TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND MAIN ARGUMENT ...... 2

II. U.S. STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY POLICY IN THE
TAIWAN STRAIT: A LONGSTANDING
COMMITMENT........................................ 6
   A. America’s National Interests in a Liberal and
      Open China...................................... 10
      1. Coping with a Rising China: Engagement Plus
         Hedging....................................... 12
      2. Obama’s “Pivot” Strategy and China’s Rise ... 15
   B. The Logic of the U.S. Strategic Ambiguity
      Policy ........................................... 19
      1. Coercive Diplomacy and Pivotal Deterrence .. 20
      2. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 2003-06 .......... 24
      3. The Obama Administration and Strategic
         Ambiguity .................................... 27
   C. Domestic Politics and the Making of China
      Policy ............................................ 29
      1. The Clinton Administration and Domestic
         Politics........................................ 30
      2. The Bush Administration and Domestic
         Politics ....................................... 31
      3. The Primacy of National Security Interests
         over Domestic Politics ....................... 32
      4. The Obama Administration and Domestic
         Politics ....................................... 33
   D. Conclusion: Should the United States Abandon
      Strategic Ambiguity? ........................... 35

III. THE “1992 CONSENSUS” AND CROSS-STRAIT
    PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT: EXAMINING THE

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(1)
Policies of Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping .......................................... 38

A. The Promises and Perils of Cross-Strait Relations .............................. 42

B. MA Ying-jeou’s Mainland Strategy: “One ROC, Two Areas” ................ 46
   1. Hedging: To Work for the Best, but to Prepare for the Worst ...... 47
   2. Binding Engagement, Limited Bandwagoning, and Soft Balancing ... 49
   3. The “1992 Consensus” and “One China, Respective Interpretations” . 53

C. China’s Peaceful Development and Relations across the Taiwan Strait .......... 56
   2. HU Jintao, XI Jinping, and Peaceful Development in Cross-Strait Relations: Engagement and Deterrence ...... 66

D. Conclusion: Diminishing Domestic Support and Ma’s Cross-Strait Policy .......... 72

IV. Conclusion: The Future of U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations ......................... 75

Glossary of Selected Chinese Persons’ Names ........................................ 84

I. Introduction and Main Argument

In 2012-13, the United States, Taiwan, and China completed their political transitions, leading to the successful reelections of Presidents Barack Obama and MA Ying-jeou, and the ascendency of XI Jinping as the new general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As Washington, Taipei, and Beijing commence their new administrations, this monograph sets out to examine their respective Taiwan Strait policies and the strategic implications for cross-strait relations.

The main argument contends that, notwithstanding their domestic political pressures at home and different normative and strategic orientations, all three actors share the common national security interest in continuing and deepening the current peaceful China-Taiwan trajectory that has existed since May 2008. Nonethe-