Ohio criminal code12 and Cincinnati Police Division define the term. To the Police Division, “force” means only the actual use of physical means (including chemical agents) “beyond what is necessary to restrain someone by handcuffing him behind his back”13 To civilians, however, “force” is probably much broader and includes a range of threatened sanctions.14

     8 The concept of the civilian “symbolic assailant” was introduced by Jerome H. Skolnick in  
     9 Ohio Advisory Committee, hearing in Cincinnati, Ohio, June 28–29, 1979, Exhibit 28 (hereafter cited as Hearing Exhibit 28). 
     10 Mayor’s Panel, pp. III–1, 6; Exhibit 28; Michael Maloney, Executive Director, Urban Appalachian Council, Transcript, pp. 130–131. 
     11 “'Force' means any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically 
     12 Civilians are aware that police officers possess the power to use physical coercion including in some circumstances fatal force to accomplish their goals. Many civilians particularly the poor and members of minority communities who as groups have the largest number of adverse police-citizens contacts, fear that power. Consequently, civilians often infer that force has been used to coerce their behavior when an officer orders him or her to do or refrain from doing an act, when the officer threatens physical or legal sanctions, when the officer draws his or her gun, as well as when the officer applies actual physical restraint or coercion against the civilian.17

         Many of the complaints received by the Ohio Advisory Committee and the Mayor's Community Relations Panel indicate that Cincinnati civilians do equate the use of authoritarian behavior control techniques by police with “force”. The Cincinnati Police Division, on the contrary, views “force” only as actual physical coercion or restrain and does not recognize symbolic or threatened force. Police personnel apparently have failed to understand that because they possess the power to use physical force including deadly weapons and chemical agents, civilians respond to police actions as “force” far earlier in the interaction then do the police themselves. For civilians, the dichotomy generally is between “persuasion” and “force.” Civilian perceptions in this regard accord with the British policy which dichotomizes “force” on the one hand and “persuasion, diplomacy and salesmanship” on the other. For the Cincinnati police, the critical distinction is between “physical force” and “all other techniques of behavior control”. Tension and alienation between civilians and police are natural by-products of such distinctions.21
A further problem created by the Cincinnati police dichotomy in regard to force involves the way civilian complaints of police misconduct are classified and handled by the Cincinnati Police Division, Internal Investigation Section (IIS). The IIS uses nine categories for classifying complaints. Only two categories are germane to the present discussion. Category 1 is titled 'discourtesy' and Category 3 is called "excessive force". These are the two principal categories into which civilian complaints of verbal or physical "force", "abuse", "brutality", or "harassment" are placed. Category 3, "excessive force", is limited to instances where actual physical force has allegedly been used against the civilian. On the other hand, Category 1, "discourtesy", is used for complaints of unwarranted verbal threats, both of physical force and legal sanctions, such as threats to arrest for disorderly conduct. Allegations that police officers have used racial epithets and harassing techniques such as unfounded automobile pull-overs or on-the-streets stops for questioning are also placed in Category 1. Lumping abusive and threatening behavior together with rudeness into this one category can obscure the extent to which police personnel may act arbitrarily in coercing compliance with legitimate police goals. It is virtually impossible to determine the effectiveness of the IIS procedures to deal fairly with civilian complaints. The IIS regularly sustains less than 10 percent of the complaints filed under either Category 1 or 3 and its files are not open to any outside agency. Thus, no outside agency including the Ohio Advisory Committee can review the step-by-step decision making process of IIS investigators. However, the Mayor's Community Relations Panel

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"excessive force" complaints were sustained, 7 percent in 1975, 8 percent in 1976, 3 percent in 1977, and 9 percent in 1978. In 1974, 11 percent of the "discourtesy" complaints were sustained 6 percent in 1975, 4 percent in 1976, 10 percent in 1977, and 11 percent in 1978. Only the City Manager, the Safety Director, the Police Chief, the Inspectional Services Bureau Commander, and the Personnel of the Internal Investigation Section has access to internal investigation files. The statement of policy for Regulation 12.145 is:

"Whenever it becomes necessary to use force (includes chemical mace) against any person in order to overcome resistance to arrest, to ward off a physical attack, or for any other reason, subject of such force will be taken to the station or office of the arresting unit accompanied by the arresting officer. An investigation shall be conducted. An official report will be submitted to the Police Chief. Procedure Manual."
The failure to recognize force to be the opposite of persuasion and to provide better limitations on the use of both physical and non-physical coercive techniques reportedly have serious consequences for police-civilian confrontations. Experts are in agreement that, for example, most violence occurs in confrontations when the self-respect of one or both is perceived as being undermined by the other. Authoritarian techniques ordinarily create resistance in the target individual because they imply a superior or over inferior status diminishing his or her self-respect. Where civilians anticipate that in a police-civilian confrontation, the police will utilize coercive and demeaning authoritarian techniques to assert their superiority, the civilian is set to respond in a self-protective, resistant manner even without immediate provocation. The potential for civilian-police violence is thereby enhanced.

Police personnel and police wives with whom the Ohio Advisory Committee discussed problems of self-respect have indicated some confusion over the need for and the consequences of authoritarian police behavior. These individuals and others have stressed that community members must respect the authority of police officers and be sympathetic to the difficult jobs they are required to perform. Of course, many civilians do offer that respect and many have positive feelings about the Division. To the extent that a demand for community respect contains a hidden message that civilians should fear the power of hidden police officers or should accord them superior status or should obey their commands without question, a request for respect may be expected to lead to destructive confrontations in which neither party is able to behave in a conciliatory manner or resolve disputes amicably.

Police officers initiate the vast majority of police-civilian interactions in which the former wishes to control the behavior of the latter. As a result, how a police officer elects to accomplish his or her goal is a choice within the officer's control from the moment the contact is initiated. It is the police officer, supposedly well-trained in human motivation and personality development who is considered to be responsible for avoiding arbitrary and authoritarian conduct which may provoke civilian resistance. It is the officer who is responsible for attempting to persuade the civilian to act or not act as he or she has been deemed necessary, who is responsible for preventing a power struggle, and who is responsible for de-escalating a potentially explosive situation. Experts agree that police need a better understanding of how broadly civilians perceive use of force by police, how the police use of coercion to accomplish their goals leads to fear, and how fear leads to confrontations over nothing more substantive than perservation of self-respect.

Use of deadly force

At common law, law enforcement officers were privileged to use deadly force to effect the arrest of a person suspected of committing a felony.
common law privilege did not extend to the arrest of suspected misdemeanants. At common law, while all felonies were punishable by death, misdemeanors were not. Thus, the peace officer privilege to use deadly force to prevent the escape of a felon but not of a misdemeanor might be historically justified. Under modern criminal law, however, not all felonies are punishable by death. In Ohio, for example, only for aggravated murder may the death penalty be imposed. All other offenses are punishable by fines and/or incarceration.

Recognizing the modern shift from death to incarceration as punishment for most felonies, a number of states have limited the peace officer privilege to use deadly force against civilians to forcible felonies which involve the use or threatened use of physical force. The Model Penal Code promulgated by the American Law Institute recommends restricting the privilege to occasions where the crime for which the arrest is being made involved the use or threatened use of deadly force or situations where delay in the arrest of the escaping felon would create “a substantial risk that the person . . . will cause death or serious bodily harm.”

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice agrees with the Model Penal Code as to the restriction of deadly force to the arrest of individuals who used or threatened deadly force during the commission of the offense or where delay in arrest would create a substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. However, where the Model Penal Code affords the privilege to a peace officer who “believes” that either of the foregoing situations exists, the President's Commission guidelines require either that the police officer have witnessed the commission of the offense involving the use or threatened use of deadly force or “have sufficient information to know, as a virtual certainty” that the suspect committed such offense. The “virtual certainty” standard in the 1976 Commission guidelines is much more demanding than the (reasonable) “belief” standard set forward by the 1962 Model Penal Code.

In 1972, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) promulgated guidelines for its agents in regard to the use of firearms, the principal weapon of deadly force. Under the 1972 FBI policy which controls current practices, agents are not permitted “to shoot any person except, when necessary, in self-defense.” By self-defense, the FBI means the right of the agent to defend himself or another from what he “reasonably perceives as an immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm”. The FBI has thus gone even further than the Model Penal Code or the Presidents' Commission in restricting the use of deadly force by officers to remotely life endangering situations.

For many years, the national trend at the State and Federal levels has been to modify the harshness of the common law by restricting the police officer's privilege to use deadly force against civilians. Ohio, on the other hand, continues to follow common law and is one of only eight states which has enacted no general statute limiting the use of deadly force by peace officers. A number of attempts have been made in the Ohio legislature to enact such a statute. All have been defeated except
for a bill now pending before the Ohio General Assembly which would allow a peace officer to use deadly force only where a civilian has committed or attempted to commit a forcible felony by means of a dangerous weapon, is currently creating a substantial risk of serious physical harm to another, and, in addition, only where deadly force is necessary to protect the life of the officer or another person. In other words, deadly force could only be used as a last resort. Opposition to this bill has come from several sources, in particular from the Fraternal Order of Police.

The Cincinnati Police Division has since 1940 provided express guidelines for the use of force including deadly force by police officers in its Division Rules and Regulations Manual and in its correlative Procedures Manual. The Manual of Rules and Regulations currently provides that the use of physical force and the discharge of weapons shall be in accord with law and Division procedures. The Division Procedure Manual specifies in Regulation 12.160 that firearms are not to be fired nor is any other kind of deadly force to be used except where necessary, i.e., after all reasonable means to prevent the escape of fleeing felons have been exhausted. Deadly force may be used to thwart the escape of such a felon only where the offense in question is aggravated murder, murder, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, or complicity in any of those offenses. Division policy is far more restrictive than the Ohio state law discussed above.

In accord with the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Division procedures permit a Cincinnati police officer to use deadly force to prevent the escape of an individual fleeing from one of the above felonies only if the officer has witnessed the offense or knows “beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect or suspects did commit the offense”. The controlling regulation does not in either of its prongs require that the officer himself have witnessed the civilian against whom the deadly force is used commit the offense. The officer is, however, held to a reasonable doubt standard, the standard of proof required in conviction of a criminal act. The standard used by the Division thus complies with the national “majority rule” standard that extends the privilege only where the target of the deadly force is a “felon in fact.”

In addition to the use of deadly force to prevent escape of individuals who have committed one of the six enumerated forcible felonies, such force may be used by a Cincinnati police officer under Procedure 12.160 to protect himself or another “from loss of life or great bodily harm”. The basis for determining that deadly force is necessary is “an apprehension of real or immediate danger based on an overt and or constructive act by another”. Procedure 12.160 clearly intends to give police officers only so much discretion as is necessary, to make a critical decision, under great stress, in a crisis situation, with potentially fatal consequences for the officer or for a civilian. However, it fails to provide the tight control which is intended. For example, under the language of Procedure 12.160, how does “real” danger differ from “immediate” danger? Could an officer shoot a civilian he believed might seriously injure himself or another at some future time? What is a “constructive act” which alone justifies fatal force? Who is the “another” whose “constructive act” is a sufficient trigger? And whose must be the “apprehension” of danger?

To many civilians, justifications for using fatal force do not matter. The use of fatal force by police against a civilian is seen as tantamount to summary execution, a death penalty imposed without the due
process of a criminal trial and without a determina-
tion of guilt.\textsuperscript{73} It is essential to ensure that the way in
which police use fatal force does not unwittingly
validate these perceptions through conduct which
by intent is proscribed but which language fails to
forbid.

Simon Leis, Hamilton County Prosecutor, who is
responsible for prosecuting police officers accused
of unlawfully killing civilians, has stated to the Ohio
Advisory Committee that the mere existence of
Division policy which differs from Ohio law “leads
to confusion”.\textsuperscript{74} According to Leis, “sometimes an
officer doesn’t know whether or not he can or
should or should not use his firearms.”\textsuperscript{75} Elmer
dunaway, President of the Federation of Police
(FOP) Cincinnati Ohio has also opposed the more
restrictive Division policy on the use of deadly
force.\textsuperscript{76} On the other hand, Police Chief Myron J.
Leistler supports the restrictive Division policy and
has stated that it has been “extremely effective” in
reducing the use of firearms by police officers.\textsuperscript{77}

Division procedural regulations require that when
shots fired by an officer actually strike a civilian, the
officer must immediately notify his or her supervisor
who in turn notifies the Unit Commander.\textsuperscript{78} The
Criminal Investigation Section is then informed and
an investigation is conducted by the Homicide
Squad.\textsuperscript{79} That squad makes a report to the Safety
Director through the Criminal Investigation Sec-
tion.\textsuperscript{80} A committee consisting of the Safety Direc-
tor, the City Solicitor, and an Assistant City Man-
ger must then review the facts and make recommenda-
tions for action to the City Manager.\textsuperscript{81} The Police
Division itself may convene a Firearms Use Com-
mittee consisting of three sworn members of the
Division to review any shooting incident, whether
the shots take effect or not, and report their findings
to the Police Chief.\textsuperscript{82}

Where shots are fired and do not strike a person,
an investigation is conducted at the local level by the
officer’s supervisor with a report to the Unit
Commander.\textsuperscript{83} The applicable regulation specifically
states that during none of these investigative proce-
dures is the officer granted immunity from subse-
quently criminal prosecution.\textsuperscript{84} During formal disciplin-
ary hearings immunity is granted and the officer is
required to answer questions narrowly related to his
performance as a police officer.\textsuperscript{85}

Since 1940, the Cincinnati Police Division regula-
tions concerning the use of deadly force have
become increasingly restrictive in keeping with the
national trend.\textsuperscript{86} Since 1969, the yearly number of
shots fired by police officers at civilians has gener-
ally been diminishing. For example, in 1969, 52 shots
were fired at 67 civilians, approximately 72 percent
of whom were black.\textsuperscript{87} In 1978, 15 shots were fired
at 13 civilians, approximately 62 percent of whom
were black.\textsuperscript{88} Between 1969 and 1978, the data show
a definite trend toward fewer shots fired at fewer
civilians with the ratio of black to white generally
decreasing from a 1969 ratio of 2.53 to 1 to a 1978
ratio of 1.60 to 1.\textsuperscript{89}

Notwithstanding the general effectiveness of Divi-
sion policy and the trend toward fewer shootings of
blacks, 1978 and early 1979 represented a period of
serious trend reversal. During that period, four black
civilians were shot and killed by white police
officers.\textsuperscript{90} During the same period, four white police
officers were shot and killed by three black civil-
ians.\textsuperscript{91} Of the civilians who shot the police officers,
one was killed by return fire, one was convicted of
aggravated murder, and one is currently in a mental
hospital having been declared unfit to stand trial.\textsuperscript{92}
None of the police officers who shot and killed the
civilians were indicted by the Grant Jury nor
otherwise criminally prosecuted.\textsuperscript{93} In one case,

\textsuperscript{73} See “Police Homicide in a Democracy,” p. 168.
\textsuperscript{74} Transcript, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 150.
\textsuperscript{76} Dunaway Interview.
\textsuperscript{77} Hearing Transcript, pp. 457-58.
\textsuperscript{78} Procedure Manual, No. 12.160(C)(1).
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Thomas A. Leubbers, Transcript, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{82} Procedure Manual, 12.160(C)(4).
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., No. 12.160(1).
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., No. 12.160(D).
\textsuperscript{85} See discussion, Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{86} Manual of Rules and Regulations, revisions dated May 1, 1940, May 28,
1958, July 1, 1966, July 1, 1970, May 16, 1971, February 3, 1974, January 1,
1976.

\textsuperscript{87} Data prepared by the Program Management Bureau, Cincinnati Police
Division, June 27, 1979 and supplied to the Ohio Advisory Committee by
Police Chief Myron J. Leistler, June 28, 1979 (hereafter cited as Manage-
ment Bureau Data), Figures 1 and 2.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Management Bureau Data, Figure 4.
\textsuperscript{90} “Incidents of Serious Injury and Death to Civilians by Police,” report
from Captain Donald L. Slaughter, Criminal Investigation Section Com-
mander to Colonel Myron J. Leistler, Police Chief, dated Feb. 23, 1979,
and supplied by Leistler to the Ohio Advisory Committee, June 28, 1979.
\textsuperscript{91} Data supplied by Police Chief Myron J. Leistler to the Ohio Advisory
\textsuperscript{92} Simon Leis, telephone interview December 21, 1979.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
disciplinary charges were placed against an officer who had shot and killed a 17 year old boy. The officer was required to work 10 days without pay. This was the first time during Leistler's tenure that a police officer was administratively disciplined for violating the Division use of force and firearms policy.

The result of these eight deaths of civilians and police was a city of angry, confused, and frightened civilians and police officers. Civilians, police officers and an ad hoc group of police wives reported to the Ohio Advisory Committee, to the Mayor's Community Relations Panel, and to other community groups that they were afraid of retaliation and needed more protection and respect from the other sector. In response, a Safety Task Force consisting of eight sworn Police Division employees and the Safety Director was established by the City Council to research the technical problems and policy considerations associated with the proposed equipment changes. The Safety Task Force "conducted long investigations into handgun and ammunition with the primary thought in mind of citizen and officer safety". The result of its investigations was a report supporting the .357 caliber handgun and the controlled expansion bullet. According to the Safety Task Force report, "the aforementioned handgun and ammunition is being utilized by Federal agencies and many modern, up-to-date urban police departments". The Task Force report went on to say:

The final and most important part of the handgun and ammunition recommendation is that prior to any police personnel being supplied with either the recommended handgun or ammunition, that he or she will have to qualify with the recommended handgun and ammunition.

The Cinnicinnati Police Division views sideways with the utmost seriousness, and considers them deadly weapons to be used only as a last resort. The Cincinnati Police Division believes that no ammunition can be justified unless the use of the firearms was justified in the first place.

In addition, the report urged that any officer who cannot qualify on the firing rang with the new weapon and ammunition should be relieved of street duty until he can so qualify with the sanction for continuing failure either suspension or dismissal.

Following the recommendation of the Safety Task Force, Chief of Police Myron J. Leistler decided to seek authorization of the .357 handgun and the .38 special, controlled expansion cartridge. Unlike the ammunition then in use in Cincinnati, the expanding bullets flatten on impact and remain in the target rather than passing through. According to Leistler, the proposed ammunition has a "high level of shocking power", and, because it will remain in the target, and shatters on striking a hard surface, it will not pass through the individual who has been shot nor ricochet off an object to strike an innocent person.

The FOP President, Elmer Dunaway, also demanded greater fire power, including a demand for shotguns, not to be kept in the trunk of the police vehicle as was the current practice but instead mounted on police vehicle dashboards. Dunaway urged that officers be authorized to carry their shotguns with them each time they left their vehicles to interact with civilians. Some police officers, and the ad hoc group of police wives, United for Police and Community Safety, also supported the on-dash mounting of shotguns. The Safety Task Force report supported this position by recommend-
ing that shotguns be specially mounted in the front seat of all marked police vehicles.110

The City Council Safety Committee studied the firearms issue and determined by a two (black) to one (white) vote that a shift to the .357 caliber weapon and controlled expansion bullets and the mounting of shotguns inside police vehicles were unnecessary and undesirable.111 The Committee majority explained that the reasons for their votes against the recommendations of the Safety Task Force were, first, none of the officers who had been killed would have been saved by the proposed equipment and, second, such a shift to more firearm power would obscure the real cause of those police deaths, i.e., “poor defensive maneuvering” which would be eliminated only by better defensive training including “survival training”.112

As tensions within the community mounted with police and civilians increasingly fearing and anticipating retaliatory violence from the other, the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission requested the conciliation services of the Community Relations Service (CRS) of the Department of Justice.113 CRS agreed to work with the city toward developing workable solutions to its police/community problems.114 One of the recommendations of CRS was for the Cincinnati City Council to provide a forum for civilians to discuss their concerns about the Police Division.115 City Council cooperated by establishing the Mayor’s Panel on Police Community Relations.116 The Mayor’s Panel heard a great deal of testimony from civilians on the firearms issue such as “the new firearms will escalate hostility and distrust and increase the problems” and “moving the shotguns is capable of arousing the most resentment”.117 However, because the panel had not been specifically asked by City Council to look at the firearms issue, the final report which offered many recommendations for improving police community relations offered no suggestions in regard to deadly force policy or procedure.118

The failure of the Mayor’s Panel to address the weapons related issues, however, was mooted by the City Council in June of 1979 when the members voted to authorize the .357 caliber weapon, leaving to Chief Leistler the determination of appropriate ammunition.119 He had indicated earlier on that he would purchase .38 controlled expansion bullets.120 The Council also decided that none of the new firearms would be issued to an officer without prior training in their use. Training began on January 3, 1980 and consists of an 8 hour community perceptions workshop and 4 hours of training in the actual use of the weapon.121 At the same time the City Council authorized a shift to a .357 caliber weapon, they expressly delayed voting on the placement of shotguns and by May of 1980 had not yet decided the issue.122

Testimony received by the Ohio Advisory Committee and by the Mayor’s Panel suggests that many Cincinnati civilians, particularly the economically disadvantaged and members of cultural or racial minorities,123 view the Cincinnati Police Division as an occupying force often acting against their personal and community interests.124 The request for more powerful weapons and ammunition apparently increased their distrust and fear of the police. Since 92.5 percent of the Cincinnati Police Division is white non-Appalachian while over 40 percent of the city itself is black and Appalachian and, in addition, many of the police officers who patrol and control Cincinnati communities live outside the city the sense of division and alienation is increased.125


Major’s Panel, p. 1-1.

City Council Proceedings, June 6, 1979. The vote in favor of the .357 caliber weapons was six to two. Councilmen Blackwell and Graham, members of the Safety Committee, cast the negative votes.

Graham interview.

Lt. Colonel Lawrence E. Whalen, Assistant Chief of Police, Inspectional Services Bureau and Captain Joseph Crawford, Internal Investigation Section, Cincinnati Police Division, interviews in Cincinnati, Ohio, Jan. 25, 1980.

Ibid.


See Mayor’s Panel, p. III-2.

Mayor’s Panel, pp. III-9–11. See discussion of the disparity between the racial composition of the Cincinnati Community and the Cincinnati Police Division and discussion of the Cincinnati residency law for public employees including police in chapters 3 and 5, respectively.
Table 1

Academic Achievement of Cincinnati Police Personnel

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Degree Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dr.'s</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bachelor's</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Years of College</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Years of College</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate's</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Years of College</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Year of College</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Than One Year of College</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>High School Graduates</td>
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<td>G.E.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Three Years and/or Less of High School</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
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Training and Education

General Considerations

It has often been stated that policing a community is personal service of the highest order requiring sterling qualities in those who perform it. Officers are compelled to make instantaneous decisions—often without clearcut guidance from a legislature, the judiciary, or from departmental policy and mistakes in judgment could cause irreparable harm to citizens, or even to the community. One incompetent officer can trigger a riot, permanently damage the reputation of a citizen, or alienate a community against a police department. It is essential, therefore, that the requirements to serve in law enforcement reflect the awesome responsibility facing the personnel that are selected.

The complexity of the police task is as great as that of any other profession. The performance of this task requires more than physical prowess and common sense. Quinn Tamm, in a "A Change for the Better" wrote:

It is nonsense to state or to assume that the enforcement of the law is so simple that it can be done best by those unencumbered by a study of the liberal arts. The man who goes into our streets in hopes of regulating, directing or controlling human behavior must be armed with more than a gun and the ability to perform mechanical movements in response to a situation. Such men as these engage in the difficult, complex and important business of human behavior. Their intellectual armament—so long restricted to the minimum—must be no less than their physical prowess and protection.

The Cincinnati Police Division provided an opportunity for police personnel to further their academic training. Even though it is not mandated, it is apparent from the data below that some have continued their education. What is not reflected in the data are the fields of study they have pursued. The figures in Table 1 represent academic achievements in the Police Division as of December 31, 1977.

Just as advanced education and above average intelligence are fundamental requisites for law enforcement personnel, so are emotional stability, common sense, and integrity. In addition, the law enforcement officer must be free of prejudices which might interfere with the proper carrying out of his responsibilities. As reported by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:

The police are frequently confronted with emotion-charged situations that tempt strong

131 Task Force Report, p. 128.
responses from them. Important to success in dealing with such situations is a stability imperious to work-related and other emotional stresses and unhindered by prejudices and undesirable attitudes in getting along with people under trying circumstances. . . .Police service affords unusual opportunities and temptations to accept graft, to indulge in other forms of dishonesty, immorality, and excesses and to wreak vengeance on persons who have offended. Successful police service is predicated on the integrity, morality, and fairness of the members of the force.132

No person, regardless of his individual qualifications, is prepared to perform police work on native ability alone. Aside from individual intelligence, prior education, judgment, and emotional fitness, an officer must receive extensive vocational training before he or she can understand the police task and learn how to fulfill it. A 1962 consultant report to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice noted that the need for such training, however, was not fully recognized until the decade prior to World War II, and concluded:

In years gone by, it was an opinion among both police and public that any man of general ability could learn to "police" by doing it. Consequently, the then prevailing "training" philosophy was one of providing the recruit with a uniform and badge; arming him with a baton, revolver, and handcuffs; assuring his geographical orientation by issuing him a local street map; and instructing him to "hit the street" and enforce the Ten Commandments. This philosophy conforms conveniently with that which proclaims "there is more justice and law in the end of a night stick than is to be found in all law books."133

Cincinnati's Mayor Kenneth Blackwell believes that the entire police force needs more training and testified that:

Our Chief of Police is a nationally renowned expert on survival training. Yet, Cincinnati's Police Division has no survival training course. We must make the capital investment required to set up a survival range and accept the operating cost for officers to spend a substantial amount of their working time on it. . . .This may be the most significant step we can take in saving the lives of police officers and it has the pay off in citizens' safety as well, for it is specifically directed at training officers to make the right level decision in the use of deadly force.134

Many organizations and individuals have raised the issue of adequate training programs to prepare Cincinnati police officers to respond to crisis situations. These concerns escalated after the shooting on March 3, 1978 of Joseph Thomas, an alleged emotionally disturbed person. In response, on May 8, 1978, former City Manager William V. Donaldson appointed a Special Police Training Study Team. The Team's general task was to review the adequacy of current training and training-related activities for preparing police officers to respond to crisis situations.135

The report's definition of training, in its clearest sense, refers to all of the activities in an organization which instruct and maintain behavior. This includes formal classroom and on-job training programs designed to impart knowledge and/or skill.136

The report concludes:

We must note that physical arrest is a serious interpersonal conflict for both the citizen and the police officer. In a number of arrests, force must be used to overcome resistance and the threat of harm to citizens and the officer. However, community reaction to police use of force by police is frequently conditioned by value judgments which fall on all sides of the conflict. When a community experiences or perceives incidents of excessive force by police during the process of apprehension or after an arrestee is in custody, there is obvious need for continued, intensive efforts to eliminate such incidents and to improve police-community communications. These kinds of efforts require organizational, management and training interventions. Structural, formal programs at the police academy, no matter how well conceived or delivered, will not suffice.137

It remains doubtful whether even the majority of training programs provide recruits with an ample understanding of the police task. Arthur Niederhofffer says:

132 Ibid., p. 128.
133 Ibid., p. 137.
134 Transcript, p. 58.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., p. 5.
The new patrolman must resolve the dilemma of choosing between the professional ideal of police work he has learned at the academy and the pragmatic precinct approach. In the academy, where professionalism is accentuated, the orientation is toward that of the social sciences as opposed to the lock-them-up philosophy, but in the precinct the patrolman is measured by his arrest record. Thus, the new man is needled when he shows signs of diffidence in arresting or asserting his authority. Over and over again, well-meaning old timers reiterate, "Ya gotta be tough kid, or you'll never last."138

Specific Training

In an interview in April 1980, Captain Thomas Amann, Regional Police Academy Director, Cincinnati Police Division, discussed the actual training that was provided police officers.139 According to Amann, both recruit training and in-service training have included courses in the proper use of force, both policy and practice. However, there have been no recruit classes since 1975 due to the budget cuts that prevented the hiring of more police officers.

The specific training courses given recruits at the Regional Police Academy on use of force include:

1. **Firearms Training** —44 hours. The student must demonstrate proficiency in the use of the official side arm; and the moral aspects, legal provisions, safety precautions and restrictions covering the use of the firearm, shotgun, and tear gas are included.

2. **Physical Conditioning** —A generalized introduction to physical conditioning; protection against persons armed with dangerous and deadly weapons; demonstration and drill in a limited number of holds and come alongs; restraint of prisoners and the mentally ill; fundamental use of the baton.

3. **Rules and Regulations** —Rules and regulations of the Police Division are stressed to the trainee so that he will act within the guidelines of Division policy, both on and off duty.

4. **Legal Procedures** —A course which embraces the mechanics of arrest, from the early history of law to the modern techniques of arrest. Special instructions are imparted in the handling and arrest of felons, misdemeanors witnessed by officers and those not witnessed by officers. Criminal law, including history, structure, and pertinent statutes; rules of evidence; City Ordinances and other regulatory measures. New procedures and latest court decisions concerning Search and Seizures, Civil Rights, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Guarantees are discussed.

5. **Patrol Tactics** —The course includes classroom discussion and practical field application of the theories of patrol. The subjects in this field range from the basic topic of maintenance of the uniform to the complexities that could occur in handling of suspicious persons. The officer is inculcated with the vast techniques of day-time-nighttime patrolling on foot and in an automobile. He is exposed to the multiplicity of problems inherent in dealing with civil complaints; the security of business places; fire scenes, disaster scenes, and unlawful gatherings. The new trainee is tutored in the responsibilities of handling crime prevention procedures and the methods of attaining this important law enforcement function.140

The last recruit class was held in 1975. However, in-service training has continued and additional programs have been integrated into the regular training curriculum including the following:

- **Officer Survival Training Program** —This program was developed to make the officer more aware of the hazards he was likely to encounter on his beat. The training included the types of activity most likely to result in serious injury to themselves and to the individuals with whom they are in contact. Training for 803 officers took place from July 1976 to March 1977.141 No training reported after 1977.

- **Model Rules Training** —The Police Foundation sponsored a project to formulate a set of model rules to guide police officers in the performance of their duties. The rules do not have the effect of rules and regulations to which officers must adhere, but serve as a source material for training in the area of criminal procedure. 871 officers attended an eight-hour one day session.

- **"Stop and Frisk" Training** —This program covered the areas of the basis for stopping people,
their actions and appearances, police conduct in these situations, use of physical force, the rights of the detained individuals, and the effect of their refusal to cooperate. "The Use and Abuse of Force" is shown that depicts situations in which officers find themselves everyday. The film also discusses the necessary use of force in accomplishing police objectives, and how the use of force can become abusive. It shows the officer how to avoid abusing the use of force. This program in 1977, was a one day, eight hour session and 871 officers attended.

The training programs that have been given both to recruits and veterans are well received by the officers that have taken them and serve the purpose for which they are intended. However, there is no clear understanding of the phrase "use of force," and little formal training is offered in alternatives to the use of force.

What is needed

It is extremely difficult for a police officer to maintain composure in all street situations even though this is routinely expected and demanded of police. For example, the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, which has been adopted by nearly all departments and police associations, requires the following:

I will*** maintain courageous calm in the face of danger, scorn, or ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be constantly mindful of the welfare of others. I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, animosities or friendships to influence my decisions***. I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence***.

But the capability of a police officer, and particularly one who works in a high crime rate or slum neighborhood, to act in a restrained manner is constantly tested. Even if the police office is of the highest quality his work and the people he has to deal with many cause him to become disillusioned or angry. If he is not of the highest quality or if he has not been properly trained, if he is prejudiced or hot headed, he may succumb to his anger or resentment and physically or verbally abuse someone who offends him.

If officers are abusive, insulting or condescending, the most insignificant contact can become an occasion which arouses hostility against the police. On the other hand, if police officers are polite, forthright, respectful, and when appropriate, friendly, a field interrogation, a traffic ticket, or even an arrest can actually increase the respect of the citizen, as well as others who see the incident, for the police.

Reverend Fred Shutesworth shared with the Ohio Advisory Committee his concern that the rights of civilians be protected against abusive police officers. He told of how he has been on the scene on more than one or two occasions where someone he knew was being stopped by the police:

I've said, 'Well, officer, is he being arrested? What's the charge?' The white officer says, 'That's none of your business,' and I say, 'How are things, is anything happening, officer? He says, 'Nothing we can't handle,' No, you can't and several times people are not allowed to ask you to get a phone number. . . .

Unjustified use of force, like verbal abuse, cannot be tolerated in law enforcement. Many persons in Cincinnati, especially blacks and poor whites, believe that police officers frequently engage in excessive or unnecessary physical force. Stan Hirtle, Attorney, National Lawyers Guild, expressed his opinion of the use of force:

Our problem which is recurring is the separation of the police from the community and the feeling among the police that they are alone, that they help each other but no one helps them—it's us against them. I think that police should be educated with other citizens in regular, probably college programs rather than be isolated in a police academy which fosters again the "us against them" mentality.

Police officers have many responsibilities and opportunities to perform, but they measure their capacity to "do the job," and are judged by their colleagues, by their success in policing people. They must learn to control their fears and anxiety, they
must learn to examine people for signs of resistance, flight, and threat. They must learn to use the powerful weapons they carry, so they will do what they are suppose to do and no more. They must learn how to establish and express authority by cajoling, requesting, negotiating to avoid using force.\textsuperscript{151}

Unfortunately, this type of training is not given any special emphasis. It is included in some human relation courses, but to actually train police officers in to force and how to use persuasion is nonexistent. There exist no guidelines, no specific range of objectives, no adequate limitations that instruct police officers in what they should do. Nor do there exist any criteria that allow external review of whether forceful intervention was necessary, desirable, or proper or whether persuasion was appropriate. The Cincinnati Police and City Administration are aware of these and other training problems and are attempting to address them.\textsuperscript{152}


\textsuperscript{152} Training Study Team Report, p. 14.
The first order of the police, legally sanctioned since the origins of policing in England, has been the preservation of the peace. James S. Campbell defines the peacekeeping role this way:

This duty is a broad most important mandate which involves the protection of lives and rights ranging from handling street corner brawls to the settlement of violent family disputes. In a word, it means maintaining public safety.\(^1\)

Perhaps the most important sources of police frustration and the most severe limitations under which they operate are the conflicting roles and demands involved in the order maintenance, community service, and crimefighting responsibilities of the police. Though the community calls mostly for community service and peace-keeping, police nevertheless consider the fundamental job, the "real guts" of policing, to be the apprehension of felons. Police are occupied with peace-keeping but preoccupied with crime fighting.

The Cincinnati Police Division and the Cincinnati community is experiencing this same frustration. As Richard A. Castellini, former Cincinnati Safety Director, stated:

The majority of the time is serviced to the community in a myriad of assignments, many of which are not directly assigned to the Police Division, but because there is no one else there the police agency is sort of the last port in the storm and where people are directed to. The social agencies generally close at 5:00 p.m. and from that point until morning—or on Friday night until Monday morning—the police officer is the one that is called upon to solve a problem.\(^2\)

In addition, the type and time of service needed varies from one neighborhood to another. This variance in service occasionally contributes to police-community tensions, as Castellini observed:

We are now faced with the situation of having to prioritize calls. Things like a dog bite, which is not a life and death matter, but if it is your child bit by the dog, it is very important to you. We are forced now many times to be 45 minutes to an hour, even an hour and a half to respond to your house.\(^3\)

The time delay factor in answering calls was not the only complaint the Ohio Advisory Committee received of police performance in servicing the community. The conduct and attitude of the responding police was also of great concern. Mr. Virgil V. Ashley, Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority cited the following incident:

I received a call from one of our resident leaders that she had reported to the police a break-in at a West End business establishment on June 20, 1979. Six cars of police officers responded quickly and proceeded to arrest the two persons involved. She stated that the two arresting officers cursed the two persons being

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2 Richard A. Castellini, former Cincinnati Safety Director, testimony before the Ohio State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, hearing in Cincinnati, Ohio, June 28, 1979, transcript (hereafter cited as Transcript) pp. 419–20.
3 Ibid., p. 429.
arrested using very vile, abusive language. She observed that the persons being arrested seemed to offer no resistance at all, but the police officers threatened to shoot them.

She also reported to me that the abusive arresting officers were white and the two persons being arrested were black. The actions of the arresting officers were witnessed by many youth in the vicinity who began to harass the police as a result of their treatment of the two persons being arrested.4

This report Mr. Ashley received from his tenant was contrary to the relationship that had previously been established with the Cincinnati Police Division and the residents and staff of the Housing Authority. “Local beat patrolmen in districts one, three, four, and five have been extremely cooperative with our staff in an effort to eliminate areas of loitering, eliminating nuisances and in general crime control,” concluded Mr. Ashley.5

Concern with maldistribution of service, and the attitude and conduct of police officers rendering the service was expressed in many of the statements submitted to the Mayor’s Community Relations Panel. The Panel’s report summarized some of these:

The perceived lack of concern on the part of official Cincinnati for disciplining police misconduct has contributed to an atmosphere of fear and distrust. The public questions whether or not the Police Division can police itself, and more seriously, whether elected officials and appointed officials are willing to control the police.

There is also a perception among some police and some citizens that neither group respects the other. In addition to racism, which many citizens feel is a part of the problem, others expressed concern about class prejudice. The Panel was told that some police officers treat the poor, both black or white, with contempt and disrespect. At the same time, the police feel isolated, unappreciated, and disrespected by parts of the community.

Citizens complain that police officers in their cars are isolated from the community and interact with the community very infrequently in other than crime related situations. To some segments of the community the police are symbols of a power structure which is perceived to be prejudiced with regard to race and class. Police are seen as outsiders in many communities.6

Complaint Processing: Internal Investigation Section

The investigative process of the Cincinnati Police Division is one of the most controversial issues that faces the community. Many who have been through the process have no faith in it and see the process as an instrument to protect the police. Others who have not filed complaints against the police often cannot understand why there is so much distrust of the system.

Perhaps the most serious allegation a citizen can bring against a policeman is brutality. Since the police are authorized to use violence against certain civilians, indiscretion in that respect is a damaging charge, one to which the police are rightly sensitive. Yet brutality—excessive use of force—is very difficult to prove; indeed, no clear definition of brutality exists. The charge has been raised when the police used racial or ethnic slurs against members of minority groups as well as in cases where police officers have beaten citizens or even shot at them.

There have been many studies, proposals, statements, as well as verbal complaints about the operations of the internal investigative activities in the Cincinnati Police Division. Robert Newman of the Legal Aid Society, shared with the Committee his thoughts on the problems with the Internal Investigation Section:

First of all, there are several hundred claims made each year to both internal affairs and Cincinnati Commission on Human Relations of various sorts of police misconduct. Virtually none of these claims are fully and finally resolved, and as a result the complaining part and the members of his community are induced to believe that the complaint process is a ruse. From all that is known internal affairs, it may function very well. However, its scope is only to provide a confidential means of allowing the police department to discipline itself. Assuming it causes appropriate disciplinary action in the rare case of serious police misconduct, it does

4 Written statement of Virgil V. Ashley, Assistant Director/General Housing Manager, presented to the Ohio Advisory Committee June 28, 1979.

5 Ibid.

not provide the victim with any assistance or recourse for his loss.\textsuperscript{7}

In his statement to the Committee, Rev. James R. Jones offered:

In my opinion, the internal disciplinary system for the police department is woefully inadequate. No one knows what happens to complaints and they are simply dismissed. In cases of violators, nothing is done leaving the public to the conclusion that whatever the policeman does is okay.\textsuperscript{8}

The police internal investigation process has been a topic of many discussions and grew into an issue of concern over a period of years. One of the problems is that there are many citizens who do not understand how it functions and many more that mistrust the process.

The disorders in the 60's brought so many complaints of police harassment, brutality, and verbal abuse from the Cincinnati community that the city fathers felt some system had to be devised to receive and address these concerns. On August 5, 1970, the Internal Investigation Section was approved by City Council. It is referred to as Police Procedure Manual Section 14.300.\textsuperscript{9} The Internal Investigation Section which handles complaints of police misconduct is a part of the Inspectional Services Bureau.

If a citizen has a complaint concerning any police action or inaction that the citizen considers to be contrary to law, improper procedure or prejudicial to the citizen or community, he or she may complain to the officer's supervisor. The supervisor will instruct the complainant to fill out a citizen complaint form, which will be forwarded to the chief's office and the Internal Investigation Section the following day. If the citizen prefers to send a complaint by mail, the officer receiving the complaint turns it over to his or her supervisor, enters it on the unit blotter, and forwards it to the chief's office and the Internal Investigation Section. If a citizen reports a complaint by telephone, the officer receiving the complaint attempts to have a supervisor accept the call who enters on a citizen complaint report all pertinent information and forwards the report to the Internal Investigation Section.

Regardless of the method of receiving a citizen's complaint, the actions of the Internal Investigation Section are supposed to follow standard procedures.\textsuperscript{10} Upon receipt of a complaint it will be assigned to an investigator, who will contact the complainant before the close of the second work day. Upon completion of the investigation, the complainant will be notified of the outcome.

It is at this point that the lines of communication break down and the mistrust of the system begins. Some citizens have reported that they never received any report of the dispositions of their complaints and felt that it was useless to even lodge a complaint against the police. Some were afraid to complain because of anticipated retaliation and increased harassment from the police.\textsuperscript{11}

Michael E. Maloney of the Urban Appalachian Council stated to the Committee:

The range of complaints that have come to our attention include: improper use of firearms which led to the death of a young Appalachian, a police killing of a young man in Northside through a beating, and other beating incidents and there has been a pattern over the years of fear within the Appalachian community to complain, either through the Human Relations Commission or through the process of filing through the district police offices. There have been complaints of harassment of those who file complaints and their witnesses.\textsuperscript{12}

A review of the complaint statistics from the Cincinnati Police Division for the years 1974 through April 1979 revealed the following (see Table 2). There were 1,634 complaints filed during the five-year period: 517 by blacks, 582 by whites, and 535 by others. Of this number, only 489 complaints were sustained. The two categories Exonerated and Unfounded are combined in the summary of internal investigation activities. What effect the separation of these two categories would have had on the disposition of the complaints is unknow. However, it does raise a question of whether this system should be re-evaluated since of the 1,634 complaints received, 545 or 33 percent were disposed of as exonerated/unfounded. These

\textsuperscript{7} Robert Newman, Legal Aid Society Attorney written statement presented to the Ohio Advisory Committee June 28, 1979.
\textsuperscript{8} Written statement presented to the Ohio Committee on June 28, 1979.
\textsuperscript{9} Letter to the Ohio Advisory Committee from Chief Myron J. Leistler of Cincinnati Police Division June 27, 1979—attached was the Police Division Procedure Manual, (hereafter cited as Procedure Manual), Section 14.300.
\textsuperscript{11} Mayor's Panel, p. III-2.
\textsuperscript{12} Transcript, pp. 130-31.
TABLE 2
Summary Disposition of Complaints 1974–1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Not Sus.</th>
<th>Sus.</th>
<th>Exon. Unf.</th>
<th>Open</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as of May)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 1/2 yr.</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1,634</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Police," National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. This Commission was appointed by Jerris Leonard, Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) on October 20, 1971, to formulate for the first time national criminal justice standards and goals for crime reduction and prevention at the State and local level. The report on police was released January 23, 1975 (hereafter cited as Standards and Goals).

Note: Standard 19.2 of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals defines the categories as follows: Not Sus.—Not sustained indicates that the investigation produced insufficient information to prove clearly or disprove the allegation. Sus.—Sustained indicates that the accused employee committed all or part of the alleged acts of misconduct. Exon. Unf.—Exonerated, Unfounded—these two categories are combined in the Cincinnati Police Division's summary of internal investigation activities. This combination of categories is confusing, to say the least, according to the definition cited in Standard 19.2—Exonerated denotes that the alleged act occurred but was justified, legal, and proper. Unfounded is used when the alleged act did not occur. 

facts, coupled with the fact that until recently there were no black police officers in the Internal Investigation Section, add to the feeling of at least some segments of the community that there is a bias which favors and protects the police. 

The lack of knowledge and real, open communication with the community and complainants of the nature and disposition of complaints is another serious problem. The nature of complaints and their disposition from December 1974 to May 3, 1979 are presented in Table 3. It is interesting to note that the number of complaints declined after 1976, from a total of 349 in that year to 253 in 1978. The total of 59 complaints from the first five months of 1979 seems to indicate a continuation of this trend. These findings suggest as Newman, Jones, and others have asserted, that substantial segments of the community may have lost faith in the internal investigation system.

Mrs. Bobbie Sterne, former Mayor of Cincinnati, expressed such a viewpoint when she testified at the fact-finding meeting of the Ohio Advisory Committee,

At present, the police, through their internal investigation unit, investigates all charges against the police. The community does not have confidence in this process because it lacks the objectivity that a separate investigative body can have.

Police Chief Leistler has a different opinion of the community's confidence in the internal investigative process. He stated at the meeting of the Ohio Advisory Committee;

I have to disagree with the Mayor that the community does not have confidence in the entire investigation section process. Of course, there is some dissatisfaction even in due process type hearings as we see in our courts of justice.

Assignment of Police Personnel

Most police activities are separated into line, staff, and auxiliary service operations. Patrol, traffic and detective line operations account for the largest part of the work of any police agency.
### TABLE 3
Disposition of Complaints 1974–1979

#### 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Complaints</th>
<th>Total Rec. (%)</th>
<th>Not Sus. (%/%)</th>
<th>Sus. (%/%)</th>
<th>Exon. Unf. (%/%)</th>
<th>Open (%/%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourtesy</td>
<td>99 (27)</td>
<td>43 (35/43)*</td>
<td>11 (10/11)</td>
<td>38 (36/38)</td>
<td>7 (40/7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unethical Conduct</td>
<td>18 (5)</td>
<td>2 (2/11)</td>
<td>10 (9/56)</td>
<td>6 (6/33)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Force</td>
<td>77 (21)</td>
<td>33 (27/43)</td>
<td>9 (8/12)</td>
<td>28 (26/36)</td>
<td>7 (36/9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shots Fired</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (2/100)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Police Procedures</td>
<td>88 (24)</td>
<td>18 (15/20)</td>
<td>56 (49/64)</td>
<td>13 (12/15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Proper Services</td>
<td>15 (4)</td>
<td>9 (7/60)</td>
<td>2 (2/13)</td>
<td>4 (4/27)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Violations by Officer</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>1 (0/25)</td>
<td>2 (2/50)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-duty Conduct</td>
<td>23 (6)</td>
<td>6 (5/26)</td>
<td>10 (9/44)</td>
<td>4 (4/17)</td>
<td>3 (17/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>35 (10)</td>
<td>10 (8/29)</td>
<td>13 (11/37)</td>
<td>12 (11/34)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>122 (34)</td>
<td>115 (32)</td>
<td>106 (29)</td>
<td>18 (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Complaints</th>
<th>Total Rec. (%)</th>
<th>Not Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Exon. Unf. (%)</th>
<th>Open (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourtesy</td>
<td>108 (30)</td>
<td>32 (37/30)</td>
<td>7 (8/6)</td>
<td>62 (40/57)</td>
<td>7 (37/6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unethical Conduct</td>
<td>52 (14)</td>
<td>5 (6/10)</td>
<td>27 (29/52)</td>
<td>17 (10/33)</td>
<td>3 (16/6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Force</td>
<td>94 (26)</td>
<td>32 (37/34)</td>
<td>7 (8/7)</td>
<td>50 (30/53)</td>
<td>5 (26/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shots Fired</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Police Procedures</td>
<td>51 (14)</td>
<td>2 (2/4)</td>
<td>38 (41/74)</td>
<td>9 (5/18)</td>
<td>2 (10/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Proper Services</td>
<td>9 (2)</td>
<td>3 (4/33)</td>
<td>1 (1/11)</td>
<td>5 (3/56)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Violations by Officer</td>
<td>22 (6)</td>
<td>5 (6/23)</td>
<td>6 (6/27)</td>
<td>10 (6/45)</td>
<td>1 (5/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-duty Conduct</td>
<td>19 (5)</td>
<td>5 (6/26)</td>
<td>5 (5/26)</td>
<td>8 (5/42)</td>
<td>1 (5/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>8 (2)</td>
<td>2 (2/25)</td>
<td>1 (1/12)</td>
<td>5 (3/62)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>86 (24)</td>
<td>92 (25)</td>
<td>168 (46)</td>
<td>19 (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Not Sus. (%/%)**: 43 (35/43)*  
**Sus. (%/%)**: 11 (10/11)  
**Exon. Unf. (%/%)**: 38 (36/38)  
**Open (%/%)**: 7 (40/7)  
**Not Sus. (%):** 32 (37/30)  
**Sus. (%):** 7 (8/6)  
**Exon. Unf. (%):** 62 (40/57)  
**Open (%):** 7 (37/6)  
**Not Sus. (%/%)**: 18 (15/20)  
**Sus. (%/%)**: 56 (49/64)  
**Exon. Unf. (%/%)**: 13 (12/15)  
**Open (%/%)**: 1  
**Not Sus. (%):** 122 (34)  
**Sus. (%):** 115 (32)  
**Exon. Unf. (%):** 106 (29)  
**Open (%):** 18 (5)  
**Not Sus. (%/%)**: 2 (2/4)  
**Sus. (%):** 38 (41/74)  
**Exon. Unf. (%/%)**: 9 (5/18)  
**Open (%/%)**: 2 (10/4)  
**Not Sus. (%):** 3 (4/33)  
**Sus. (%):** 1 (1/11)  
**Exon. Unf. (%):** 5 (3/56)  
**Open (%):** 0  
**Not Sus. (%/%)**: 5 (6/23)  
**Sus. (%/%)**: 6 (6/27)  
**Exon. Unf. (%/%)**: 10 (6/45)  
**Open (%/%)**: 1 (5/4)  
**Not Sus. (%/%)**: 5 (6/26)  
**Sus. (%/%)**: 5 (5/26)  
**Exon. Unf. (%/%)**: 8 (5/42)  
**Open (%/%)**: 1 (5/5)  
**Not Sus. (%/%)**: 2 (2/25)  
**Sus. (%/%)**: 1 (1/12)  
**Exon. Unf. (%/%)**: 5 (3/62)  
**Open (%/%)**: 0  
**Not Sus. (%):** 168 (46)  
**Sus. (%):** 19 (5)  

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25
### TABLE 3 (CONT’D)

#### 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Complaints</th>
<th>Total Rec. (%)</th>
<th>Not Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Exon. Unf. (%)</th>
<th>Open (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourtesy</td>
<td>91 (26)</td>
<td>52 (40/57)</td>
<td>4 (4/4)</td>
<td>33 (30/36)</td>
<td>2 (10/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unethical Conduct</td>
<td>43 (12)</td>
<td>11 (8/26)</td>
<td>20 (21/46)</td>
<td>12 (11/28)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Force</td>
<td>85 (24)</td>
<td>38 (29/45)</td>
<td>7 (8/8)</td>
<td>31 (28/36)</td>
<td>9 (47/11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shots Fired</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>3 (2/75)</td>
<td>1 (1/25)</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Police Procedures</td>
<td>58 (17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law Violations by Officer</td>
<td>27 (8)</td>
<td>9 (7/33)</td>
<td>7 (8/26)</td>
<td>9 (8/33)</td>
<td>2 (10/7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-duty Conduct</td>
<td>27 (8)</td>
<td>9 (7/33)</td>
<td>8 (9/30)</td>
<td>7 (6/26)</td>
<td>3 (16/11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>9 (3)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4 (4/44)</td>
<td>2 (10/22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>129 (37)</td>
<td>92 (26)</td>
<td>109 (31)</td>
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#### 1977

<table>
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<th>Nature of Complaints</th>
<th>Total Rec. (%)</th>
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<th>Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Exon. Unf. (%)</th>
<th>Open (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Discourtesy</td>
<td>48 (19)</td>
<td>20 (25/42)</td>
<td>5 (7/10)</td>
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<td>1 (8/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>22 (9)</td>
<td>1 (1/5)</td>
<td>17 (23/77)</td>
<td>3 (4/14)</td>
<td>1 (8/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Force</td>
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<td>2 (3/3)</td>
<td>25 (32/36)</td>
<td>3 (23/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shots Fired</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2/50)</td>
<td>1 (1/50)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Police Procedures</td>
<td>55 (22)</td>
<td>6 (7/11)</td>
<td>35 (47/64)</td>
<td>7 (9/13)</td>
<td>7 (54/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Proper Services</td>
<td>12 (5)</td>
<td>1 (1/6)</td>
<td>4 (33/5)</td>
<td>7 (9/41)</td>
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<td>1 (8/12)</td>
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<td>15 (6)</td>
<td>5 (6/33)</td>
<td>6 (8/40)</td>
<td>4 (5/27)</td>
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<td>9 (11/56)</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>81 (33)</td>
<td>74 (30)</td>
<td>79 (32)</td>
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TABLE 3 (CONT’D)

1978

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<th>Total</th>
<th>Not</th>
<th>Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Exon.</th>
<th>Unf. (%)</th>
<th>Open (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Discourtesy</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>44/46</td>
<td>6 (6/11)</td>
<td>22 (30/39)</td>
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<td>33 (13)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3/6</td>
<td>17 (17/51)</td>
<td>9 (12/27)</td>
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<td>Excessive Force</td>
<td>46 (18)</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>18 (25/31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shots Fired</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (4/100)</td>
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<td>77 (30)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>62 (63/81)</td>
<td>7 (9/9)</td>
<td>6 (26/80)</td>
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<td>Lack of Proper Services</td>
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<td>2 (2/33)</td>
<td>4 (5/67)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Violations by Officer</td>
<td>15 (6)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8/33</td>
<td>2 (2/13)</td>
<td>7 (10/47)</td>
<td>1 (4/7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Off-duty Conduct</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>7/36</td>
<td>2 (2/18)</td>
<td>3 (4/27)</td>
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<td>2 (9/25)</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>98 (39)</td>
<td>73 (29)</td>
<td>23 (9)</td>
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1979 (as of May)

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<th>Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Sus. (%)</th>
<th>Exon.</th>
<th>Unf. (%)</th>
<th>Open (%)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Discourtesy</td>
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<td>33/20</td>
<td>1 (6/7)</td>
<td>5 (50/33)</td>
<td>6 (27/40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unethical Conduct</td>
<td>3 (5)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (11/67)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (4/33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Force</td>
<td>6 (10)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22/33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (18/67)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shots Fired</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (4/0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Police Procedures</td>
<td>21 (36)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33/14</td>
<td>12 (67/57)</td>
<td>2 (20/10)</td>
<td>4 (18/19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Proper Services</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (9/11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Violations by Officer</td>
<td>7 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (11/29)</td>
<td>3 (30/43)</td>
<td>2 (9/29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-duty Conduct</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>11/50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (4/50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>1 (6/50)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (4/50)</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>(15)</td>
<td>18 (30)</td>
<td>10 (17)</td>
<td>22 (37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Total Disposition/Total Category)
Chief Leistler reported to the staff that the Cincinnati Police Division's criteria for police assignment is based on work load and service demand, and that race or ethnic background is not relevant to such assignments unless the assignment required a particular race in an undercover capacity.\textsuperscript{17}

Officer Wendell Young stated to the Advisory Committee:

Black officers in Cincinnati work everywhere but our biggest concentration is in the black community. But there are less than seven percent of the total police force black. I think if there were more black officers we might find them assigned more frequently also to white areas. But the important areas of policing aren’t in the streets. They are in the program management bureau; they’re in the Chief’s Office; they’re in the Personnel Section, the training areas; they are those areas in the Police Department where policy is made, where budget is figured out, where manpower allocations are made and so forth. And in those areas, blacks are absent, and that becomes the crucial problem.\textsuperscript{18}

The present Mayor Kenneth Blackwell stated:

Historically and presently the Internal Investigation Unit has been all white. One of the reasons that it has been all white is that the police division has decided those who serve on that unit should be of supervisory positions, meaning sergeants on up; as a consequence, we only have three black supervisors and they find themselves in a catch 22, people say, or it has been said, well, we can’t take these folk out of direct supervisor or we will be criticized.

Blackwell concluded:

What I asked the chief and I will continue to ask the Police Division, is why that unit must be made up of all supervisors? One cannot tell me that if sergeants can investigate a police chief, a specialist or patrol officer can’t investigate a sergeant or a captain or lieutenant, because the base line question is whether or not the skills of investigation that are needed to do a job are the property of a specialist and a patrolman, and the answer to that question by the chief is yes, that there aren’t any skills in that position that a patrolman or a specialist don’t have.\textsuperscript{19}

The perception of the part of some segments of the Cincinnati community that police services are not equally distributed has contributed to police-community tensions. And part of that perception is fueled by the fact that there are so few minorities and women among the sworn personnel, particularly at the policy making levels, thus, it is argued, leading to an insensitivity to the concerns of these particular groups.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Police Community Relations}

According to an excerpt in the book \textit{Issues in Police Administration}:

With social tensions mounting throughout the nation police agencies cannot preserve the public peace without the public participating in a positive way more fully than it now does. Poor community feelings does more than create social distance, it produces irrational responses to rational problems.\textsuperscript{21}

A community relations program is not a public-relations program to “sell the police image” to the community. It is not a panacea which will tranquilize an angry neighborhood by suddenly promoting a few black or women officers in wake of a racial disturbance. It is a long-range, full-scale effort to acquaint the police and the community with each other’s problems and to stimulate action aimed at solving those problems.

Community relations should not be the exclusive business of specialized units but rather the business of the entire department from the chief to the patrol-person. Community relations are not a matter of special programs but should encompass all aspects of police work from the selection, training, assignments, promotion of personnel field procedures, staff policy making and planning, departmental discipline, to the handling of citizens’ complaints.\textsuperscript{22} A community’s attitude toward the police is influenced by the actions of individual officers on the street and in public places.

\textsuperscript{17} Administration of Justice: City Police Department Survey, Cincinnati Police Division, Jan. 13, 1979.
\textsuperscript{18} Transcript p. 554-55.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., pp. 80-82. Recently one black officer was appointed.
\textsuperscript{20} Mayor’s Panel, p. III-1, 8, 14-15.
\textsuperscript{22} The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, a Report by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, (February, 1967), p. 100.
An incident that happened in Cincinnati’s City Council Chambers on May 9, 1979 demonstrates how some police officers are often discourteous and hostile when dealing with members of the black community. Mrs. Marion Spencer described the incident in her statement to the Ohio Advisory Committee:

J.C. Johnson, President of the local branch of the NAACP, was offended by a sign, which had been posted to the right rear of the mayor’s chair, which said, “Eliminate prison overcrowding, electrocute the killer bastards.” He walked to the Mayor’s podium and tore the sign down. As Mr. Johnson attempted to return to his seat, his move was blocked. In full view of hundreds of witnesses, news and T.V. cameras he was snatched by the tie by a police officer and pushed from behind, almost being brought to the floor.

The need for elimination of racially prejudicial attitudes at all levels of the police division was expressed by John H. Burlew, attorney:

For a long period of time, there was a picture of Les Gaines in one of the police stations with an Amos and Andy caricature, and a cigar in his mouth, with a big quote saying, “This looks like one of the cases for the kingfish.” I’ve never heard a police captain do anything about it. The division tolerates this action and it goes on and on and on, and unless they do something affirmative they are part of the problem, as far as I’m concerned.

Officer Fred Stonestreet offered the following examples of insensitivity on the part of a policeman on the street.

When Stonestreet came to the police force in 1966, he was assigned a “Patrolman coach” whose job it was to teach the new officer the ropes. His coach was a 23 year old white officer from Mt. Washington.

One of their first calls came from a 70 year old black woman in the west end whose grandson’s bike had been stolen. While questioning the woman, the white officer kept calling her by her first name Mary. Stonestreet was disturbed, “why couldn’t he address her as Mrs. The way police officers talked to people bothered me when I was young and its still a problem.”

On May 18, 1979, the Mayor of Cincinnati, Bobbie Sterne, created the Mayors’ Community Relations Panel. The Panel was charged with holding public hearings to solicit comments and opinions from organizations, community groups and individual citizens about police/community tensions. The Panel was appointed following a series of incidents that was creating a crisis situation in Cincinnati. The tensions built up from the killing of police officers and civilians, actions of the organization of police wives, and the one day strike by Cincinnati’s Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). This pent up frustration spilled over at a meeting of the City Council on May 9, 1979, when hundreds of police officers, police wives, and inner city residents filled the Council Chambers and overflowed into hallways and stairs outside. All three groups made speeches on the increasing incidents of police community violence and what Council should do about it. When it was over, members of Cincinnati City Council reacted generally with a cautious optimism that police anger can be diffused by enacting new safety measures and community reactions can be addressed by a deeper examination of police community tensions.

There are some police community relations programs going on in the city involving the participation of community groups, including the following:

Police/Youth Live-Ins —A summer three-day Live-In allows police officers and teenagers to know each other on a one-to-one basis to improve relations and understanding between the groups.

Police/Clergy Crisis Team — Over 30 concerned clergy are trained to serve on call with the Cincinnati police to go with them to assist in counseling emotionally distressed families for disputes, death notices, and lost children.

These two programs are sponsored by the National Conference of Christians and Jews and the Counsel of Christian Communions.

Victims of Crime—Witness Program — Funded through a grant from LEAA to Talbert House. This three year old program assists elderly victims of assault, homicides, robberies, and rape. Aids

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23 Transcript pp. 88-89.
24 Ibid., p. 249.
26 Letter from former Mayor Bobbie Sterne to appointees to the Mayors’ Community Relations Panel.
call individuals off the offense sheet and offer to help or refer them to others.\textsuperscript{29}

Recently, City Council finally came to grips with the serious lack of an organized police community relations program and proceeded to take steps to improve this situation. On November 4, 1979, the Community Assistance Section became operational. This Section is headed by Lieutenant Thomas Burke and is located on the second floor of 310 Ezzard Charles Drive. Its functions will include the development of positive crime prevention programs; developing defined policies and procedures as related to Police Community relations; actively engaging in various projects and programs with civic groups, schools, etc., in developing and presenting programs; coordinating like programs in the Districts; assisting in arranging tours, speakers, etc.; developing programs for police recruits and in-service training; and providing liaison with community groups and other human relations organizations.\textsuperscript{30}

It remains to be seen if a separate section of the Police Division can resolve existing problems or whether it will ultimately be necessary to make this concern an integral part of each facet of the police division, from top to bottom.

\textsuperscript{29} Marilyn Logan, Project Director, interview in Cincinnati, Ohio, June 7, 1979.

\textsuperscript{30} Human Relations Newsletter, vol. 12, no. 3 (Cincinnati Human Relations Commission, December 1979), p. 2.
Chapter 3

Employment

Hiring

Members of the Cincinnati Police Division are classified civil service employees and are under the jurisdiction of the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission. The Commission derives its authority from Article V of the Charter of the city of Cincinnati, and administers the laws of the State of Ohio as set forth in the Ohio Revised Code, §124.40 (Page 1978).

The Civil Service Commission establishes qualifications for hiring applicants and announces, prepares, conducts, and grades examinations. Examination scores are ranked and candidates are selected on the basis of rank order. This rigid adherence to rank order stems from State civil service law. In his study of Cincinnati's Personnel Department, Dr. James L. Outtz, Professor at Howard University, stated, "Examinations are not validated prior to or in conjunction with their use. In most instances, no data exist which would indicate the validity of a given examination, or the manner in which examination scores should be used."

Selection of new employees as well as promotion of current employees are to be based upon merit and fitness. In order to select individuals who are best suited for a given position, there must be a clear understanding of: 1) what is done on the job; 2) the appropriate method of doing the job; and, 3) a performance appraisal system. It is useless to attempt to select employees who can perform a job well without a job description that identifies the important components of the job so that the needed knowledge, skills and ability can be ascertained.

The major problem is to develop a test which actually measures the knowledge, skills and abilities that have been identified. This test should be standardized before it is put into use. In Cincinnati, however, tests are simply constructed and then used. Written examinations as they are developed and used by the city of Cincinnati ensure the selection of test-wise, verbally fluent persons. At the same time, since few if any objective performance standards exist, these people are practically assured of being viewed as successful in their jobs.

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The 1972 amendments broadened the scope of Title VII to include Federal, State, and local governments, in addition to the private sector. In Title VII, Congress authorized the use of professionally developed tests in employment selection as long as use of the test does not discriminate against minorities, women, and other protected classes.

In 1966, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) adopted a set of guidelines designed to help employers understand the requirements of the law. EEOC revised its guidelines several times, and in August 1978, uniform guidelines were adopted by EEOC, Civil Service Com-

2 Ibid., p. 3.
3 Ibid., p. 8
4 Ibid., p. 10.
mission, Department of Labor, and Department of Justice.\(^8\) Basically, the guidelines embrace the principle of test validation. This principle dictates that use of a test which adversely affects (i.e., results in the disproportionate rejection of) members of protected classes must be justified on the basis of business necessity. Basically this means that there must be a clear relationship between test scores and job performance and that no suitable alternative with a lesser discriminatory impact is available.\(^8\)

The strict Ohio civil service code, which requires that persons be hired on the basis of their performance on an examination, may have a restrictive influence on equal opportunity programs. At the same time, however, it has been used as an excuse for the poor affirmative action record in the Cincinnati Police Division.\(^9\) Recognizing this problem, State Senator William F. Bowen, (D-Cincinnati,) attached a rider to the massive 1979 State appropriation bill which allows a charter city to remove itself from State civil service provisions to comply with Federal equal opportunity laws.\(^10\)

The total sworn personnel of the Cincinnati Police Division, as of January 25, 1980, was 939, of which one was Oriental and 69 (7 percent) were black (67 males, 2 females).\(^11\) The Cincinnati Civil Service Recruit List,\(^12\) dated February 7, 1980, showed the following:

The Police Division had a total of 1,223 applicants apply for the position of police recruit. Of these, 824 took the written exam.

After medical, physical and physical agility testing, background investigations, polygraph examinations, psychological examinations and personal interviews, 112 applicants remain in the process:

- 59 male whites, 13 female whites, 64.3% white
- 26 male blacks, 14 female blacks, 35.7% black
- 75.9% male, 24.1% female

When these 112 new recruits are added to the existing force of 939, the total police personnel will be 1,051. This total would include an increase of blacks from 69 to 109 or 7.4 percent to 10.4 percent. Though this represents genuine progress, if black representation in the police force were to increase by three percent each year, it would take ten years for the black representation in the police force to match that of the total population, assuming blacks remain at 33 percent of the population of Cincinnati.

### Training

Most of the police officers interviewed, who testified at the fact-finding meeting of the Ohio Advisory Committee, felt that the training they received was adequate to good.\(^14\)

Each recruit officer receives 880 hours of basic training after appointment. In-service training thereafter varies from year to year, dependent upon identified needs. Total in-service training hours for Cincinnati Police Division personnel in 1978 was 26,740. (Approximately) 1600 hours were didactic classroom instruction, the balance were devoted to field training. The officers average 28 in-service training hours per person, per year.\(^15\)

The training calendar for 1978 had a variety of programs, seminars, and conferences as shown in Table 4. Members of the Police Division are receiving an 8-hour course entitled Community Perspective Workshop and a 4-hour course “Shooting Decision Workshop.” As of February 1, 1980, over 800 officers have attended the 8-hour workshop.

The 4-hour course will begin when the repair of the new weapons and the weather permit.\(^16\) The outline for the 8-hour community perspective workshop, as presented in the Status of Safety Task Force Recommendations, is as follows:

#### Civil Rights

A two-hour class identifying the inalienable civil rights of citizens. A discussion of abuses of civil rights, including Philadelphia and Detroit cases. How to avoid charges of abuse and the consequences of abuse.

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\(^8\) 29 C.F.R. §§1607.1-1607.16 (1979).
\(^10\) Outtz Report, p. 2.
\(^12\) Richard Castellini, former Safety Director, letter with documents to Valeska S. Hinton, Equal Opportunity Specialist, MWRO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 6, 1980.
\(^14\) Lt. Ted Schock, Cincinnati Police Division, testimony before the Ohio Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, hearing in Cincinnati, Ohio, June 28-29, 1979 (hereafter cited as Transcript), p. 513.
\(^15\) Administration of Justice: City Police Department Survey, Cincinnati Police Division, Cincinnati, Ohio, Jan. 13, 1979.
\(^16\) “Status of Safety Task Force Recommendations” sent to Valeska Hinton by Richard Castellini, former Safety Director, Feb. 6, 1979.
## TABLE 4
Training Calendar 1978

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<td>Sign Language</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breathalyzer Retraining</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police/Clergy Orientation</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td><strong>Special Training &amp; Conferences</strong></td>
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<td>Crime Prevention Seminar</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liquor Law Conference</td>
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<td>Honda Motorcycle Training</td>
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<td>Crime Prevention Theory &amp; Practice</td>
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<td>Ringmaster Training for School Resource Officers</td>
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<td>Robbery Task Force</td>
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<td>Core Group Training for Police Training Officers</td>
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<td>Management Training</td>
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<td>Management Training</td>
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<td>First Aid Training 2-day Program</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>171</td>
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Source: Cincinnati Police Division.

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**Community Makeup, Demography**

This one-hour class identifies ethnic community makeup, neighborhood population and education, the unemployment and welfare rate, along with the poverty level and educational level in the community.

**Prejudice**

A one-hour class identifying the origins of prejudices, how they are fostered and passed on from generation to generation. How to identify your personal prejudices, and how to cope with and control them.

**Community Makeup, The Cultures**

This two-hour class explores some aspects of the Black and Appalachia cultures, and a brief synopsis of the direction of homosexual activity in Cincinnati. The class is designed to identify behavioral and communicative responses resulting in negative community contacts.

**The Handling and Mishandling of Confrontations**

A Two-hour class on conflict-reducing skills designed to improve communication techniques.

1. Handling Verbal Abuse
3. Use of Language as a Weapon
4. The Psychology of Using Psychology
Police Division personnel and making on-site visits on the West Coast to develop ideas for a stress management program. This program is to be operational by August 1, 1980. Survival training is scheduled to begin with the completion of the outdoor target range and each officer is expected to attend four 8-hour days each year. All new recruits will receive 30 hours of self defense training and 30 hours of physical education training. In-service classes for both of these programs for officers are being developed. The stress awareness program to make police officers more conscious of stress will be provided to all members of the division. A three-day program on investigative skills will begin as soon as Federal funds are awarded in late 1980 or early 1981. Training will begin in 1980 for sergeants and lieutenants in first line supervision. The program is designed to establish accountability and quality supervision at the field level. It will attempt to reinforce the field level supervisor's confidence in the administration, yet remind him of his responsibility and accountability for the actions of his men. This training was recommended by the Police Safety Task Force and is being implemented as funds are available.

The Mayor's Community Relations Panel recommended that the Police Academy training staff should include minorities and women. The full-time training staff currently consists of nine persons including two female clericals. There are no blacks on the full-time staff. The part-time staff is made up of other members of the police agency, other police agencies, and community resource people. According to the listed instructors in approved training, the only minorities to be involved in the training staff are in the two-hour class on "Community Makeup, The Cultures."

The Panel report also concluded:

While outside resources can be used to assist in training, responsibility is in the hierarchy of the Police Division and requires the active and visible support of the Chief and Assistant Chiefs. Training should not be one of the first items to be cut when there are budget reductions. To be successful, training must be reinforced. Training is linked to supervision and is reemphasized by supervisors who direct and motivate. What is taught should be what is expected and used in the field. Preferably, training is voluntary. Reluctant learners do not learn well. Police training in dealing with various people and the community should have the same importance and priority as training in how to fill out a particular form or how to write a shots fired report. Much of the training in community relations must come from the officer who is already on the street. Human relations training is an area which the Police Division should reemphasize, not only occasionally but on a constant basis.

**Promotion**

The promotion policy of police officers is based upon the rules and regulations of the Ohio Civil Service Law (Ohio Rev. Code Ann., §124.44, (page 1979)), and defined in the Charter of the city of Cincinnati, Article V, Section 5. Section 5 states:

The members of the police force engaged in police service, shall consist of the following ranks: Chief, Assistant Chief, Major, Captain, Lieutenant, Sergeant, Patrolman, Police Recruit. Within the ranks below that of assistant chief, the council shall establish such special positions having special duties with preferential pay as the council deems necessary; but the existence of such special positions shall not establish eligibility for promotion to the next higher rank. No special position established by council within the ranks below that of assistant chief shall be filled without promotional examination.

When an examination is held for any rank above patrolman, all incumbents of the next lower rank shall be eligible who meet the seniority and efficiency standards established by the civil service commission; provided, however, that the rank of major shall not be considered a rank for the purpose of eligibility in promotional examinations.

If no more than one incumbent of the next lower rank meets such requirements, the civil service commission shall be empowered to open the examination to incumbents of the second lower rank.

The rank of major may be used as a title by the present incumbents now holding said title until they are separated from the service, at which time said rank shall cease to exist.

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17 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
This rigid rule has hampered the Police Division in complying with Federal rules for equal employment opportunity and upward mobility. William Sheehan, Civil Service Commissioner, explained the process whereby promotional exams are developed and given:

Written promotional examinations are ranked and rated according to task. This is done by incumbents and supervisors. Using computer analysis for task ratings and rankings, knowledge, abilities and skills and personal characteristics are written up and then rated and ranked by subject matter experts. After the computer analysis, test questions are developed by Civil Service examiners. Only one person does this because of the emphasis on security.

William Clark, Secretary of the Civil Service Commission concluded:

Because of allegations of stolen tests, circulated among officers, but not shared with minority officers, the Police Division’s testing process has been changed for security reasons. The actual examination booklet is only prepared literally hours before the test is actually given.

Regardless of the reasons, the number of promotions of minority police officers is dismally low. According to the City Personnel Office, on December 31, 1978, there were 36 white lieutenants, one black; 128 white sergeants, two black; 168 white specialist, five black; 576 white patrolmen, and 62 black. Except for the single black lieutenant, there are no minority police officers above the rank of sergeant.

The Safety Task Force recommended to the City Manager the following procedures for promotional examinations: Limit promotional lists to one year. Provide copies of previous examinations and more specific study references to all officers. Grade, post, and provide answer sheets to all examinations within 48-hours.

The Mayor’s Panel also recommended: 1) the police department should promote black and women police officers through provisional appointments, 2) city council should appoint a committee to study police hiring and promotion practices, and 3) city personnel department should conduct open pre-examination classes for all taking promotional examinations.

Arthur Crum, a 29-year veteran black police officer, summed up the feelings of frustration over promotions:

As a young officer, I had the aspiration to serve in some specialized units, like Homicide Squad, Robbery Squad, and Control Bureau, but these jobs were limited to only white officers. As the years went by, they did bring blacks into these jobs. However, it was always only two or even one. And you had to be a special kind of black person in order to get into these type of jobs. It was the kind of Uncle Tom syndrome that I think the Police Department required of you in order for you to reach this level. If you weren’t the type of black person that they enjoyed or liked, then there was no chance for you ever to move up into these ranks.

Crum concluded:

It is very stressful for black police officers to watch some of our finest talent leave the Cincinnati Police Department because a lot of them couldn’t move up in the ranks. We are seeing a period now (April, May 1979) where we have lost in the neighborhood of four to five black officers.

A report from the former Safety Director, Richard Castellini, showed that of 36 resignations in 1979, seven were black males (19.4 percent). Some of these have taken jobs as security guards in private industry. Castellini stated to the Committee:

One of our major problems is we are losing good young black police officers like we’re losing good female officers. We lose them because they are good. There is a job out there in industry where the rewards are greater. We just lost a couple of black police officers, very sharp young people, they are going out to Ford and General Electric and they start at $3,000 to $4,000 more than our highest paid patrolman.

Castellini concluded:

They are really jumping past the Specialist and Sergeant rank as they start with these firms. The industry is looking for minorities and women and we are supplying some of those. To
some degree, it's gratifying that people think enough of our people, but it's difficult for us to keep people under these circumstances.\textsuperscript{28}

The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) has not addressed the hiring and promotion policy. FOP President Elmer Dunaway stated that the FOP has not looked at civil service testing problems because it has been too busy protecting the job rights and benefits it has already secured for its members.\textsuperscript{29}

There has been considerable controversy about the leadership of the FOP. According to Wendell Young, President of the Sentinels, "The Sentinels, a black police officers organization, has a very strong gripe with the present FOP leadership in this city, and we feel that this kind of leadership has probably taken this city back 10 years in its police-community relations effort."\textsuperscript{30}

Police Chief Myron J. Leistler offered this observation to the Ohio Advisory Committee, "My personal thoughts are that there has never been anything more destructive to police professionalism in the city of Cincinnati than the blatant unionism exhibited by the FOP, personified by Elmer Dunaway, and I cannot subscribe, nor will I support, such activities as he advocates."\textsuperscript{31} The specific activity to which Leistler referred was the "Stress Day" walkout of the police officers on May 8, 1979, which was a reaction to the shooting death of a police officer. The union had been involved in a slowdown in writing traffic and parking tickets from January to May 1979 in protest of the breakdown in contract negotiations. Six veteran police supervisors resigned from the FOP because of the Stress Day strike.\textsuperscript{32}

Members of the black community believe that the FOP was taking over the Police Division and running a police State.\textsuperscript{33} This view was shared by some members of the Cincinnati police supervisors association when they issued a statement highly critical of the way the FOP's leadership handled the walkout. One supervisor, who did not resign said: "Somehow or other there has to be a change [in the FOP], either from within or without. "An officer can't effect that change," he said, "by resigning from the organization."\textsuperscript{34}

There are recent signs of a breakthrough of the restrictions placed on hiring of minorities for the Police Division. Senator Bowen's amendment permitting state civil service laws to be waived for purposes of achieving equal employment opportunity discussed above, and the increased number of black recruits that have passed the entrance exams are steps in the right direction. If the recommendation of the Mayor's Panel, that the city council appoint a committee to study all components of the police hiring and promotional process, including the civil service system, for adverse impact upon hiring, retention, and promotion of minority and female police officers,\textsuperscript{35} is put into place, and such adverse impact eliminated, then the Police Division will move closer to the goal of hiring and promoting officers solely on the basis of merit and fitness.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{28} Transcript, pp. 434, 435.
\bibitem{29} Elmer Dunaway, FOP President, interview in Cincinnati, Ohio, April 6, 1979.
\bibitem{30} Transcript p. 567.
\bibitem{31} Ibid., p. 481.
\bibitem{32} The Cincinnati Post, May 10, 1979, p. 2.
\bibitem{33} Transcript, p. 212.
\bibitem{34} The Cincinnati Post, May 19, 1979.
\bibitem{35} Mayor's Panel, p. 1VC-1, No. 4.
\end{thebibliography}
Chapter 4

External Oversight

Several government agencies at the local, State, and Federal levels have varying degrees of oversight authority pertaining to the Cincinnati Police Division. This chapter briefly reviews the specific jurisdiction and enforcement activity of these agencies as they relate to civil rights considerations in the areas of use of force, distribution of services, and employment. In addition to summarizing what the law requires as established by legislation, litigation, and regulation, the following pages review the complaints which have been filed with these agencies and their on-going monitoring efforts.

City and County Involvement

Office of the Cincinnati City Solicitor

The City Solicitor is the chief law officer for the City of Cincinnati. Within the Office of the City Solicitor, the municipal prosecutor is responsible for prosecuting violations of all Cincinnati ordinances and, in addition, of Ohio State criminal laws where the alleged offense is a misdemeanor occurring within Cincinnati. In addition, the municipal prosecutor represents the State of Ohio at local preliminary hearings of individuals alleged to have committed felonies.

Under Ohio law, assault is a misdemeanor. Therefore, if a police officer “assaults” a civilian, the officer is subject to criminal prosecution. Assault is defined as knowingly causing or attempting to cause physical harm to another or recklessly causing serious physical harm to another. Negligent assault, also a misdemeanor, is assault with a deadly weapon such as a gun.

While the misuse of physical force by a police officer against a civilian could constitute an assault or a negligent assault, misdemeanors under Ohio law, Cincinnati has never instituted criminal proceedings against police officers for engaging in such conduct while on duty. In addition, no local prosecutions have been brought against police officers in the deaths of civilians because in each such case either a determination was made that the officer acted in accord with State law concerning a peace officer’s allowable use of deadly force or else the County Prosecutor’s Office handled the case as a felony.

Since 1974, there have been a number of private civil suits filed against Cincinnati police officers for alleged excessive use of force against civilians. These suits have been filed in the Federal District

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3 Thomas A. Leubbers, Transcript, p. 140.
5 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2903.14 (Page 1975). Under Ohio Law, a dangerous weapon is “any instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2923.11 (A) (Page 1975).
6 Thomas A. Leubbers, interview in Cincinnati, Ohio, Jan. 25, 1980 (hereafter cited as Leubbers Interview). Misdemeanors committed within Cincinnati proper are prosecuted by the City Solicitor’s office.
7 Leubbers Interview. See discussion of Ohio peace officers’ privilege to use force including deadly force, Chapter 1.
8 Thomas A. Leubbers, memorandum to Techumseh X. Graham, Cincinnati City Council, Aug. 9, 1979 (hereafter cited as Leubbers memorandum).
Court and have alleged a violation of the aggrieved civilian's federally protected constitutional rights. In such civil rights suits, the City Solicitor's office routinely defends the defendant police officers where the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred within the scope of their employment responsibilities, was not willful, wanton, or malicious, and was undertaken in good faith. The City Solicitor's office has defended all but two of the defendant police officers who were sued civilly for excessive use of force.

Since 1974, 15 cases against the city or individual police officers have been filed alleging excessive use of force. Six are pending at this time. Nine additional cases have been closed. The total amount paid to the plaintiffs by the city in these cases is $475. Three of the nine cases were tried to a jury which in each case found for the city and against the civilian plaintiff.

A police officer's use of force may also violate Division rules and procedures. Where a police officer is terminated, suspended, or reduced in pay for violating Police Division policy, including use of force policy, and appeals to the Civil Service Commission, the City Solicitor routinely represents the Police Division against the police officer. Civil Service generally has sustained the few appeals which have been taken from disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Police Chief.

The role of the City Solicitor's office in regard to the Police Division is indeed complex. For example, a police officer who misuses physical force against a civilian may be in violation of Division rules and procedures and of Ohio State law. If the Police Chief terminates, suspends, or reduces the pay of the officer as discipline and the officer appeals, the City Solicitor represents the Division against the officer. In addition, based on the same conduct, the City Solicitor could institute a criminal prosecution against the officer for the violation of Ohio law. But if the officer were to be sued civilly for damages by the victim of his abuse, the City Solicitor could be required to defend the officer in his capacity as the city's chief law officer.

This potential conflict has been at least partially resolved by the policy of requiring police officers who are defendants in civil suits to retain private attorneys where the City Solicitor has appeared against them on behalf of the city administration in prior legal proceedings. In such cases, however, the city would pay the attorney's fees where the City Solicitor had determined the conduct to be in the scope of employment, undertaken in good faith, and was not willful, wanton, or malicious. In almost all cases, however, the City Solicitor has defended police officers in civil actions against them where excessive force was alleged. Whether the City Solicitor's failure to represent an officer in a civil suit would provide unwitting but effective notice to the Court that the Solicitor had already determined that the officer had acted improperly thus potentially prejudicing the defendant officer's case is an issue which the former City Solicitor recognized but determined to be irremediable.

**Office of the Hamilton County Prosecutor**

Simon Leis, Hamilton County Prosecutor, is responsible for prosecuting all felonies which are committed within Cincinnati. Such felonies include felonious and aggravated assault, murder, and attempted murder. If a police officer uses deadly force against a civilian and that conduct is not within the purview of Ohio State law concerning the

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10 Ibid.; Thomas A. Leubbers, Transcript, pp. 157-158.
12 Ibid.
13 Leubbers Memorandum.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 As discussed in Chapter 1, the Cincinnati Police Division use of force policy is far more restrictive than Ohio State law governing a peace officer's use of force including deadly force.
19 Thomas A. Leubbers, Transcript, pp. 141-42.
22 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2903.11 (felonious assault), §2903.12 (aggravated assault), §2903.13 (assault), §2903.14 (negligent assault), §2903.01 (aggravated murder), §2903.02 (murder), & §2903.03 (voluntary manslaughter), §2903.04 (involuntary manslaughter), §2903.05 (negligent homicide) (Page 1975).
23 All reductions in pay, suspensions, and terminations of police officers are appealable to the Civil Service Commission. With other municipal employees, only suspensions over three days, reductions in pay, and terminations may be appealed. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §124.34 (Page Supp. 1979).
24 Leubbers Interview.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 See Ohio Rules Crim. Pro., 2, 7 (Page 1975 and Supp. 1979). The County Prosecutor prosecutes all felonies committed inside the Cincinnati city limits. Misdemeanors occurring within Cincinnati are prosecuted by the Cincinnati City Solicitor's office.
permissible use of deadly force by police officers, the officer may be prosecuted for a violation of the relevant State criminal law.\textsuperscript{31} In the nine years that Leis has been with the County Prosecutor's office, no Cincinnati police officer has been tried for a criminal offense arising out of his or her use or misuse of force while on duty.\textsuperscript{32} Of the use of force cases Leis has reviewed, he has independently determined in almost all cases that the officer acted properly in accord with State law.\textsuperscript{33} Of the approximately four cases which Leis has sent to the grand jury, none has been returned with an indictment.\textsuperscript{34}

**State Involvement**

**Ohio Civil Rights Commission**

The Ohio Civil Rights Commission is the principle State agency responsible for preventing race and sex discrimination in employment.\textsuperscript{35} The Commission's authority extends both to private and public employers.\textsuperscript{36} Under its mandate, the Commission is empowered to receive complaints of unlawful discrimination, to investigate those complaints, and upon a finding of probable liability, to seek enforcement and disciplinary proceedings against the offending employer.\textsuperscript{37} Formal enforcement proceedings against an employer are conducted by the Ohio Attorney General.\textsuperscript{38} The Commission does not have jurisdiction to investigate complaints of excessive use of force or discrimination in the provision of police services even if the alleged discrimination is based upon race or sex.\textsuperscript{39}

The Ohio Civil Rights Commission has received complaints of unlawful employment discrimination and has recently initiated charges of employment discrimination against the Cincinnati Police Division.\textsuperscript{40} These charges which allege system-wide racial discrimination in policies and practices are currently being investigated by the Ohio Attorney General.\textsuperscript{41} A final decision on future proceedings against the Division has not yet been made.\textsuperscript{42}

**Office of Criminal Justice**

The State of Ohio, Office of Criminal Justice, Department of Economic and Community Development, is the State planning agency through which Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds are principally channeled to municipal police departments including the Cincinnati Police Division.\textsuperscript{43} That Office is empowered to accept and distribute Federal as well as State monies to law enforcement agencies.\textsuperscript{44} The Office of Criminal Justice is statutorily required to administer all funds in accord with the laws of Ohio as well as with Federal law.\textsuperscript{45} Because Ohio statutes include nondiscrimination in employment laws, the Office of Criminal Justice could require police departments practicing race or sex based discrimination in employment to alter their practices as a condition of continued funding. However, according to the Metropolitan Supervisor of the Office of Criminal Justice, Horst Gienapp, complaints of discrimination would be referred to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission or to LEAA for action rather than be investigated directly by the one-person Civil Rights Division of his office.\textsuperscript{46} Gienapp has stated that his Office has actually received no complaints of discrimination in employment, no complaints of excessive use of force, and no complaints of inequitable distribution of police services arising from the operations of the Cincinnati Police Division.\textsuperscript{47} According to Gienapp, few people are even aware of the civil rights jurisdiction of his Office.\textsuperscript{48} Since that Office has received no complaints and has no independent evidence of race or sex based discrimination, no investigation of the Cincinnati Police Division is contemplated at this time.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{31} See discussion of State law concerning the privilege of Ohio peace officers to use force including deadly force in Chapter I.
\textsuperscript{32} Simon Leis, interview in Cincinnati, Ohio, Jan. 25, 1980 (Hereafter cited as Leis Interview); Simon Leis, Transcript, p. 153. According to Leis, one officer was successfully prosecuted for rape committed while on duty.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Leis Interview.
\textsuperscript{35} The Commission's jurisdiction also extends to discrimination based on color, religion, national origin, handicap, age, and ancestry in public accommodations, housing and credit. Discrimination in credit based on marital status is also prohibited. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§4112.02(A)-(H) (Page Supp. 1979); §§4112.03, 4112.04 (Page Supp. 1979).
\textsuperscript{36} Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4112.02(A) (Page Supp. 1979).
\textsuperscript{39} Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4112.04(B) (Page Supp. 1979).
\textsuperscript{40} Ray O. Paul, Regional Director, Ohio Civil Rights Commission, interview in Cincinnati, Ohio, Aprul 5, 1979 (hereafter cited as Paul Interview).
\textsuperscript{42} Moore letter.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§122.02 (Page 1978).
\textsuperscript{45} Id.
\textsuperscript{46} Id.
\textsuperscript{47} Telephone interview, Jan. 11, 1980.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
State Training Council

Ohio has established a State Training Council which sets minimum training standards for local law enforcement agencies. Ohio has not created a State board of performance standards for municipal law enforcement agencies as some other States have. Minnesota, for example, has recently created a State Peace Officer Standards and Training Board which includes both functions: setting uniform standards for training and for conduct for Minnesota law enforcement officers. The Minnesota Board possesses the power to independently license local police officers and, in appropriate circumstances, to revoke or refuse to renew their licenses.

Past attempts to establish State control over selection standards for municipal law enforcement agencies in Ohio have met with strenuous opposition. While the Executive Director of the Ohio Training Council, Wilfred Goodwin, has recommended that the powers of the Council be expanded to enable it to set minimum standards for personnel selection such as educational requirements, he questions the need for State control over police performance including State licensure.

Goodwin believes that the present process of internal discipline with review by civil service and appeal to the courts should be sufficient to maintain high standards of performance within local police departments, including the Cincinnati Police Division. Goodwin has stated, however, that there would be some benefit to requiring uniform standards of conduct across the State. Such uniformity would be possible only if a State standards board were established.

According to Goodwin, the training standards of the Cincinnati Police Division exceed State requirements. In addition, the Training Council has received no complaints that officers have suffered race or sex based discrimination in the training they received from the Cincinnati Police Division. As a result, no investigation of Cincinnati training practices and procedures has taken place or is contemplated by the Training Council.

Federal Involvement

Funding agencies

The Cincinnati Police Division receives funds from several Federal agencies under a variety of programs. First, the Office of Revenue Sharing, (ORS) Department of the Treasury, disburses funds to the Division under the Fiscal Assistance to State and Local Governments Act. That Act requires city recipients to hold at least one public hearing on the proposed expenditure of Federal revenue sharing funds no less than seven days before the city budget is presented to city council for approval. A second hearing on the final proposed budget including allocation of the revenue sharing funds to specific budgetary items is also required. In addition, the Act requires that the city submit to the Secretary of the Treasury and make available to the public for inspection a yearly accounting of how the revenue sharing funds have actually been expended. Public participation in deciding the most appropriate uses for the revenue sharing funds is expressly encouraged in the Act.

According to the Assistant City Manager, Director of Research, Evaluation, and Budget, Michael Bierman, Cincinnati complies with the Federal requirement that citizens be permitted to participate in the decision-making process concerning the expenditure of Federal funds. An initial public hearing prior to the preparation of the city budget is held to elicit citizen input in regard to the revenue sharing funds. Subsequent to that hearing, the Assistant City Manager, Director of Research, Evaluation, and Budget prepares the annual budget

52 Minn. Stat. §626.845, Subd. 1(d) (1978).
53 Wilfred Goodwin, Executive Director, Ohio Peace Officer Training Council, telephone interview, Dec. 3, 1979 (hereafter cited as Goodwin Interview).
55 Goodwin Interview.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
which is then submitted by the City Manager to the City Council for approval.\textsuperscript{66} After the budget is reviewed by the City Council and finally approved, a second set of public hearings is held on the entire budget.\textsuperscript{67} These public hearings are held to comply both with Federal requirements and with the established policy and practice of the Cincinnati City Council.\textsuperscript{68}

The Cincinnati Police Division regularly receives a significant amount of money under the revenue sharing program. In 1976, the Division received $3.392 million.\textsuperscript{69} In 1977 and 1978, the Division received $3.032 million and $2.762 million respectively.\textsuperscript{70} In 1979, ORS disbursed $2.95 million to the Division under the revenue sharing program.\textsuperscript{71}

Federal funds were also distributed to the Cincinnati Police Division through ORS under the Antirecession Provisions.\textsuperscript{72} These provisions were enacted in 1976 to assist State and local governments overcome their fiscal difficulties and remedy problems caused by necessary budgetary contractions.\textsuperscript{73} No public hearings were mandated in regard to deciding the disposition of these funds. Reports to the Secretary of the Treasury through ORS by Cincinnati and all other recipients as to the expenditure of those funds were, of course, required.\textsuperscript{74} In addition, a number of assurances had to be filed by the recipient with the Secretary before funds were disbursed under this authority, in particular an assurance that the funds would be used to maintain levels of public employment and basic services ordinarily provided by the recipient.\textsuperscript{75}

No funds were distributed under the Antirecession Provisions during 1976 to the Cincinnati Police Division. In 1977, $1.452 million were granted the Division.\textsuperscript{76} In 1978, the Division received $3.090 million.\textsuperscript{77} The Antirecession program was terminated in 1978, eliminating this source of funds.\textsuperscript{78}

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the Department of Justice which is currently being phased out\textsuperscript{79} also distributes funds to the Cincinnati Police Division under the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, an expansion of an earlier funding authority.\textsuperscript{80} Under these provisions, LEAA distributes funds to cities for a variety of programs including comprehensive law enforcement planning, training, education, research, development of law enforcement techniques, and crime prevention.\textsuperscript{81} While funds may be awarded directly to the city of Cincinnati or the Cincinnati Police Division by LEAA, most of the funds have been awarded through the State of Ohio criminal justice planning council entitled the Office of Criminal Justice Services, Department of Economic and Community Development.\textsuperscript{82}

Like the Federal revenue sharing program,\textsuperscript{83} there is now a statutory requirement that local public opinion be obtained on any proposed expenditure of LEAA funds.\textsuperscript{84} In addition, public hearings have been regularly required by the State criminal justice planning agency.\textsuperscript{85} To the extent that the final Cincinnati city budget is subject to public hearing, the line items for which the LEAA funds are expended are subject to local public scrutiny.\textsuperscript{86} The LEAA Act does, of course, require that all recipients of LEAA funds maintain adequate records for purposes of LEAA audit.\textsuperscript{87} Funds which were


\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{69} Martin Walsh, former Acting City Manager, Transcript, p. 25.


\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} 42 U.S.C. §§6731-6735 (1976).

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} 42 U.S.C. §6733 required the Secretary to report yearly to the Congress the purposes for which recipients expended the antirecession funds.

\textsuperscript{76} 42 U.S.C. §6725 (1)(1976).

\textsuperscript{77} Leistler Data.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{80} No further funds are being distributed by LEAA during the phase out. However, 11 staff persons will continue to monitor existing programs through FY82. Wilbur Brantley, Director, Office of Civil Rights Compliance, LEAA, telephone interview, August 5, 1980.
distributed to the Cincinnati Police Division from LEAA in 1976 totalled $362,000. In 1977 and 1978 respectively, $128,250 and $132,118 were awarded. In 1979, LEAA disbursed $240,107 to the Division. In 1973 Congress enacted The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). The purpose of the Act is to provide training and to enlarge employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged individuals who are undereducated and underemployed. Since 1977, the Cincinnati Police Division through the Safety Department has been receiving funds under CETA. However, none of those funds has been utilized to train or employ sworn police personnel. All of the CETA funds expended by the Police Division have been used to train and employ civilian employees such as custodians, secretaries, and school crossing guards. At the present time, the Police Division is currently spending CETA funds for school crossing guards and supplementing, civilian salaries. Since January 1, 1976, the Cincinnati Police Division has received a total of $3.5 million in CETA funds with all but $3,192 being used to subsidize the salaries of civilian employees. According to the former Safety Director, Richard Castellini, several of the 1978 amendments to CETA which have limited eligibility to individuals from families with incomes below the poverty level or from families receiving public assistance make locating qualified CETA trainees for the Cincinnati Police Division virtually impossible. C. Thomas Ross, Regional Administrator, Employment and Training Administration, (ETA), Department of Labor, agrees that the 1978 enactment in changing certain of the CETA eligibility requirements and maximum wage limitations does “make it difficult to hire police personnel due to the high wages in those jobs.”

During the years 1976 through 1979, the Cincinnati Police Division received approximately $21.0 million from the Federal government. During the same approximate period, the Division received $67.01 million from the city and $734,032 from the State of Ohio. During that four year period, 1976–1979, the Division received and expended over $88.8 million for law enforcement and law enforcement-related activities. The expenditure of local revenues by the Police Division represents between 14 and 19 percent of the total city budgets in those four years. Law enforcement is indeed costly.

### Enforcement of civil rights

#### Misuse of force

As discussed above, the Ohio Advisory Committee has received a number of complaints that some members of the Cincinnati community have been subjected to unnecessary or excessive force because of their race, economic status, or cultural background by Cincinnati police personnel. These complaints were largely responsible for triggering the Committee’s initial investigation into the policies and practices of the Cincinnati Police Division.

A number of Federal civil and criminal statutes forbid police personnel from misusing force against civilians. For example, recipients of Federal funds are precluded from discriminating against beneficiaries on the basis of race, color, or national origin. The widespread misuse of force against members of racial minorities because of their race by police officers has been determined to constitute forbidden discrimination. However, recipients of Federal funds are not expressly precluded from discrimination based on economic status or cultural background (as distinguished from national origin). Thus, Cincinnati civilians abused by police for reasons of poverty or Appalachian origin are not protected under these fundings statutes.

as to the protected classes of persons and whether a racial basis for the infliction of that force is required to trigger the operation of the statute. These are other problems with the Federal criminal civil rights statutes are discussed below.

All Federal agencies which provide Federal funds to recipients including law enforcement agencies such as the Cincinnati Police Division are responsible for ensuring that no person is subjected to discrimination because of race, color, or national origin under the funded program or activity. The primary responsibility in regard to protecting the civil rights of the ultimate beneficiaries of Federal funds is imposed on Federal agencies through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by Presidential Executive Order and under guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice. Under these legal mandates, Federal funding agencies may obtain compliance of recalcitrant recipients through fund termination or denial in accord with established administrative procedures. Alternatively, the agency may refer the case to the Department of Justice for judicial enforcement if compliance cannot be obtained voluntarily or through administrative proceedings.

While each Federal funding agency is responsible for ensuring that recipients of its funds comply with nondiscrimination requirements of Title VI, the Department of Justice is responsible for coordinating enforcement efforts by the funding agencies and for developing standards and procedures to implement Title VI. The Department has promulgated such standards and procedures through regulations and guidelines. Under these extensive regulations, for example, every recipient of Federal funds must as a condition of funding provide an assurance that it will comply with the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VI. If the assurance appears to be "untrue or is not being honored" by the recipient, the guidelines provide for investigation and, if necessary, an administrative hearing or judicial proceeding to secure compliance or to terminate funding. The regulations also provide for consolidated hearings in certain circumstances where two or more Federal agencies are funding a single recipient who is alleged in noncompliance with Title VI.

Title VI could be an appropriate vehicle for ensuring that Cincinnati civilians are not victimized by unnecessary or excessive force by their police officers for racial reasons. However, the Federal agencies which fund the Cincinnati Police Division (either directly or indirectly through the city or State) have their own unique statutory requirements in regard to nondiscrimination. In each case, revenue sharing, antirecession, LEAA, and CETA, the enabling statute was enacted subsequent to Title VI and embodies the nondiscrimination provisions of that earlier act. Therefore, the Federal funding agencies which administer these funds have determined that they will proceed under their own statutory authority in regard to nondiscrimination requirements rather than under the general provisions of Title VI and its implementing regulations and guidelines.

The Office of Revenue Sharing (ORS) is responsible for distributing Fiscal Assistance to State and Local Governments (Revenue Sharing Act) funds to recipient units of government. ORS disburse approximately $3 million dollars annually, to the Cincinnati Police Division. The Division is therefore subject to the nondiscrimination provisions on which these revenue sharing funds are contingent. As with Title VI, a city which receives revenue sharing funds may not exclude from participation or deny benefits to or subject a beneficiary to discrimination for reasons of race under any program or activity maintained by that city. The Act does

110 28 C.F.R. §§42.401-42.415, 50.3 (1979).
112 28 C.F.R. §§42.412(b), 50.3(c) (I)(B) (1979).
114 28 C.F.R. §§42.401-42.415 and §50.3 (1979).
permit the city to defend itself against charges of prohibited discrimination by showing that the offending program or activity was not funded at all by revenue sharing funds. The regulations promulgated by ORS in 1977 suggested that the language "program or activity" was to be read narrowly as "specific activity." Such an interpretation would allow a recipient operating in bad faith to channel Federal funds into programs which were operated in a nondiscriminatory manner while discriminating with impunity in other programs funded with non-Federal monies.

In April of 1979, in accord with case law, the express statutory authority encouraging interagency cooperation, and the interpretation of comparable language by its sister agency, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), ORS amended its definition of "program or activity" to mean "the operations of the agency or organizational unit of the government receiving or substantially benefitting from entitlement funds, e.g., a police department; department of corrections; health department." What ORS has effectively done through this amendment is to close the loophole which would allow a recipient to allocate funds in such a way that it could practice racial discrimination in violation of the intent of the Revenue Sharing Act while being in technical compliance. Thus, ORS now looks at the ultimate beneficiaries of funds flowing to the recipient. If the recipient is denying benefits or discriminating against the ultimate beneficiaries because of their race in any activity under its authority, the nexus between prohibited discrimination and funding is sufficiently close to provide ORS with jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions or, alternately, to terminate funding. Experts agree that police departments exist to benefit the communities which employ them. It is the civilian community which is the ultimate beneficiary of police services. No police department receiving ORS funds may discriminate against civilian members of racial minorities in any of its programs and still comply with the Revenue Sharing Act and its concomitant regulations. However, in order to hold an entire police department, i.e., the department itself, liable for racial discrimination because of the excessive use of force against minorities it would be necessary to prove that the department officials knew about the conduct, that they could have but failed to correct the misconduct, and that the misconduct represented not merely infrequent and sporadic occurrences but rather a substantial and systemic problem. Absent these strict legal requirements, injunctive or other relief such as fund termination against the department as a whole would not be granted.

During its brief life, Antirecession Provisions Act funds were also distributed by ORS. That program also precluded racial discrimination by recipients comparable to Title VI and the Revenue Sharing Act. Under the Antirecession Provisions Act, enforcement of the nondiscrimination provisions was expressly to accord with the Title VI enforcement provisions. In addition, a private right of action was provided just as under the Revenue Sharing Act. Both the Antirecession Act and the Revenue Sharing Act contemplated judicial enforcement by the Attorney General. The same problems with holding the entire police department liable for racially motivated excessive force by police officers as exists under the Revenue Sharing Act also would have existed under the Antirecession Provisions.

In regard to the Cincinnati Police Division, the Office of Revenue Sharing has not received any complaints that excessive force is being inflicted upon civilians by police personnel for racial or for any other reason. ORS has not self-initiated monitoring of the Cincinnati Police Division's compliance with the nondiscrimination requirements of either the Revenue Sharing Act or the Antirecession Provisions beyond reviewing the required assurances that funds distributed to the Cincinnati Police Division under the Revenue Sharing Act by the City
of Cincinnati will not be used in a racially discriminatory manner. If complaints of racially motivated excessive force were received by ORS, the Manager of the Civil Rights Division of ORS, Treadwell O. Phillips, has indicated that his office would investigate those complaints to determine whether a "strong statistical pattern and practice of complaints against the police department by members of the minority community" existed to justify further proceedings. Phillips has determined that ORS does have the jurisdiction and the responsibility to pursue such complaints should they arise. At the present time, however, ORS has no plans to instigate an investigation of excessive use of force by Cincinnati police personnel.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Department of Justice, extends funds to local police departments usually through a State criminal justice planning agency. Racial discrimination by recipients against beneficiaries of those funds is prohibited. Under its authority, LEAA has enacted regulations implementing statutory nondiscrimination requirements. These regulations are comparable to those of ORS discussed above, including the requirement that assurances of compliance with nondiscrimination provisions be filed by the recipient as a condition of funding.

LEAA has determined that it has jurisdiction over recipients who discriminate against racial minorities by inflicting excessive force upon them. Under their authority, an amendment to existing regulations has been proposed which will expressly prohibit physical abuse of any individual by a recipient of LEAA funds. The problem with imputing culpability to an entire police department in order to intervene in internal policy (as opposed to holding a few "bad apples" responsible for the misconduct) discussed above had led to a decision that complaints of excessive use of force would be referred to the Attorney General for litigation under the criminal statutes whenever they allege racial or any other motivation for the misuse of force. The proposed regulations recognize the validity of this alternative.

Since the Office of Civil Rights Compliance, (OCRC), LEAA, was established in 1971, that agency has received no complaints of unlawful discrimination against Cincinnati police personnel. Other than reviewing the required assurances of compliance for conformity with the requirements of law and implementing regulations, OCRC has not conducted a civil rights compliance review of the Cincinnati Police Division. Because of limited staff resources, OCRC does not launch investigations of law enforcement agencies such as the Cincinnati Police Division absent complaints of some reasonable basis to believe the recipient is not in compliance with applicable nondiscrimination requirements.

In keeping with many other Federal funding statutes enacted subsequent to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 1973 CETA enactment prohibited discrimination in any CETA program or activity because of race, color, national origin, or sex. Whenever a prime sponsor of a CETA program such as the City of Cincinnati failed to comply with the nondiscrimination provisions, the Secretary of Labor was empowered to seek compliance. If the prime sponsor, e.g., a unit of government such as a city, refused to alter its practices to bring itself into compliance, the Attorney General for the United States could intervene in internal policy (as opposed to holding a few "bad apples" responsible for the misconduct) discussed above had led to a decision that complaints of excessive use of force would be referred to the Attorney General for litigation under the criminal statutes whenever they allege racial or any other motivation for the misuse of force. The proposed regulations recognize the validity of this alternative.

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compliance with CETA nondiscrimination requirements, the Secretary of Labor was authorized to refer the matter to the Department of Justice for enforcement or to proceed directly under Title VI to an administrative hearing in order to terminate funding.158

The provisions discussed above have remained essentially intact under the 1978 amendments to CETA.159 According to the regulations enacted by the Department of Labor under its CETA responsibilities, every application for CETA funding must be accompanied by assurances that the recipient will comply with the nondiscrimination requirements discussed above.160 In addition, the regulations provide for periodic compliance reviews by the Department of Labor.161 If a recipient is found to be engaging in unlawful discriminatory conduct and conciliation efforts do not succeed in bringing the recipient into compliance, funds may be terminated but only after a formal administrative hearing determines the recipient's culpability.162

The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor is responsible for monitoring compliance with CETA requirements.163 The ETA has received no complaints of discrimination under the Cincinnati CETA program.164 If complaints of unlawful discrimination based on excessive force or brutality were received, however, ETA has determined that it would refer the matter to the Department of Justice for review and enforcement.165

The Attorney General, Department of Justice, is authorized to bring criminal actions against certain individuals who deprive other persons of their civil rights under a number of statutes. Under one authority, 18 U.S.C. §241 (1976), the Attorney General may institute criminal proceedings against persons who conspire to injure any citizen in the exercise of his constitutional or other federally secured legal rights. Under a second statute, 18 U.S.C. §242 (1976), the Attorney General may bring a criminal action against State and local public employees including peace officers who willfully deprive an inhabitant of a State of his or her constitutional or otherwise federally protective rights. In addition, the Attorney General may bring a criminal action under 18 U.S.C. §245 (1976) against anyone who willfully injures or attempts to injure any person because of his race who is exercising a federally protected right. Of these three potential jurisdictional bases for criminal action against a police officer who brutalizes a civilian, the Attorney General ordinarily proceeds under §242.166 According to the Criminal Section, Department of Justice, §245 would not be appropriate for litigating the misuse of force by police personnel.167

Both 18 U.S.C. §241 and 242 require for a finding of guilt that the defendant must have specifically intended to deprive the citizen or inhabitant of the State of a constitutionally or otherwise federally protected right. In Screws v. United States which expressly established this principle, a young black man was arrested and then beaten to death by peace officers.168 The Supreme Court determined that only if the defendant peace officers had specifically intended to deprive the victim of a Federally protected right, in this case his Sixth Amendment right to be tried by a jury rather than by ordeal i.e., by a beating, could they be found guilty.169 This specific intent requirement has reportedly severely hampered the ability of the Attorney General to protect the rights of civilians against the excessive use of force by police officers.170 However, under a proposed revision of the criminal code, the requirement of specific intent would be eliminated.171

A further impediment to the ability of the Attorney General to protect civilians against the excessive use of force by police personnel is State use of force policy.172 As discussed in Chapter 1, Ohio follows the common law which permits a peace officer to use force including deadly force to effect the arrest of an escaping felon, as well as when he believes it is

158 Ibid. The Attorney General, Department of Justice was specifically authorized to take judicial action against prime sponsors engaging in a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination. 29 U.S.C. §991(c) (1976).
159 However, the protected classes have been expanded to prohibit discrimination based on religion, age, handicap, citizenship, and political affiliation as well as race, color, sex, and national origin. Comprehensive Employment and Training Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-524, §2, 92 Stat. 1912 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §834).
160 29 C.F.R. §98.21(c) (1979).
162 29 C.F.R. §§98.21(c), 98.46 (1979).
163 C. Thompson Ross, Regional Administrator, Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, letter to Clark G. Roberts, (hereafter cited as Ross Letter).
164 Ibid.
165 Charles C. Kane, Executive Assistant to the Regional Administrator, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, telephone interview, Feb. 15, 1980.
166 Bruce Berger, Staff Attorney, Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, telephone interview Jan. 10, 1980.
167 Ibid.
necessary in defense of self or others. To the extent that the use of deadly force can be justified by a peace officer under State law, the officer is apparently immune from Federal criminal prosecution. 173

The Attorney General has received a number of complaints concerning the excessive use of force by Cincinnati police personnel against civilians. 174 A number of these complaints have been forwarded from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cincinnati Office. 175 That Office has received 31 complaints of excessive use of force by Cincinnati police officers over the last five years including four complaints of the misuse of deadly force. 176 However, none of these complaints has resulted in criminal prosecutions 177 or in a request for the U.S. Attorney to impanel a grand jury. However, four active investigations are still in progress by the Attorney General. 178 Given the difficulty caused by the present "specific intent" requirement and the relatively broad discretion granted to Ohio police officers to use force including deadly force under State law as discussed above, it is unlikely that criminal prosecutions will result from the current investigations.

**Discrimination in the allocation of services**

The Ohio Advisory Committee has received a number of complaints from black, poor, and Appalachian civilians that their needs and requests for police services are not receiving the same concern as are Cincinnati communities composed of more affluent white residents. These complaints are discussed above in Chapter 2.

The responsibility of various Federal funding agencies to ensure that the ultimate beneficiaries of their funds are not denied a fair share of those benefits for reasons of race, sex, or national origin are discussed above. 179 Where allegations that police services and benefits are being inequitably distributed based on economic or cultural factors, however, those Federal funding agencies do not have jurisdiction to require that police departments alter their policies toward even-handed service delivery. 180

The Department of Justice has not received any complaints of racial discrimination in violation of Title VI. 181 ORS, 182 LEAA, 183 and the Employment and Training Administration, 184 Department of Labor, which monitors CETA funds have also received no complaints under their specific statutory civil rights responsibilities in regard to the services dispensed to beneficiaries. Therefore, no investigations nor compliance monitoring is currently in process for the Cincinnati Police Division by any of the foregoing Federal agencies.

**Employment discrimination**

Under its authority to ensure that recipients do not discriminate against beneficiaries on the basis of race and sex, ORS has promulgated regulations prohibiting employment discrimination whether in hiring, promotion, benefits, training, or other employment related events. 185 Those regulations were enacted to accord with the requirements of Title VII 186 and its implementing regulations and guidelines. 187 Part of the ORS regulations require assurances from recipients that they will not discriminate in employment or in any other activity on the basis of race or sex. 188 In addition, ORS is required to initiate compliance reviews "from time to time." 189 Those reviews in regard to civil rights compliance are triggered by civilian complaints in addition to the regulatory trigger of "significant disparity" between the recipient's work force and the potential labor market. 190 Treadwell O. Phillips, Manager of the Civil Rights Division, Office of Revenue Sharing, has stated that ORS has not received any complaints of employment discrimination from Cincinnati civilians or police personnel. 191 As a result, ORS has not monitored the compliance the recipient government must ameliorate that imbalance. 31 C.F.R. §51.52(b)(5) (1979).

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176 Ibid.


178 Days Letter.

179 See also the regulations of ORS which provide in pertinent part, "Recipient governments are encouraged to take action with entitlement funds to ameliorate an imbalance in services . . . provided to any geographic area or specific group in order to overcome the effects of prior discriminatory practice or usage." If an imbalance of services is discovered, 31 C.F.R. §§51.52(b)(1979).

180 See discussion this chapter.


182 Phillips Letter.

183 Dogin Letter.

184 Ross Letter.


188 31 C.F.R. §51.58 (1979). In addition, discrimination based on color, national origin, religion, age, or handicap is also prohibited. 31 C.F.R. §51.52 (1979).


190 31 C.F.R. §§51.53(e), 51.61(b) (1979).

191 Phillips Letter.
of the Cincinnati Police Division with the civil rights requirements upon which revenue sharing funds are disbursed beyond a cursory review of the required nondiscrimination assurances.192

The governing statute under which LEAA distributes funds to recipients contains an express prohibition against race or sex based employment discrimination.193 Under its authority,194 LEAA has enacted regulations and guidelines which detail prohibited racial and sex discrimination in employment related practices.195 LEAA requires recipients to file an equal employment opportunity program196 including a job classification breakdown, disciplinary actions taken, applications for employment, employment terminations, and the available local workforce by race, sex, and national origin, in addition to routine assurances197 of compliance with the nondiscrimination requirements.

The Office of Civil Rights Compliance of LEAA has reviewed the Equal Employment Opportunity Programs (EEOP) submissions from Cincinnati and has determined them to be in compliance with LEAA civil rights requirements.198 Since, in addition, LEAA has received no complaints of unlawful employment discrimination from any Cincinnati department or agency, including the Cincinnati Police Division, it has not conducted a compliance review for that city.199

The CETA program is principally designed to provide job training and employment to economically disadvantaged persons.200 The statute which mandates the CETA program forbids discrimination based on race, color, sex, or national origin, and further prohibits denying an otherwise qualified applicant employment on the same bases in any program or activity funded with CETA monies.201

The accompanying regulations also prohibit such discrimination.202 Therefore, if race or sex based employment discrimination is alleged, ETA has the authority and the duty to require a CETA fund recipient to bring its practices into compliance with the nondiscrimination requirements of CETA.203 If informal conciliation efforts fail, the Administration could refer the matter to the Department of Justice for appropriate judicial enforcement or proceed to an administrative hearing to seek fund termination.204 In fact, however, ETA has reviewed the assurances of the City of Cincinnati and has determined that the Police Division is not unlawfully discriminating in its use of CETA funds.205 In addition, ETA has not received any complaints of unfair discrimination in the use of CETA funds by the Cincinnati Police Division.206 As a result, no further compliance reviews of the Cincinnati Police Division are contemplated at this time.207

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is primarily responsible for enforcing Title VII which forbids employment discrimination based upon sex or race.208 Not only is discrimination in hiring prohibited under Title VII, but also discrimination in promotion, pay, assignment, and other terms and conditions of employment.209 EEOC receives complaints of unlawful discrimination, investigates those complaints, and attempts to conciliate disputes. If the offending employer is a State or local government and conciliation fails, EEOC refers the case to the Department of Justice for judicial enforcement.210

In 1976, EEOC received three complaints of racial discrimination in promotion policies and procedures against the Cincinnati Police Division.211 In 1979, EEOC determined that the Police Division

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192 Ibid.
193 Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-157, § 813(c)(1), 93 Stat. 1167. Discrimination based on color, religion, or national origin is also forbidden.
195 28 C.F.R. §42.203(a) (1979). In addition to race and racial discrimination, discrimination based on color, religion, or national origin is also prohibited.
196 28 C.F.R. § 42.304 (1979).
197 28 C.F.R. § 42.204(a) (1979).
198 Dogin Letter.
199 Ibid.
201 28 C.F.R. §42.204(a) (1979).
202 Ross Letter.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Dogin Letter.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Dogin Letter.
210 Ross Letter.
211 Dogin Letter.
employment practices had violated the rights of the three complainants.\textsuperscript{212} Since that time, EEOC has been attempting to resolve the complaints through conciliation.\textsuperscript{213} According to Joel Kay, Compliance Manager, EEOC Regional Office, Cleveland, Ohio, no time limit has been set for resolving the complaints.\textsuperscript{214} Therefore, it is not possible to determine when or whether the complaints will be referred to the Department of Justice for further proceedings.

The Department of Justice is responsible for enforcing Title VII which prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex where the employer is a governmental agency such as the Cincinnati Police Division and litigation is required.\textsuperscript{215} The scope of Title VII is very broad as to which employment related practices are included within its protection. Not only hiring and recruitment practices but such factors as promotional criteria, specialized training, job assignment, and other “terms and conditions” of employment must be applied uniformly without racial or sex discrimination.\textsuperscript{216}

In October 1979 the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice launched an investigation into allegations of employment discrimination in the Cincinnati Police Division. A consent decree was obtained in July 1980 in which the city agreed to increase substantially the hiring and promotion of blacks and women in the Police Division. In its suit, the Justice Department charged the city with violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the non-discrimination provisions of Revenue Sharing programs. Under the decree the city agreed to a five-year goal in which the proportion of black and female police officers would equal their representation in the qualified city labor force. Specifically, the city is committed to filling 34 percent of police officer vacancies with blacks and 23 percent with women (their representation of the 1980 police recruit list) for each of the next five years. Blacks and women will receive 25 percent of all promotions for the positions of police specialist and sergeant with each group obtaining promotions in proportion to their representation in the eligible pool. For higher grades, qualified blacks and women will fill vacancies in proportion to their representation in the eligible pool for each grade. The city is required to report to the Justice Department on its progress twice each year.\textsuperscript{217} Given the extensive investigation and findings of the Justice Department, it is surprising that neither LEAA nor ORS has been involved in any compliance monitoring of the Division nor is apparently aware that complaints against the Division have been filed.

This chapter has reviewed the authority of local, State, and Federal agencies to review the practices of the Cincinnati Police Division in regard to use of force, distribution of services and employment discrimination. In addition, the present monitoring and enforcement activities of these agencies has been discussed. The following and final chapter of the report will analyze various proposals for limiting police discretion, a frequent source of police-community conflict, and resolving police-civilian disputes and will compare the actual practices of the Cincinnati Police Division to those proposals.

\textsuperscript{212} Mayfield Interview.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release on consent decree pertaining to employment discrimination in the Cincinnati Police Division, July 14, 1980. Commission files.
Proposals for Guiding, Regulating, and Reviewing Police Conduct and Resolving Civilian-Police Disputes

Public Policy and Police Discretion

The role of police departments in democratic societies is the subject of increasing attention by scholars and concerned community members alike. All agree that the police must be responsive and accountable to the public and to their elected representatives. Although granted unique power and authority, police in other than totalitarian societies are an integral part of their communities, not superior and separate organizations.

Police departments are public agencies which exist to carry out public policy. Unlike other public agencies, however, police departments throughout the country have traditionally operated largely independent of effective public and legislative oversight. Police officials acting alone, for example, determine the distribution of manpower resources within their communities. By deciding how and where personnel and equipment will be utilized, e.g., a large vice squad, an assignment of personnel to affluent residential areas disproportionate to the number of service calls, these officials in fact establish community priorities in law enforcement. Nonetheless, it is responsiveness to community priorities which differentiates a domestic from a military police force.

Not only have civilians throughout the United States been effectively locked out of determining police policy, but to a significant extent that policy is

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reportedly not being made even by upper echelon police administrators. Rather, the lowest level of police personnel, the police officer, makes significant policy decisions in on-the-spot interactions with civilians. This unwitting delegation of policy-making to lower level police personnel occurs whenever decisions must be made for which there are no clear standards to guide the officer in the exercise of his or her discretion. For example, police officers do not arrest every person who is involved in a fight, i.e., commits an assault or the offense of disorderly conduct. If departmental policy demands strict enforcement of the criminal laws without guidelines for leniency, then a police officer coming upon a minor incident where only a few punches are exchanged will create his own ad hoc non-enforcement policy, i.e., that a public fight between two men who are both unarmed, where no person is seriously injured and where there is no immediate threat to the public order deserves only a casual warning.

The creation of such on-the-spot policy might be reasonable if it were not for the extensive research which indicates that police officers no less than civilians are subject to various biases in decision-making associated particularly with sex, race, and economic status. Where these factors enter into the decision of the officer to arrest, to warn, or to ignore proscribed conduct, the ultimate decision is likely to be unfairly discriminatory. Indeed, one of the principal complaints received from Cincinnati citizens by the Ohio Advisory Committee has been the unfair and unequal enforcement of the law in poorer and black neighborhoods, as opposed to affluent white neighborhoods. The routine granting of broad discretion to lower level personnel in police departments through default of upper echelon administrators is one of the most significant differences between policing and other occupational structures. In most other occupations, the extent of individual discretion varies directly with the level of the decisionmaker in the organization. The amount of freedom or latitude granted the decisionmaker in reaching a particular decision is ordinarily related directly to the degree of power and control he or she possesses within the organization. Police officers, on the other hand, continually interacting with civilians in a variety of situations where strict law enforcement is either impossible or undesirable and where neither statutes, administrative regulations, nor supervisory personnel effectively guide their judgments, exercise the greatest discretion. These judgments are usually made in situations with low visibility when both officer and civilian are under great stress. Research has demonstrated that such stressful confrontations do not lead to rational problem solving. Instead, such confrontations are a principal cause of police officers' misperceptions that civilians are behaving in provocative and threatening ways, and represent a significant source of officer-civilian violence.

13 The officer's power not to enforce the law is sometimes turned into an affirmative weapon against civilians to force submission and compliance. See e.g., Justice, p. 109; David Muir Peterson, The Police, Discretion and the Decision to Arrest (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1968) (hereafter cited as Decision to Arrest), p. 320.
14 See e.g., Harold E. Pepinsky, "Police Decision-Making," in Decision-making, p. 38; Decision to Arrest, p. 320.
17 Task Force, p. 128.
18 Ibid.
Police officers need firm and clear legislative and administrative guidelines for the proper exercise of their responsibilities to "serve and protect" their communities in an even-handed way. For example, if it is public policy that parks close at 11 p.m., then that policy should be applied uniformly regardless of the race or affluence of civilians. If, on the other hand, it is determined that on summer evenings the park closing hour will not be fully enforced, the limits of that decision should be determined at the official level, not by individual officers on the basis of "gut" feelings, who thereby create an uneven and unfairly discriminatory policy.

The young and least experienced police personnel, police officers, are required to make the day-to-day decisions concerning whether to embroil a civilian in the ponderous machinery of the criminal justice system through a decision to arrest or, on the other hand, to protect the individual from the serious consequences of that system by merely issuing an informal warning. The need to provide officers with clear guidelines which reflect genuine public policy is obvious. Only with the imposition of realistic limitations upon the exercise of their law enforcement discretion derived from well considered policy determinations in turn reflecting the priorities of the community, can police officers be expected to discharge their responsibilities as public servants at the high level of "wisdom and skill" which is rightfully expected of them.

What stands in the way of establishing guidelines to control the policy-setting discretion of police officers is the almost universal pretense both by State legislatures and police department officials of full law enforcement. Thus, questions of "what law to enforce, how much to enforce it, against whom, and on what occasion" are not questions that official policy bodies have been willing to consider. In Ohio, for example, police officers by law must enforce all ordinances and criminal laws of the State and of the United States. Read narrowly, the governing statute sets forth a strict law enforcement standard. Police officers, however, do not in fact arrest every individual whose conduct constitutes a criminal offense but rather exercise discretion depending on the particular situation, including the perceived seriousness of the conduct. That perception is likely to be influenced by emotional, racial and economic factors, factors which do not contribute to rational even-handed law enforcement.

The first step in establishing effective limits to police officer discretion is the admission that broad discretion exists. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals states in Standard 1.3: "Every police agency should acknowledge the existence of the broad range of administrative and operational discretion that is exercised by all police agencies and individual officers. That acknowledgement should take the form of comprehensive policy statements that publicly establish the limits of discretion, that provide guidelines for its exercise within those limits, and that eliminate discriminatory enforcement of the law."

The Cincinnati Police Division differs in two respects from most police departments in regard to strict law enforcement, first in its formalized traffic enforcement policy, secondly, in initial officer training. While Cincinnati has enacted no ordinance concerning the duties of police officers, the Police Division Procedures Manual states that police personnel shall apply the traffic laws and ordinances between official and actual practice is reflected in community attitudes of police abuse. Robert W. Clawson and David L. Norrgard, "National Responses to Urban Crime," in Police in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970) (hereafter cited as "National Responses"), p. 84.

25 "Serve and Protect" is the motto of the Chicago Police Department. The Cincinnati Police Division has not adopted a motto. Presumably the Cincinnati Police Division would agree that their duty is to serve and protect the Cincinnati community.


28 Decision to Arrest, p. 305. Problems caused by the unintended delegation of discretion to police officers and resulting from official adherence to a policy of full law enforcement is not unique to the United States. Both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union among other countries officially maintain that no discretion in law enforcement exists while tolerating broad discretion among police officers in practice. In all cases, this discrepancy
with tolerance in a reasonable and meaningful manner to accomplish the objectives of those laws.\(^{31}\) In other than traffic enforcement, however, the Division, by failure to enact regulations and procedures based on official and express policy recognizing and then limiting deviation from strict law enforcement, tacitly supports the rigid State policy.\(^{32}\)

The discretion problem is heightened in Cincinnati because of a discrepancy between the initial training an officer receives in this matter and the published policy which guides his or her conduct on the job. During initial training, recruits are taught that good law enforcement is not the strict standard codified in the State law and reiterated in the Division rules and regulations but rather law enforcement tempered by reasonableness and meaningfulness. In other words, recruits are taught that good law enforcement involves tolerance and leniency where the application of those qualities will increase respect for the law at the same time such conduct accomplishes the purpose of the law which is protection of the public welfare.\(^{33}\)

Cincinnati police officers, therefore, are initially trained that strict law enforcement may in certain circumstances be neither necessary nor even desirable. They are thereby encouraged to use their judgment in how they apply the law. The Division Manual of Rules and Regulations and Procedures, however, is silent on the question. Instead of providing express guidance for the exercise of individual judgment, the Manual requires that police officers obey all the laws and ordinances they are obligated to enforce.\(^{34}\) One of the laws they must obey is the State law obligating them to strict law enforcement.\(^{35}\) As a result, a policy vacuum is created between the official requirement of strict law enforcement and the unofficial policy encouraging only reasonable law enforcement. This vacuum must be filled by default of express official action by individual officers making idiosyncratic on-the-spot decisions on the basis of their own values and experience.\(^{36}\) Consequently, individual officers must determine for themselves when and why, for example, a civilian driving a car looks suspicious and should be stopped or when or where a youngster walking along a street is "up to no good" and should be stopped and questioned.\(^{37}\) To eliminate any effect of racial, economic, or other irrelevant factors, on these decisions,\(^{38}\) express policy guidelines translated into rules and regulations governing the discretion of police personnel in such situations are essential.\(^{39}\)

These rules and regulations also should be readily available to the public, in for example, an appendix to the city municipal code. At the present time, Cincinnati publishes the rules of several boards and commissions in its municipal code but not the Police Division guidelines.\(^{40}\) Thus the Cincinnati public is routinely denied substantive input in the establishment of police force policy and also lacks ready access to the policy itself. Further, when disputes between Cincinnati police personnel and civilians arise in regard to the application of law enforcement techniques, the determination of what occurred and who was at fault is entirely an internal matter within the Internal Investigation Section of the Police Division.\(^{41}\) The affected civilian receives only an ultimate determination of whether the complaint was sustained or not, unaccompanied by specific reasons for the determination.\(^{42}\) Consequently, the public is locked-out even of the process of reviewing police-civilian disputes.

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\(^{31}\) Procedure 12. 565 (B) (8). The fundamental objectives of the traffic laws are to keep traffic moving and prevent accidents.


\(^{33}\) Captain Joseph Crawford, Commander, Internal Investigation Section, Cincinnati Police Division, telephone interview December 12, 1979 (hereafter cited as Crawford Telephone Interview of Dec. 12, 1979).


\(^{36}\) The National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has recommended that police officials should identify situations where arrest would be unreasonable. In such cases, alternatives to arrest should be expressly set forth in guidelines to limit and control the discretion of individual officers. The Commission further urges that both situations and crimes be identified in determining such guidelines. Police, p. 24.

\(^{37}\) Dewey C. Fuller, Director of the Urban League of Greater Cincinnati reported to the Ohio Advisory Committee that he had been stopped by police while driving through a white area "purely and simply because I was black going across that section of town," Transcript, p. 119; Ann Martin, Transcript, p. 233-34.

\(^{38}\) Decision-making, p. 30. To the extent that law enforcement decisions by state or local peace officers are based on the race or ethnicity of the civilian, such decisions would violate the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires equal justice. See, Police, p. 24; Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).


\(^{40}\) Cincinnati Administrative Code, as amended (March 1980).

\(^{41}\) See discussion this chapter.


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53
Guiding and Regulating Police Discretion

Administrative rule-making

Police departments are administrative agencies. In recent years, there has been a significant trend at both the Federal and State levels to provide for greater citizen input in the development of policy by administrative agencies through administrative rule-making procedures. Kenneth Culp Davis, an early and vigorous proponent of administrative rule-making for police departments, has often expressed concern over the absence of clear rules to guide police discretion. Davis has also been concerned with maximizing civilian contributions to police policy formulation. He has suggested that by requiring municipalities to adopt the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in regard to rule-making by their police departments, communities would have the opportunity to review and comment on proposed rules and rule changes. The procedure for determining policy and codifying that policy in rules and regulations would thus become a visible public process potentially involving the entire community not merely designated ad hoc community leaders.

Administrative rule-making procedures also permit the continuous and systematic input of outside experts on both technical and policy issues as well as departmental police personnel. To Davis and other scholars, policy decisions should be made by upper echelon personnel only after consultation with community members, including experts, and should be uniformly followed by all police personnel. The alternative is unequal justice which develops when individual officers create different policies through different on-the-spot decisions about the same conduct.

Ohio has enacted an Administrative Procedure Act which governs the rule-making of some agencies of State government. The law enforcement activities of police departments are not currently within the ambit of the Act. Those agencies which are subject to the Act are required to provide the public with 30-days advance notice in a local newspaper of any proposed rule adoption or change including a statement of the agency’s intent to take action, the date of the required hearing at which oral and written evidence may be presented, and a synopsis of the proposed rule change. Only after a hearing following proper notice may the agency effect or alter a rule.

The Cincinnati Administrative Code provides that subject to the authority of the City Manager, the heads of departments and other offices may issue rules. The police force in Cincinnati is an administrative division of the Safety Department. Thus, the Safety Director and the Police Chief may prescribe rules for the operation of the Cincinnati police force subject to the approval of the City Manager. The City Manager is himself empowered to issue general rules for the Police Division “as he may deem necessary or expedient for the general conduct of administrative agencies subject to his authority.” The Cincinnati Administrative Code which is part of the city’s Municipal Code does not require civilian input into rule-making for the Police Division. Indeed, there is no requirement that the public be informed that a proposed rule or rule change is to be effected.

The Cincinnati Police Division manuals of rules and regulations and procedures are extensive compendia of purposes, policies, and procedures designed to accomplish what Davis and others enthusiastically endorse, i.e., the limitation of discretion by police officers. However, the manuals have been prepared without the level of citizen input which is

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44 See e.g., The (Federal) Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-559 (1976); The (Ohio) Administrative Procedure Act, §§119.01-119.13 (Page 1979).
45 Police Discretion, p. 98.
46 Ibid., pp. 113-19.
48 Staff One, pp. 70-71.
50 See e.g., Police Discretion, pp. 113-119.
desirable in a domestic police force. In addition, the existing rules, regulations, and procedures do not adequately address the need for a formal expression of official limits on the exercise of law enforcement discretion.

The official public commitment to an impossible standard of strict law enforcement coupled with the absence of citizen input prior to the establishment of departmental rules and regulations means that some police policy which is imposed upon Cincinnati civilians, has been developed by senior Division personnel, most has been created by individual officers on an ad hoc basis and none has been derived from direct pre-enactment community opinion. The distinction between a military and a domestic police force thus becomes blurred in Cincinnati as elsewhere because of the failure to submit departmental policy to prior review and comment by the residents of Cincinnati, not just “community leaders” on an occasional basis but rather all the residents on a continuing basis.

Neighborhood advisory committees

Citizen input into the development of police policy including law enforcement priorities has also been encouraged through on-going neighborhood advisory committees. While “blue ribbon” citizens’ panels consisting of community “leaders” appointed during periods of crisis are often not in touch with real concerns of neighborhoods, a continuing advisory committee which is made up of a cross section of neighborhood residents can provide assistance to the police department both in developing appropriate police policy and in helping to resolve conflicts between civilians and police.

Neighborhood advisory committees permit civilians to have a voice in the development of police policy and to evaluate the adequacy of police services being administered in their particular communities. Such committees are not intended to be passive recipients of imposed police practices, nor passive groups on which police policy established elsewhere is merely explained and justified. Rather, such groups are intended to be active participants in the development and review of police practices.

Neighborhood advisory groups are in integral part of decentralized team policing. These groups are necessary to provide the police force with information about community sentiments, to ensure that the police are responsive to the needs of the neighborhoods, and to improve communication between police and civilians. It is of course, imperative that police personnel attend the neighborhood meetings if the advisory groups are to accomplish their fundamental purpose. Cincinnati consists of 44 neighborhood organizations which could provide input into the development of police policy in accord with the team policing program Cincinnati established in 1972.

According to the former City Manager of Cincinnati, William v. Donaldson, a member of the Cincinnati Police Division attends every neighborhood group meeting. According to members of various neighborhood councils, however, police do not attend the meetings on a regular basis, particularly of those organizations representing poorer and minority neighborhoods. As a result, the Police Division does not receive the input of the various for reducing the isolation of the police and increasing community participation in law enforcement activities. In 1966 Great Britain introduced “unit beat policing” which also stressed public-police cooperation.

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communities where in fact most confrontations between police and civilians occur. In addition, the neighborhood groups established in Cincinnati are not even potentially as strong a source of Division policy as they would be if they were constituted as neighborhood advisory councils whose sole function was to advise the Police Division on policy and procedures as opposed to serving a variety of other community interests.

Police often fear that a strong citizen's advisory board will diminish their authority. The Cincinnati police are probably no different in this regard from their professional brethren employed elsewhere in the country in comparable departments. However, a police force responsive to the needs of the community it serves, a police force genuinely integrated into that community would be less likely to provoke resistance and more likely to engender cooperation than a police force which operates on a strictly militaristic model imposing externally derived policy and practice through isolated and apprehensive officers.

Officer participation in the community

During 1979, Cincinnati seemed to become a polarized community. Police and more affluent whites coalesced at one pole while poor and minority members could be identified at the other. In other polarized communities, reconciliation leading to community-wide civilian-police cooperation generally has occurred where the police were willing to take affirmative steps to elicit the confidence and genuine respect of alienated and angered civilians. Shows of authoritarian force by police personnel may in the short run reduce the anxiety of officers working in hostile or high risk communities but they reportedly are not likely to create a police force genuinely responsive to community concerns nor trusted by area residents.

One way in which police officers have lessened the "us against them" syndrome elsewhere is to participate in community activities. Particularly where police are residents of the community which employs them, officers can diminish their adversary role through involvement in neighborhood organizations and programs. In addition, positive civilian-police contacts help alleviate the cynicism which is endemic among police officers and seems to be a national occupational hazard.

In Cincinnati, there appears to be minimal current involvement of police personnel in the on-going activities of the community other than as invited speakers at formal meetings. Several officers have, however, participated in special projects such as the Police Youth Campouts organized under the auspices of the Santa Maria Community Services in the East Price Hill community. According to the Santa Maria project director, Stephen Lange, these campouts involving police officers, parents, and youngsters have contributed to greater understanding and mutual confidence between the police and the young people who have shared the camping experiences.

Participation in local events is minimized in Cincinnati by its currently uncertain residency ordinance. The former Mayor of Cincinnati, Bobbie Sterne, supported a residency requirement for police personnel because "people who live in a city have a stake in that city, so to speak, and therefore are interested in their work." The Chief of Police Myron J. Leistler, does not support a local residency requirement because he believes that police will not be less willing to do their jobs merely because they

79 Duane Holmes, Metropolitan Area Religious Council, Transcript, pp. 189-90; Rev. James W. Jones, Ministerial Coalition, Transcript, p. 192; Kenneth J. Blackwell, City Council Member and currently Mayor of Cincinnati, Transcript, p. 69; Mayor's Panel, p. I-1.
81 See e.g., Lt. Col. Lawrence E. Whalen, Assistant Police Chief, Cincinnati Police Division, Inspectional Services Bureau, Hearing Transcript, p. 390.
82 Bernard L. Garmire, ed., Local Government Police Management (Washington, D.C.: The Internal City Management Association, 1977), pp. 15, 37; Staff One, pp. 30, 63; Conflict or Cooperation, p. 84; Peacekeeping, pp. 6-7.
83 Mayor's Panel, pp. III-1; Kenneth J. Blackwell, Transcript, pp. 59-60.
84 If police personnel are to be successful in reconciling with alienated civilians from other sub-cultures and life-styles, they must work at understanding and then avoiding behavior, including language, offensive to those civilians. See Donald W. McElvay, The Police and Their Many Publics (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1976), pp. 68, 73.
85 Conflict or Cooperation, p. 84; Urban Ghetto, p. 252; Peacekeeping, p. 29.
do not live in the community and do not "have a stake in the city you are serving." Whether or not police personnel living within the city which employs them would or would not do a better job of enforcing the law or maintaining social order, those personnel living outside the city limits cannot be as actively involved in local affairs as those living within the limits. For example, nonresident police cannot participate in local PTA activities, vote in local elections, involve themselves in block parties, or work with others on issues of general community concerns as neighbors and families.

The controversy over a local residency requirement for police and other public employees is certainly not unique to Cincinnati. In addition, as cities have expanded to include surrounding suburbs within a single urban unit of economic interdependence, arguments against a strict residency requirement have increased. To the extent that a strict residency requirement diminishes the well-documented isolation and alienation of police and integrates them into the community, however, such a requirement may be valid.

**Reviewing Police Conduct and Resolving Civilian-Police Disputes**

**Internal investigation units**

Police are public servants who are thus accountable to the public for their professional conduct. According to the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice:

> Since a principal function of police is the safeguarding of democratic processes, if police fail to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, they subvert the democratic process and frustrate the achievement of a principal police function. It is for this reason that high priority must be given for ensuring that the police are made fully accountable to their police administrator and to the public for their actions.

Internal affairs or investigation units were created to permit police departments to review the practices of police personnel to ensure compliance with applicable laws and standards of performance. One of their most significant functions is to accept complaints of police misconduct from civilians, to investigate those complaints with vigor, and when appropriate, to make recommendations to the chief administrative officer of the department for disciplinary action. Stressing the ultimate accountability of the chief administrative officer for the conduct of all police agency employees, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has emphasized the importance of public participation to an effective internal discipline system. Others have stated that it is the failure of the chief administrative police officer to accept this responsibility for the conduct of his subordinates and his failure to control abuses of authority by police personnel that has led to community pressure for external control through civilian review boards and other outside agencies. That is, the confidence of the public in its police department is reportedly diminished to the extent effective internal discipline for police misconduct is not imposed and is not communicated to the public.

Because an internal investigation unit is composed of police whose responsibility it is to investigate fellow officers, personnel assigned to the unit have an onerous job. Internal investigation unit personnel have been found to suffer severe morale problems over time. As a result, it has been suggested that officers be rotated out of the unit every eighteen months to two years to avoid problems with creeping bias and cynicism which make objectivity virtually impossible.

One of the ways in which an internal investigation unit can be utilized as a preventive as opposed to a often been chastised for failing to understand the "constructive role of dissent in a democracy." See e.g., National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, "The Police in Protest," in **Power and Authority in Law Enforcement**, eds. Terry R. Armstrong and Kenneth M. Cinnamon (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1976), p. 178.

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87 Transcript, p. 447.
88 Chicago has engaged in considerable controversy and extended legal proceedings over the requirement that fire and police personnel (along with all other city employees in the classified civil service) must live within the city limits. The regulation is currently being strictly enforced. *Municipal Code of the City of Chicago*, ch. 25, §25-30 (1979).
89 *Police Function*, p. 124.
90 Ibid., p. 9. See also, G. Douglas Gourley, "Legislative Barriers," in **Effective Police Organization and Management**, vol. IV, ch. xxiv, submitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 1242 for a discussion of the balance between delegated power and authority on the one hand and responsibility and accountability on the other; "Authority, Power, and Influence," p. 61. The police have
punitive agency is through its regular monitoring of the conduct of all departmental police personnel. A complaint card on each officer is maintained which lists all complaints lodged against the officer and whether the complaint was ultimately held to be unfounded, exonerated, or sustained. If a pattern of misconduct develops, the officer's captain is informed. In turn, the captain engages in a counseling program with the officer in an effort to assist such officer alter his or her own behavior before punitive action is necessary. In one community, Los Angeles, California, such a monitoring and counseling program was effective in reducing complaints by fifty-eight percent. The Internal Investigation Section of the Cincinnati Police Division does maintain a separate file on complaints and shots fired by individual officers but does not recommend or require preventive counseling for officers whose history suggests increasing emotional and behavioral problems associated, for example, with stress.

Information about police misconduct comes not only from complaints filed by aggrieved civilians but also from fellow officers. However, the number of complaints filed against police by fellow officers is miniscule. In New York, for example, police officers are officially required to inform on each other if they witness a fellow officer violate a law or departmental regulation. The rule is known informally as the "rat rule" and, according to Arthur Neiderhoffer, a criminal justice expert and former police officer, no one with "self respect" follows it. The failure of fellow officers to complain about each other's conduct and the frequent situation in which only a police officer and a civilian are involved in a confrontation without witnesses often makes it difficult for the civilian to prevail where he or she alleges police misconduct. Without corroboration, the civilian's burden to preponderate is virtually impossible to carry. In such cases, it has been suggested that the polygraph be used. That is, in a low visibility one-on-one situation, the complainant would take a polygraph test. If the results of the polygraph test supported the complaint's allegations then the officer would also be required to take a polygraph and would be subject to disciplinary proceedings for refusal. To protect the officer from criminal consequences, and to preserve his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the results of the polygraph would be strictly limited to internal administrative proceedings. The use of the polygraph may have merit at least in situations where the complainant cannot otherwise corroborate his account since complainants are ordinarily required to produce some evidentiary support for their allegations. However, if a civilian's successful performance on a polygraph were to become a threshold requirement for an internal investigation unit to investigate the facts, it could become a shortcut for a lazy unit, a perversion of the responsibility of the internal investigation unit to thoroughly, impartially, and promptly investigate all complaints from the public.

As discussed above, the Cincinnati Police Division has maintained an Internal Investigation Section since 1970. The procedures for handling civilian complaints are codified in departmental regulations. The range of dispositions recommended by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals—sustained, not sustained, exonerated, or unfounded—are utilized by the Unit. But the problem with low visibility, e.g., one-on-one civilian-police confrontations and disputes is not answer questions in an administrative proceeding "specifically, directly, and narrowly related to the performance of his official duties" which concern his alleged criminal conduct as long as the officer is granted immunity by the prosecuting authority so that neither the testimony itself nor the fruits of that testimony is used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968). See also Spevack v. Klein 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrett v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 554 (1956).

In 1978, for example, 57 per cent of the citizen complaints filed with the Cincinnati Internal Investigation Section were dismissed for lack of evidence to support the complainant's allegations. See discussion, this chapter. For a general discussion of the issue of corroboration see 4 JONES, EVIDENCE § 295, pp. 305-306 (6th ed. 1972); WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2056-2073, pp. 2054-2073 (3rd ed. 1940). See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act which requires that allegations be supported by "reliable, probative and substantial evidence" before sanctions may be imposed.

To the contrary, the Supreme Court has established the principle that, inter alia, a police officer may be required to
solved by these procedures. The category of “not sustained,” for example, is imposed where “insufficient evidence exists to indicate clearly the innocence or the guilt of the accused.” The use of the phrase “clearly indicate” by the Inspectional Services Bureau (of which the Internal Investigation Section is a part) establishes an evidentiary standard which the complainant must meet in order to prevail. Without witnesses or other evidence to support his or her allegations, it is highly unlikely that an individual complainant can meet the “clearly indicate” standard.

While this evidentiary problem is by no means unique to Cincinnati, Cincinnati has apparently not established any mechanism for resolving the problem nor even considered that a problem exists. For example, in 1978, civilians filed 69 complaints against police personnel alleging excessive use of force. Of that number, 39 or 57 percent were determined by the Internal Investigation Section to be “not sustained,” i.e., not supported by sufficient evidence to “clearly indicate” the guilt or innocence of the officer. Assuming the most vigorous investigation by the Section and a total dedication to its responsibilities, turning away over half the complainants solely because of insufficient evidence is unlikely to increase public confidence in the efficacy of an internal corrective process.

Public trust and respect for a police force is reportedly contingent on public accountability and internal discipline. According to the former Mayor of Cincinnati, Bobbie Sterne, the community does not have confidence in the internal investigative process because the Internal Investigation Section lacks objectivity. Kenneth J. Blackwell, currently Mayor of Cincinnati, member of the City Council, and Vice Chairperson of the Safety Committee, pointed out in 1979 that the Internal Investigation Section had always been composed only of white police personnel while most complaints of abuse come from black citizens. Wendell Young, President of the Sentinels Police Association, composed of black police officers in Cincinnati, believes that the traditional absence of black police personnel from the Internal Investigation Section “reinforces the concept among black people that the entire criminal justice system cares nothing and knows nothing about black people, and that we are only processed as cattle in a packing plan when we come into that system.”

Civilian review boards

Civilian review boards have often been proposed as alternatives or supplements to internal review of police practices. At least in the United States, the history of these boards has been dismal. Their failure has been attributed to a number of reasons. First, the chief administrative police officer cannot abdicate to any person or agency his ultimate authority and accountability for the conduct of his subordinates. Secondly, neither the public nor the police has supported such boards beyond the level of debate and recommendation.

In 1966, for example, then Mayor John Lindsey of New York City fulfilled a campaign promise to establish a seven-person civilian review board consisting of three police officers and four civilians. The Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association succeeded in placing the issue on a referendum and then campaigned vigorously against the establishment of the board emphasizing that “crime in the streets” would increase if the board was established. The Association was successful in defeating the proposed civilian review board by a two-to-one margin thus
defending "the occupational autonomy of the police against all interference." Similarly, an undated editorial prepared by the National Federation of Police entitled "Police Review Boards" claimed that civilian review boards "excuse the obnoxious odor of communism." The Federation cited as its authority the "Communist handbook" which says "police are the enemies of communism."

Minority groups which have often been the targets of abusive police practices have actively supported civilian review boards. The extreme hostility of police to such boards has increased the mistrust of minorities in the police. During the attempt to establish a civilian review board in New York, for example, the black community reviewed the board as a means of defending itself against police brutality. It is of interest to note that during the New York controversy, the Black Guardians, the association of black police officers, rejected the position of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association. The conduct of the Black Guardians reportedly indicated their solidarity with the black community but it also suggested to non-black police personnel that they were an organized and disloyal group within the police department.

Cincinnati has never established a citizens' review board as such. However, the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission established by the City Council has attempted to fulfill some of the functions of such a board. The response of the city administration to the attempts of the Commission to review police practices upon complaint of civilians often has been unfavorable. According to Arthur Slater, former staff representative of the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission, the former City Manager, William V. Donaldson, blamed the Commission for the breakdown in police-community relations in the city. In addition, the Police Division and the Safety Director have been critical of investigations conducted by the Commission and reportedly have been unwilling to cooperate with staff. On the other hand, the head of the Internal Investigation Section, Lawrence E. Whalen, has stated that many civilians are afraid to bring their complaints of police abuse to the police division directly but prefer instead to initiate complaints through the Human Relations Commission.

Since the Human Relations Commission does not have the authority to interview police personnel against whom complaints of abuse have been filed by civilians nor to review internal division files, its ability to investigate complaints adequately is severely limited. While the City Council has recently limited the funds allocated to the Commission, others, including Marion A. Spencer representing the Committee of 50 (a broad based community group representing black citizens of Cincinnati headed by former Mayor Theodore Berry), has advocated expanding the powers of the Commission.

Tecumseh X. Graham, former member of City Council and Chairman of the Safety Committee, has advocated the establishment of a citizens review board for the police division. Graham has recommended that such a board be composed of five members appointed by the Mayor with the consent of Council. The board would have the power to review all policies and practices of the police division and recommend changes to Council. In addition, the board would review complaints against the department and recommend techniques for improving police-community relations. Finally, the board would not have the direct power to discipline police officers but instead would transmit its findings to the police chief for action. Young, President of the Sentinels Police Association, also supports a civilian review board with the "confidence and the power to honestly and openly investigate police problems in this city." In addition, the Mayor's Community Relations Panel has recommended a "citizens complaints committee" to which a civilian who is dissatisfied with the final determination of the Internal Investigation Section may appeal.

At the present time, Cincinnati does not plan to establish a citizens review board as such or strengthen the powers of the Human Relations Commission. interview in Cincinnati, Ohio, Jan. 26, 1979 (hereafter cited as Whalen Interview); Donald Mooney, Chairman, Cincinnati Human Relations Commission, Transcript, p. 737. 

Whalen Interview.

Arthur Slater, Transcript, p. 337.

Donald Mooney, Transcript, pp. 736–37.

Transcript, p. 91.

Ibid., pp. 46–47.

Ibid., p. 547.

Mayor's Panel, IVE-2.
to investigate civilian complaints of police abuse. However, several elected officials, the Mayor's Community Relations Panel, the president of the black police officers' association, and representatives of a number of community organizations along with other civilians publicly concluded in 1979 that a significant proportion of the Cincinnati civilian population had lost confidence in the ability of the Internal Investigation Section to investigate properly allegations of police misconduct. In response to these problems, the Cincinnati City Council authorized the establishment of an Office of Municipal Investigations. When operational, the unit will be composed of independent, trained law enforcement investigators and will look into major complaints against the police. The plan for the new unit has the approval of the Police Chief and the Safety Director, both of whom have firmly opposed all other forms of external administrative review of alleged police misconduct.

Peer review panels
Hans Toch, a criminologist who has worked with the Oakland Police Department to develop a program to curb violence by police officers against civilians, believes it is imperative for police departments to control internally the excessive use of physical force by police personnel. In support of his position, Toch has cited a number of reasons including 1) officers possess extensive legal and physical powers to use force to accomplish their goals, 2) "free lance" police violence polarizes the community and destroys public confidence in government, and 3) the low visibility of police-civilian confrontations makes it difficult to subject police to external review and control. His efforts and the willingness of the Oakland Police Department to accept, first, that there was a serious if limited problem with police brutality in the department and, second, that the problem should and could be remedied have reportedly been successful in reducing the incidence of violence by police against civilians in that city.

In addition to working with individual officers with a history of violence, Toch implemented a peer review panel to assess the reasonableness of officers' conduct. The panel consisted entirely of fellow police officers. Individual officers were referred to the panel either by their superiors or on the basis of having been involved in a predetermined number of violent incidents. The purpose of the panel was to help the officers understand and alter their conduct through peer pressure thus avoiding the disciplinary sanctions which would inevitably follow if the misconduct were not stopped.

Toch recommended that members rotate on a regular basis and that the panel include officers who had appeared before it earlier and subsequently eliminated their violent interactions with civilians. By including on the panel police who had formerly committed violent acts against civilians but who had successfully changed their attitudes and behavior, troubled officers now in need of counsel were able to identify with and benefit from their successes. As with certain programs for alcoholics, drug addicted persons, compulsive gamblers, and others who lack control over particular aspects of their behavior, utilizing individual officers who had successfully developed appropriate attitudes and controls to assist others alter their conduct reportedly diminished those moralistic and adversary qualities which militate against positive change.

The peer review panel implemented in Oakland, California has reportedly reduced significantly the number of violent incidents between police and civilians. Other cities including Kansas City have also implemented such a panel. As vehicles to influence deviant and abusive police officers, "without violating taboos of in-group loyalty," peer review panels have apparently been successful.

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144 Bobbie Sterne, Transcript, p. 16; Tecumseh X. Graham, Transcript, pp. 46-47.
145 Mayor's Panel, p. IVE-1.
146 Wendell Young, Transcript, p. 547.
147 Marion Spencer, Transcript, p. 101; Michael E. Maloney, Transcript, p. 131; Damon J. Lynch; Ministerial Coalition, Transcript, p. 213; Mayor's Panel, pp. III-2, 3.
149 Ibid.
150 Professor Toch has been affiliated with the State University of New York at Albany for many years as a professor of criminal justice.
151 Peacekeeping, p. 6.
152 Ibid., p. 40.
154 Ibid., p. 39.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid., p. 40.
157 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid., p. 40.
Ombudsman

An ombudsman is a governmental officer of high rank generally appointed by and responsible to the legislative branch of government who is empowered to evaluate the merits of citizens complaints about official conduct and publicly recommend action to correct misconduct or inefficiency. The concept of "ombudsman" goes back into the mists of European history. The first office of ombudsman was officially established by the King of Sweden in 1793. Subsequently, the position became part of Sweden's democratic constitution of 1809.

A number of countries now have ombudsmen each of which has somewhat different powers and procedures. For example, only the Swedish ombudsman has the power to institute disciplinary proceedings against officials. The French Mediatur (ombudsman) may receive complaints only after administrative remedies have been exhausted and only from a Deputy or Senator. The British Parliamentary Commission for Administration (ombudsman) may not investigate police matters. Thus, each country has developed the concept of ombudsman in its own way but all share the same purpose which is to provide a competent official body external to executive agencies to review citizen complaints concerning the performance of those agencies to ensure compliance with applicable law, regulation, and standards of conduct.

The American Bar Association in 1969 adopted the recommendations of its Section on Administrative Law that state and local governments consider establishing ombudsmen "authorized to inquire into administrative action and to make public criticism." Other authorities have also recommended establishing ombudsmen to review official conduct, including police practices, upon complaint of citizens. These writers generally emphasize that the ombudsman to be effective must be independent of the executive branch, impartial, an expert in government, universally accessible to citizens, and possess-
By 1976, four States in the United States had established statewide offices of ombudsman: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, and Nebraska. Minnesota has established an ombudsman throughout the executive branch to handle complaints from prison inmates. Other than Minnesota with its limited office, each State has empowered its ombudsman to investigate any department, agency, or office which has allegedly failed to perform its official duties properly. None of the State ombudsmen is mandated to institute enforcement proceedings but rather must refer to other authorities for enforcement. The State officers routinely receive anywhere from 500 to 2,000 complaints a year. Almost half of those complaints which have been fully investigated have been found to be justified.

Buffalo, New York instituted an ombudsman project in the 1960's which differed somewhat from the traditional ombudsman approach. The Buffalo group decided that where police misconduct was alleged, it would present only the citizen's point of view to police administrators because the police officer's account was already readily accessible to officials within the department. The group found that almost always the civilian was alleging physical mistreatment, he had been charged with disorderly conduct or placed under arrest. Often, the police had agreed to drop criminal charges if the civilian took no action in regard to the physical mistreatment. Review of civilian complaints by the Buffalo project did not supplant internal investigation nor was it intended as a criticism of the internal investigation unit. Rather, the project provided civilians with an external administrative body where they could bring their complaints confident of a sympathetic audience. When those complaints were subsequently brought to the attention of the police department, they were reportedly fairly and objectively handled by the police administration.

Neither Ohio nor Cincinnati has established an office of ombudsman. The Cincinnati Police Chief, Myron J. Leistler, has traditionally opposed all forms of external review of police misconduct because he believes the Internal Investigation Section has earned the trust of the public in the complaint process and believes in the ability of the Section to investigate complaints with the objectivity essential to a competent review process. While recognizing the importance of a judicial appellate procedure, Chief Leistler apparently has not considered an administrative appellate procedure, whereby a civilian who is dissatisfied with the conduct of police officers and with the internal investigation of his or her complaint may obtain review, to be necessary or desirable. The Office of Municipal Investigations, recently established in Cincinnati, however, has received Leistler's approval. That unit would not serve an appellate role for civilian complaints and would investigate only major complaints against the police. At the present time, this proposed unit has not progressed beyond the planning stage.

Michael Maloney, Executive Director of the Urban Appalachian Council, Wendell Young, President of the Sentinels Police Association and others have proposed that some system of external review of police practices and procedures, including procedures for complaint investigation, is essential to overcome the bias inherent in the police alone policing themselves and for purposes of public accountability. The office of ombudsman is one such form of external review which leaves intact the internal investigatory process of the police division while serving an appellate function upon completion of the internal process.

186 Ibid.
187 Report 1, pp. 207-10.
188 Ibid., p. 209.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 However, the Director of the Ohio Department of Corrections did administratively create an office of ombudsman to review prisoner complaints. The ombudsman was responsible only to the Director. The position was abolished early in 1975. Ohio State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Protecting Inmate Rights: Prison
Arbitration

Arbitration and mediation as techniques of conflict resolution between police personnel and civilians have received very little attention in the United States. Although arbitration and mediation have been used successfully in resolving a variety of problems including landlord-tenant disputes, minor criminal matters between defendants and victims, labor disputes, and grievances in correctional facilities between residents and staff, these well-established tools have not been utilized by communities in police-civilian disputes. There is no reason, however, why these tools could not be used to settle grievances against police personnel.

Mediation and arbitration both utilize neutral third parties to assist in resolving disputes between persons who have attempted and failed to resolve those disputes themselves. Mediation and arbitration techniques differ in several ways. First, mediation involves the neutral third party acting as liaison between the disputants to assist each develop a new perspective about their own and the other party's position and goals. The mediator is a harmonizer, an individual who helps disputants recognize their own basic interests and reconcile them with the basic interests of the opposing party.

Arbitration involves a hearing, with formal presentation of evidence, before an arbitrator who weighs that evidence, makes formal findings of fact, and determines the outcome of the dispute. If binding arbitration is utilized, the determination of the arbitrator is binding on the parties. If voluntary arbitration is involved, then the arbitrator's determination acts as a persuasive recommendation only. Both voluntary and binding arbitration are used to resolve disputes arising in a variety of contracts throughout the country.

Mediation or arbitration of individual civilian-police disputes could be utilized in Cincinnati. Such a program would provide a neutral decision-maker at the appellate level. That is, the Internal Investigation Section would continue to investigate complaints of police misconduct by civilians. Only if the civilian were dissatisfied with the outcome would the matter be referred to a mediator or arbitrator. At the present time, an officer dissatisfied with a disciplinary decision of the police chief based on the investigation of the Internal Investigation Section may appeal to the Civil Service Commission before being forced to seek judicial remedies. No similar administrative appeal is available to complainants who are dissatisfied with the actions of the Internal Investigation Section and/or the police chief.

Unlike the Internal Investigation Section which aims at establishing the guilt or innocence of the officer who is the subject of the complaint, mediation and arbitration aim at providing appropriate resolution of the underlying grievance. It is possible, for example, that where a racial epithet has been used by an officer against a civilian, what the civilian wants is an apology and cares only secondarily whether the officer is officially reprimanded. If in a physically violent altercation between an officer and a civilian, the latter's coat is torn and the decision is that the officer behaved improperly, repair or replacement of the coat as recommended by the arbitrator or mediator may be more appropriate than a three-day suspension of the officer. In other words, mediation and arbitration aim at resolving the grievance rather than merely assessing blame, thereby leaving the aggrieved party without restitution.

Professional organizations with considerable expertise are currently available to assist the Cincinnati Police Division establish and maintain a mediation/arbitration program. The Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice for example, has worked as mediator in Cincinnati and elsewhere may only appeal a suspension in excess of three days, a reduction in pay, or a dismissal to their local civil service board. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §124.34 (Page Supp. 1979).

198 Robert Coulson, President, American Arbitration Association, telephone interview Nov. 9, 1979 (hereafter cited as Coulson Interview).
200 Ibid.
202 Bridge Interview.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Only after exhausting the internal complaint process would a complainant be able to invoke the mediation/arbitration process.
207 A police officer may appeal any suspension as well as a reduction in pay or a dismissal to the municipal civil service board. Other public servants at the present time, an aggrieved civilian must file a claim for damages with the City Solicitor who is empowered to award compensation up to a total of $3000,000 a year. Thomas A. Leubbers, former City Solicitor, Cincinnati, Ohio, interview in Cincinnati, Ohio, Jan. 25, 1980.
210 See discussion Chapter 1. The Mayor’s Community Relations Panel was established as a result of the efforts of the Community Relations Service to assist Cincinnati in developing solutions to the critical problems facing that community in the Spring of 1979. Richard A. Salem, Midwest Regional Director, Community Relations Service, Department of Justice, letter to Clark G. Roberts, Regional Director, MWRO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Nov. 20, 1979 (hereafter cited as Salem Letter).
on issues of community-wide concern where the police division and significant segments of the community have become polarized. The Service does not, however, routinely involve itself in the individual grievance process.\(^{211}\)

On the other hand, the American Arbitration Association, a private non-profit organization founded in 1926 "to provide private dispute settlement services. . .[including] arbitration, mediation, elections, and other voluntary methods of conflict resolution,"\(^ {212}\) does act as mediator and arbitrator in individual disputes. The Association has participated in a variety of programs to increase the use and the usefulness of arbitration in reconciling disputing parties through mediation and providing solutions to disputes through arbitration.\(^ {213}\) The Association provides training to mediators and arbitrators and selects or recommends specific mediators or arbitrators in specific cases.\(^ {214}\) The Association has indicated that it would be willing to become involved in a program in Cincinnati upon agreement of the police division.\(^ {215}\) Funding for the program could be obtained through the city or through a source like the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.\(^ {216}\) The Association would train sufficient community members in mediation and arbitration techniques to build an available cadre of experts in regard to police-civilian disputes.\(^ {217}\) Funds now authorized by City Council for payment of damage claims against the police could potentially be transferred to such a project with Council approval.\(^ {218}\)

In addition to training civilians in mediating and/or arbitrating disputes between police and civilians, the Association has also indicated its willingness to participate in the initial and in-service training of Cincinnati police officers in techniques of mediation.\(^ {219}\) A great deal of an officer's professional activities consists of mediating disputes between civilians, e.g., husband and wife or quarreling patrons of a bar.\(^ {220}\) The better trained police officers are in mediation techniques, the better able they are to de-escalate potentially explosive situations.\(^ {221}\) Reliance on persuasive as opposed to authoritarian techniques is a desirable ability officers reportedly develop with professional maturity.\(^ {222}\) That process can probably be accelerated through initial and in-service training in mediation techniques.

This chapter has reviewed mechanisms for guiding, regulating, and reviewing police conduct and resolving disputes between civilians and police. The following chapter presents recommendations for limiting the use of force by police officers, ensuring evenhanded law enforcement and the equal distribution of police services throughout Cincinnati, expanding public participation in the development and review of police division policy and procedures, and increasing the numbers of minority and female officers and supervisory personnel in the Cincinnati Police Division.

\(^ {211}\) Salem Letter. However, the jurisdiction of the Community Relations Service is broad enough to permit its involvement in the resolution of individual grievances which are based on race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §2000g-1 (1976).

\(^ {212}\) American Arbitration Association, "Your Dispute Resolution Forum" (New York, undated).

\(^ {213}\) Bridge Interview.

\(^ {214}\) Ibid.

\(^ {215}\) Phillip S. Thompson, Regional Director, Cincinnati, Ohio, telephone interview Nov. 9, 1979 (hereafter cited as Thompson Interview).

\(^ {216}\) David Tevelin, Attorney Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, telephone interview, Nov. 14, 1979; See also Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-157, §203; 93 Stat. 1167.

\(^ {217}\) Thompson Interview.

\(^ {218}\) At the present time, an aggrieved civilian must file a formal claim with the City Solicitor who has a yearly $300,000 fund at his disposal. Thomas A Leubbers, Interview in Cincinnati, Ohio, Jan. 25, 1980.
Chapter 6

Summary of Investigation, Findings and Recommendations

Summary

During the last two years, a number of individuals and community groups in Cincinnati have complained to the Ohio Advisory Committee that police officers abuse their authority to use force against civilians, apply the law unevenly according to the race or cultural background of civilians, and that officials in the Police Division and the city administration are indifferent to these problems. In addition, the Committee became aware early in its investigation of the complaints of a substantial underemployment of women and minorities in the Police Division, a situation which a number of complainants alleged contributes to the continuing and serious police-civilian tensions.

At the request of a number of community organizations and individual Cincinnatians, the Committee undertook a study of the Cincinnati Police Division focusing on five major issues. First, the Committee evaluated the Police Division's use of force policy, including formal officer training and subsequent actual practice in the community. Second, the issue of whether all segments of the Cincinnati community were receiving their fair share of police services was analyzed. Third, the Committee reviewed the makeup of the workforce of the Police Division, in particular, the disparity between the racial and sexual composition of the sworn force and the Cincinnati population. Fourth, local, county, State, and Federal agencies with oversight responsibilities were examined. Finally, problems with controlling police discretion and proposals for resolving civilian-police disputes were evaluated.

The Ohio Advisory Committee found problems involving misuse of force by the police; inequitable distribution of police services; inadequate oversight and control by local, State, and Federal agencies; and abuse of discretion by police. However, the most glaring problem uncovered is the serious underrepresentation of blacks and females among police officers, particularly at the supervisory levels where blacks and females are virtually nonexistent. A recent consent decree agreed to by the U.S. Department of Justice and the city may lead to an eventual solution to this problem.

The following pages contain the specific findings and recommendations designed to remedy the problems identified in this investigation. The Committee intends to continue monitoring the policies and practices of the Cincinnati Police Division in cooperation with concerned community groups until the causes of unnecessary tensions between the Cincinnati police and the Cincinnati civilian community have been eliminated.

Findings

Use of Force

1. Cincinnati police officers frequently fail or refuse to provide civilians with the reasons for their actions and incorrectly perceive requests and demands for reasons as resistance. This conduct creates great resentment, fear, and distrust in civilians, and may ultimately create actual resistance.

2. Civilians, fearing the extensive powers of the police, perceive force as any coercive technique, both physical and verbal, including threats of legal sanctions. On the other hand, the Cincinnati Police
Division defines force only as extreme physical force while lesser physical force and verbal threats are categorized as discourtesy. The discrepancy between civilian and police definitions of "force" creates a significant communication problem and obscures the degree to which police officers use coercive as opposed to persuasive techniques in interactions with civilians.

3. Ohio is one of only eight States which has not enacted a statute governing the use of deadly force by police officers. Current Ohio law, which is derived from judicial decisions interpreting older common law, permits police officers to use deadly force against civilians where necessary to effect the arrest of any fleeing felon or in defense of self or another. Proposals to enact a statute which would restrict the use of deadly force by police officers have consistently been defeated in the Ohio legislature.

4. The express Police Division policy on use of deadly force is far more restrictive than Ohio law. This more restrictive policy has resulted in a general decline in the number of shots fired at civilians, particularly at black civilians.

5. The recent modernization of police equipment which has involved a shift from a .38 to a .357 caliber handgun and controlled expansion bullets which has been approved by the Chief of Police, a Safety Task Force appointed by the City Council, and the City Council itself, has been the source of considerable outrage and fear by Cincinnati civilians many of whom view the increased stopping power of the new equipment solely as a power game by the Police Division.

6. Many organizations and individuals have raised concerns about the adequacy of training in the area of response to crisis situations. In a number of arrest situations force must be used to overcome resistance and the threat of harm to citizens and the officer. However, there is no formal training given the Cincinnati police officers which provides an ample understanding of the proper use of force or alternatives to force in such situations.

7. Police officers have many responsibilities and opportunities to perform involving community service, maintaining order, and fighting crime. But they measure their capacity to "do the job", and are judged by their colleagues, by their success in policing people. This tradition has led to an "us against them" mentality resulting occasionally in the excessive use of force by police in cases where other persuasive tactics would have been more appropriate. Unfortunately, the guidelines and instructions on use of force are inadequate for effectively informing officers of appropriate limits in the use of force or advising them on the use of other persuasive approaches to reduce tension and conflict.

**Employment**

1. The City of Cincinnati, the Cincinnati Police Division, and the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission have pursued policies and practices which have discriminated against blacks and women depriving them of equal employment opportunity in the Police Division.

2. The discriminatory practice of not recruiting, hiring, assigning, or promoting blacks and women as police officers on the same basis as white males has a detrimental affect on keeping good black and women police officers in the Police Division.

3. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) has not addressed the hiring and promotion policy in a manner conducive to the elimination of underutilization of minorities and women in the Cincinnati Police Division. In fact, the leadership of the FOP has been criticized for its lack of professionalism and insensitivity to the problem of discriminatory employment practices.

4. There is no formal structure to facilitate community input into the recruitment, hiring, promotion, and training policies and practices of the Police Division.

5. The U.S. Department of Justice and the City of Cincinnati have recently reached a consent decree in which the city agreed to specific numerical hiring goals that, if met, will eliminate underutilization of minorities and women in the Cincinnati Police Division. The City also agreed to promote minorities and women at a rate consistent with their representation in the pool of qualified candidates.

**Distribution of Service**

1. Cincinnati police officers experience frustration in attempting to meet frequently conflicting demands of maintaining order, providing community service, and fighting crime. The community calls for service and peace keeping, while police consider their fundamental job to be the apprehension of felons.

2. There is a perception among some police and some citizens that neither group respects the other.
Segments of the community are concerned with both racism and class prejudice because of what they view as demonstrable contempt and disrespect of police for both poor blacks and poor whites. At the same time many police feel isolated, unappreciated, and disrespected by some parts of the community.

3. Police officers and citizens interact with each other very infrequently in any way other than crime related situations. The reduction of personnel in the police division, underutilization of black officers and women, and lack of organized formal involvement in community life has contributed to the widening gap of misunderstanding and lack of communication between the police and the community.

4. The investigative process of the Cincinnati Internal Investigation Section is one of the most controversial issues that faces the community, primarily because of a virtual total lack of communication with the community and complainants about the disposition of the complaints.

5. Until very recently, there were no black police officers in the Internal Investigation Section which demonstrated a longstanding lack of sensitivity to the concerns of part of a significant community.

6. Due to the fragmented approach and the absence of full support of the Police Division, from the chief to the officer on the street, community relations programs in the Police Division have failed to achieve their stated objectives.

External Oversight and Control of the Police Division

Local and County Agencies

1. City Solicitor

The involvement of the City Solicitor in issues of alleged police misconduct is complex and raises questions of potential conflicts of interest. The City Solicitor is responsible for all misdemeanors committed in Cincinnati including misdemeanor assault by a police officer on a civilian; defending police officers sued civilly by civilians for misconduct where the alleged misconduct occurs in the scope of the officers' employment duties, and representing the Police Division against police officers who have been administratively disciplined by the Police Chief and appeal their disciplinary sanctions to Civil Service.

The City Solicitor has attempted to resolve its conflicting responsibilities by authorizing officers to retain their own counsel, paid for by the city, in cases where the City Solicitor has earlier appeared in an adverse role and the alleged misconduct was not wanton or malicious.

The City Solicitor has never prosecuted a police officer for the excessive use of force against a civilian.

2. County Prosecutor

The County Prosecutor is responsible for prosecuting all felonies committed within Cincinnati, including felonious assault by a police officer on a civilian, after an indictment is returned by the Grand Jury. The County Prosecutor decides which cases of alleged police misconduct will be presented to the Grand Jury for their determination of whether an indictable offense has occurred.

In the last ten years, only four cases of alleged police misconduct grounded in the excessive use of force were submitted to the Grand Jury (which returned no indictments) because in all other cases the County Prosecutor independently determined that no criminal offense had been committed under State law governing use of force against a civilian.

State Agencies

1. Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC)

The OCRC has jurisdiction over complaints of discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, handicap, and ancestry in employment, housing, and credit but not in public services.

Because the OCRC does not have jurisdiction over complaints grounded in cultural background or economic class, it cannot protect poor white and white Appalachians from employment discrimination.

2. Ohio Office of Criminal Justice, Department of Economic and Community Development (OCJ)

The OCJ is responsible for ensuring that the recipients of State and Federal funds abide by applicable laws requiring nondiscrimination against beneficiaries. This responsibility includes jurisdiction over complaints of race or sex based employ-
ment discrimination, excessive use of force by police officers against civilians, and the inequitable distribution of police services.

The OCJ has determined that its civil rights enforcement staff is too small to permit it to investigate complaints of unlawful discrimination directly. Instead, all such complaints will be referred to other agencies including OCRC and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) if and when received.

3. Ohio State Training Council

The Ohio State Training Council is responsible for promulgating minimum standards of training for State police academies including the Cincinnati Police Academy, but has no jurisdiction to set standards for the basic or continuing education or conduct of police officers. As a result:
—There are no uniform State standards for police officers education or conduct, and
—Municipal police officers are not licensed at the State level.

Federal Involvement

1. During the years 1976–1979, Federal funds flowing to the Cincinnati Police Division to support its $88.8 million budget totaled $21.0 million (24 percent). The city contributed $67.01 million (75 percent), and the State $734,032 (1 percent). Law enforcement related activities consume a considerable portion of the city budget. Expenditures of local revenues by the Police Division during those same years represented between 14 and 19 percent of the total municipal budgets.

2. Federal agencies which have funded Cincinnati since 1976 are the Office of Revenue Sharing (ORS), the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) (which is currently being phased out), and the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor which administers the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Each of these agencies has enacted its own set of regulations and investigative procedures. There is no express provision for coordinated enforcement activities, leading to unnecessary duplication of effort.

3. All Federal funding agencies are responsible for ensuring that the ultimate beneficiaries of their funds are not subjected to unlawful discrimination. However, the various enabling statues of these agencies are not uniform in their classification of protected categories.

—Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin.
—LEAA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, or religion.
—ORS prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or handicap.
—CETA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, handicap, citizenship, or political affiliation.

4. This lack of uniformity in protected categories among the Federal funding agencies exists for no valid substantive reason and contributes to problems in uniformity and coordination of enforcement responsibilities.

5. No Federal agency providing funds to Cincinnati protects civilians from discrimination based on cultural background or economic class. Consequently, poor white and white Appalachian Cincinnatians may be subjected to invidious discrimination without fear of sanctions by those Federal agencies.

6. Regulations enacted by the various Federal funding agencies do not consistently require assurances of nondiscrimination from the ultimate individual municipal departmental recipients of Federal funds: only assurances and aggregate data from the city itself are usually required. As a result, in Cincinnati which is one-third black and in which the sworn police force is 92.5 percent white:
—ORS has not monitored the policies and practices of the Police Division although it is required to do so where there is a significant disparity between the actual and potential minority composition of the workforce, and
—LEAA has monitored the Equal Employment Opportunity Programs of the city and has found it to be in compliance with LEAA nondiscrimination requirements.
—The Department of Justice (DOJ) has determined that minorities and women are underemployed by the Cincinnati Police Division and has entered into a consent agreement with the city to rectify that underutilization.

7. All Federal agencies which have provided funds to the Police Division have jurisdiction over complaints of race or sex based discrimination arising from allegations of excessive use of force by police officers against civilians, inequitable distribution of police services, and employment within the Division. However:
—Few civilians or police officers are aware they may file complaints with these agencies;
—Unless the complaints allege a "pattern or practice" of unlawful discrimination, these agencies do not have jurisdiction to require that recipients modify their policies and practices as a condition of continued funding; and
—Difficulties in proving "pattern or practice" suits have led these agencies to decide to refer most complaints of unlawful discrimination to appropriate enforcement agencies which are the DOJ and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

8. The ability of the DOJ to prosecute police officers for the excessive use of force against civilians is severely hampered by existing law which requires that no officer may be found guilty of violating Federal criminal civil rights law unless he or she committed the alleged misconduct with specific intent to deprive the affected civilian of a constitutional or other federally protected right and acted outside the limits of State law governing use of force by police officers. As a result, no Cincinnati police officer has been criminally prosecuted by the DOJ for the excessive use of force against a civilian because:
— the specific intent standard is virtually impossible to meet, and
— Ohio law governing use of force including use of deadly force by police officers against civilians is sufficiently broad to provide virtual immunity from Federal prosecution.

9. No Federal funding or enforcement agency has or is now monitoring the policies and practices of the Cincinnati Police Division to determine whether each segment of the community is receiving its fair share of police services.

Proposals for Guiding, Regulating, and Reviewing Police Conduct and Resolving Civilian-Police Disputes

Guiding and Regulating Police Discretion
1. Police officers in Cincinnati, as elsewhere, with the least maturity and experience are the most often involved with civilians in potentially adverse interactions. In addition, these officers have inadequate official guidance in law enforcement related decision making. As a result:
— Officers must make ad hoc decisions based upon their individual judgments and standards which are greatly influenced by collateral factors of race and economic class, and
— law enforcement in minority and majority and in poor and affluent communities is uneven.

2. The Police Chief in allocating resources, i.e., a large vice squad, geographic distribution of police officers, determines community priorities in law enforcement. There is inadequate civilian input from the Cincinnati community into determining law enforcement priorities.

3. There is inadequate public involvement in rulemaking for the Cincinnati Police Division:
— Unlike several other municipal subdivisions, the Cincinnati Police Division does not publish its rules and regulations as an appendix to the municipal code or make them otherwise readily available to the public.
— There is no requirement of public notice and opportunity for public comment before rules and regulations are adopted or amended. Thus, rules which regulate police conduct in interactions with civilians have been promulgated without participation by the very civilians who are affected by that conduct.

4. No on-going citizens' advisory board or neighborhood council exists to provide regular input into the development of Police Division policy or to monitor the effectiveness of existing policies and practices. As a result, official communication between the Police Division and the community is sporadic and unrepresentative of the community as a whole.

5. A combination of the poorly enforced and uncertain residency requirement for Cincinnati police officers and the failure of the Police Division to provide officers with paid time-off to participate in community activities adds to the separation between civilians and police and contributes to the frequent perception that the Cincinnati police are a hostile and occupying force.

Reviewing Police Conduct and Resolving Civilian-Police Disputes
1. The Internal Investigation Section is not fully effective in reviewing police conduct:
— The Section maintains a separate file on each officer, listing complaints and shots fired, but does not monitor this file to identify officers who are developing a pattern of abusive conduct nor require them to obtain professional counseling
before the conduct reaches a point where disciplinary sanctions must be imposed.
—Police officers assigned to the Section are subject to unique stresses and severe moral problems which may hamper the effectiveness and professionalism of their investigations.
—Over half the complaints of excessive force are discourtesy filed with the Section are ultimately dismissed for lack of evidence. Public trust cannot be expected where those in control of gathering evidence and determining facts regularly fail to do so. In addition, no outside agency is permitted to review Internal Investigation Section files to ensure that adequate procedures have been followed and a proper evidentiary basis exists to support decisions of the Section and the Police Chief, significant contributing factor to lack of public confidence in the internal process.

2. Many Cincinnati residents who are afraid to file their complaints of police misconduct with the Internal Investigations Section bring them instead to the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission (CHRC). However, the ability of CHRC to investigate and resolve civilian-police disputes is severely hampered because investigators have no authority to interview police officers nor review Internal Investigation Section files.

3. Citizens' review boards have experienced a dismal history in the United States because they lack support from police departments and from civilians other than members of minority groups, those most often subject to police abuse of force.

4. Peer review panels composed of fellow officers to which officers are referred by their supervisors when a pattern of abusive conduct is first discerned have been successful in reducing the incidence of police misconduct.

5. Cincinnatians who are dissatisfied with the process and outcome of the internal investigations of their complaints have no administrative appeal whereas police officers who are administratively disciplined may appeal to Civil Service. A recent proposal to provide external administrative review is inadequate. That is:
—The Office of Municipal Investigations which has been established by the City Council will investigate only major complaints against the Police Division and other agencies and will not review the process or outcome of investigations of individual complaints.

—Cincinnati has not established an Office of Ombudsman with the authority to receive complaints from civilians dissatisfied with the internal investigation process and outcome and to review compliance of the Police Division with established policies and procedures.
—Cincinnati provides no mechanism whereby civilians who have been injured by the misconduct of police officers may seek restitution through an administrative process from the officer and no procedure for mediation or arbitration of civilian-police disputes.

Recommendations

To the Congress

1. Congress should review categories of individuals currently protected under Federal funding statutes and establish a uniform classification of protected categories except where an exception is clearly justified by the purposes of the legislation.
2. Congress should add cultural background and economic class to the list of protected categories under Federal funding statutes.
3. Congress should enact legislation removing the specific intent requirement from Federal statutes which empower the DOJ to criminally prosecute police officers for brutalizing civilians.
4. Congress should allocate sufficient resources to permit the civil rights divisions of Federal funding agencies to carry out their responsibilities effectively.

To Federal Funding Agencies

1. In cooperation with the DOJ, the Federal agencies providing funds to the Cincinnati Police Division, ORS, ETA and if it continues in existence, LEAA, or its successor, should immediately develop a uniform system and set of standards for reviewing the compliance of individual municipal agencies with nondiscrimination requirements, including coordination procedures for investigations and administrative proceedings.
2. In cooperation with the DOJ, the Federal agencies providing funds to the Cincinnati Police Division, ORS, ETA, and, if it continues in existence, LEAA, or its successor, should immediately undertake an investigation of the Cincinnati Police Division to determine whether police services, including complaint investigation and disposition,
are being equitably distributed to Cincinnati civilians without regard to minority status.

To the Ohio Legislature

1. The Ohio legislature should enact legislation restricting the use of deadly force by police officers to those situations where such force is necessary to protect self or others from imminent death or great bodily harm.
2. The powers of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC) should be expanded to include jurisdiction over complaints of discrimination in public services and complaints grounded in discrimination based upon cultural background and economic class.
3. Sufficient resources must be allocated to the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice, Department of Economic and Community Development to ensure that it will be able to carry out its civil rights responsibilities effectively in coordination with OCRC and LEAA.
4. The jurisdiction of the Ohio State Training Council should be expanded to include authority to establish minimum standards of education and conduct for police officers as well as to license municipal police officers.
5. The Ohio legislature should establish a State Office of Ombudsman to review and investigate complaints that State and municipal agencies, including the Cincinnati Police Division, are not complying with established policies and procedures and to recommend modifications of those policies and procedures.

To the County Prosecutor and the City Solicitor

1. All instances involving police use of force against civilians including the use of deadly force should be screened by a special prosecutor to determine if such conduct constitutes a probable violation of State or municipal law which requires further prosecutorial action.
2. The City Solicitor should vigorously enforce the Cincinnati residency requirement for Cincinnati police officers.

To the City Council

1. The City Council should establish formally the Mayor's Community Relations Panel to serve as the coordinator of special police community relation programs. These programs should include public education to increase community understanding of the complexities of police work and police understanding of the diverse neighborhoods they are to serve and protect.
2. The City Council should establish formal administrative rulemaking procedures for the Police Division which require public notice and an opportunity for comment before any rule is adopted or amended.
3. The jurisdiction of the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission (CHRC) should be expanded to permit that agency to review whether the Internal Investigation Section has complied with established procedures for investigating the complaint of an aggrieved civilian. The expanded jurisdiction should permit CHRC to interview individual police officers and to review Internal Investigation Section files.
4. The City Council should establish a mechanism for mediating or arbitrating civilian-police disputes which permits civilians to obtain, where appropriate, restitution for damages to self or property.

To the Cincinnati Police Division

1. The Police Chief should strongly support the Community Assistance Section by specific directives from him concerning the section's function and responsibilities. The directives in turn must be effectively communicated through the ranks and to recruits.
2. Either the Police Chief should hold regular public meetings in various Cincinnati neighborhoods or neighborhood police advisory councils should be established for community participation in determining law enforcement priorities and reviewing the effectiveness of current law enforcement policies and practices.
3. The manual of Police Division rules and regulations should be readily available to the public as an appendix to the Municipal Code.
4. Current rules should be amended to expressly regulate the use of persuasive and coercive techniques by police officers and set forth standards for reasonable and purposeful law enforcement. The Cincinnati Police Division should amend its rules and regulations to limit use of deadly force by police personnel to situations where it is necessary to protect the officer or another from imminent death or great bodily harm. Training should be upgraded to provide officers clear guidelines on the appropriate use of force and other persuasive tactics.
5. The Internal Investigation Section must have sufficient staff to work effectively. Investigators should have special training in the conduct of internal investigations and be available on duty at times and places for public convenience.

6. The Internal Investigation Section should regularly monitor the complaint and shots fired history of each police officer such history should be available to the individual officer and to his captain.

7. The Police Division should establish a Peer Review Panel to which a supervisor of the Internal Investigation Section may refer officers manifesting growing loss of control over their aggression for assistance before the misconduct leads to disciplinary sanctions.

8. Police officers must be required by express Police Division rules and regulations to give reason for their actions to civilians except in emergency circumstances.

9. The citizens' complaints process and the disposition of complaints should be effectively communicated to the public so that the public can fully understand the process and the disposition of any and all complaints.

10. The Cincinnati Police Division should categorize complaints of verbal and physical threats and of actual physical force which is less than extreme in a more realistic category than the present one called "discourtesy."

11. Minority and women's organizations should be involved in the formation and implementation of any recruit program.

12. If a reduction in the police force is contemplated, the Police Division should implement that reduction in a manner that does not hinder progress towards obtaining a representative police force.

13. The training staff should include greater representation of minority and women both from the police force itself and from the community.

14. There should be an inservice training program for police officers of all ranks to reinforce and further develop officers' understanding of and ability to communicate with the diverse segments of the Cincinnati community.

15. All officers promoted to supervisory positions should be given thorough management training prior to assuming his or her duties. Such training would give confidence to the officers being promoted, the unit he or she will supervise, and the community being served.