Interrogation of Detainees: 
Overview of the McCain Amendment

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Summary

Recent controversy has arisen regarding U.S. treatment of enemy combatants and terrorist suspects detained in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations, and whether such treatment complies with U.S. statutes and treaties such as the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Congress recently approved additional guidelines concerning the treatment of detainees. The Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-148), and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) contain identical provisions that (1) require Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to employ United States Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees, and (2) prohibit the “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of persons under the detention, custody, or control of the United States Government.” These provisions, added to the defense appropriations and authorization bills via amendments introduced by Senator John McCain, have popularly been referred to as “the McCain amendment.” This report discusses the McCain amendment, as modified and subsequently enacted into law. For a discussion of the provisions in the defense appropriations and authorization bills that limit judicial review of challenges to U.S. detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Guantanamo Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Kenneth Thomas.

Amidst controversy regarding U.S. treatment of enemy combatants and terrorist suspects detained in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations, Congress recently approved additional guidelines concerning the treatment of persons in U.S. custody and control. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163), and the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-148) contain identical provisions that (1) require Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to employ United States Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees, and (2) prohibit the “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of persons under the detention, custody, or control of the United States Government.” These provisions, added to the defense appropriations and authorization bills via amendments introduced by Senator John
McCain, have popularly been referred to as “the McCain amendment.” As subsequently modified, the McCain amendment also provides certain legal protections and assistance to U.S. personnel engaged in the authorized interrogation of a terrorist suspect.

Summary and Analysis of the McCain Amendment

The McCain amendment, as modified and enacted into law, contains three provisions, which are described in the following sections.

Applying U.S. Army Field Manual Standards. The first provision of the McCain amendment provides that no person in the custody or effective control of the DOD or detained in a DOD facility shall be subject to any interrogation treatment or technique that is not authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation. An exception to this general requirement is made for individuals being held pursuant to U.S. criminal or immigration laws. The McCain amendment does not require non-DOD agencies, such as non-military intelligence and law enforcement agencies, to employ Field Manual guidelines with respect to interrogations they conduct.

The United States Army Field Manual addresses intelligence interrogation under FM 34-52, detailing certain procedures for the treatment and questioning of persons by military personnel. FM 34-52 also contains a section regarding the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. According to the manual, these Conventions, including the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, are to be “strictly observed and enforced by the United States Forces without regard to whether they are legally binding upon this country and its specific relations with any other specific country.” In applying these standards, the Field Manual requires soldiers to adhere to the...
Geneva Convention’s prohibition against “cruel treatment and torture” and “[o]utriges upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”

The McCain amendment does not prevent DOD from subsequently amending the Field Manual.

**Prohibition on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.** The second provision of the McCain amendment prohibits persons in the custody or control of the U.S. government, regardless of their nationality or physical location, from being subjected to “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” The amendment specifies that this restriction is without geographical limitation as to where and when the government must abide by it. Unlike the first section of the McCain amendment, this provision covers not only DOD activities, but also intelligence and law enforcement activities occurring both inside and outside the United States. This provision does not appear to prohibit U.S. agencies from transferring persons to other countries where those persons would face “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” so long as such persons were no longer in U.S. custody or control. However, such transfers might nonetheless be limited by applicable treaties and statutes. The McCain amendment also provides that this provision may “not be superseded, except by a provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of this act which specifically repeals, modifies, or supersedes the provisions of this section.”

In interpreting whether treatment falls below this standard, the McCain amendment defines “cruel, unusual, and inhuman treatment or punishment” to cover those acts prohibited under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as stated in U.S. reservations to the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The Constitution applies to U.S. citizens abroad, thereby protecting them from the extraterritorial infliction by U.S. state or federal officials of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited under the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments. However,

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10 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”).
noncitizens arguably only receive constitutional protections after they have effected entry into the United States.\footnote{See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States, 494 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1990) (“aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with the country”). But see Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, n.15 (2004) (noting in dicta that petitioners’ allegations that they had been held in Executive detention for more than two years “in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing — unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States’”) (citing federal habeas statute 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), under which petitioners challenged their detention). Whether the \textit{Rasul} ruling meant only that federal habeas jurisdiction extended to Guantanamo, or more broadly found that non-citizens detained at Guantanamo possessed constitutional rights, has been subject to conflicting rulings by district courts. \textit{Compare} Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp.2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that while federal habeas statute covers Guantanamo detainees, non-citizens detained there do not receive constitutional protections) \textit{with} \textit{In re Guantanamo Detainees}, 355 F. Supp.2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (reading \textit{Rasul} to mean that persons detained at Guantanamo are owed constitutional protections). For further information, see CRS Report RS22173, \textit{Detainees at Guantánamo Bay}, by Jennifer Elsea.}

The McCain amendment prohibits persons under U.S. custody or control from being subjected to “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” of any kind prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, \textit{regardless of their geographic location or nationality}. Accordingly, it appears that the McCain amendment is intended to ensure that persons in U.S. custody or control abroad cannot be subjected to treatment that would be deemed unconstitutional if it occurred in the United States.\footnote{The McCain amendment also appears aimed at resolving controversy concerning U.S. implementation of CAT Article 16, which obligates CAT parties to prevent cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment within territories under their jurisdiction. When the U.S. ratified CAT, it did so with the reservation that the “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” prohibited by CAT covered only those types of actions prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. There is some legal dispute as to whether CAT Article 16, as read in light of U.S. reservations, applies to non-citizens held outside the United States. For further background, see CRS Report RL32438, \textit{U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to Interrogation Techniques}, by Michael Garcia.}

The scope of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions upon harsh treatment or punishment is subject to evolving case law interpretation and constant legal and scholarly debate.\footnote{The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” concerns the imposition of a criminal punishment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). The constitutional restraint of persons in other areas, such as pre-trial interrogation, is found in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment (concerning obligations owed by the U.S. federal government) and Fourteenth Amendment (concerning duties owed by U.S. state governments). These due process rights protect persons from executive abuses which “shock the conscience.” See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).} The types of acts that fall within “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” contained in the McCain amendment may change over time and may not always be clear. Heightening this uncertainty is the possible difficulty of comparing situations that might arise in the context of hostilities and “the war on terror” with interrogation, detention, and incarceration within the U.S. criminal justice system.
For example, a U.S. court might employ a different standard for determining whether interrogation techniques employed against a criminal suspect are unconstitutionally harsh than it would use in assessing whether those same techniques were unconstitutional if employed against an enemy combatant in a war zone.

Nevertheless, types of treatment in a criminal law context that have been deemed to be prohibited under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments may be deemed instructive by a reviewing court. A sampling might include, *inter alia*:

- handcuffing an individual to a hitching post in a standing position for an extended period of time that “surpasses the need to quell a threat or restore order”;\(^{14}\)
- maintaining temperatures and ventilation systems in detention facilities that fail to meet reasonable levels of comfort;\(^{15}\) and
- prolonged interrogation over an unreasonably extended period of time,\(^{16}\) including interrogation of a duration that might not seem unreasonable in a vacuum, but becomes such when evaluated in the totality of the circumstances.\(^{17}\)

Again, whether such conduct would also be considered “cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment” when employed in other circumstances (e.g., against terrorist suspects or enemy combatants abroad), or whether different constitutional standards could govern such conduct, remains unclear.

Conduct that has not been deemed to violate the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments includes, *inter alia*:

- The double-celling of those in custody, at least so long as it does not lead to deprivations of essentials, an unreasonable increase in violence, or create other conditions intolerable for confinement.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{15}\) Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2004).

\(^{16}\) Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). *See also* Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (holding that confession of escaped convict held incommunicado 16 days was involuntary, even though he was interrogated only an hour each day he was held).


\(^{18}\) Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). The Court stated that, “General considerations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double celling under these circumstances either inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of crimes warranting imprisonment.” Here, the condition of the cells was modern and well-equipped. This contributed to the Court’s decision for allowing it in this situation, but also showed that the decision does not preclude all other situations of double celling from being cruel and unusual.
Solitary or isolated confinement, so long as such confinement is within a cell in acceptable condition and is not of an unreasonable duration.\textsuperscript{19}

In detention situations, the use of constant lighting in prisoner cells is allowed as the detainees’ inconvenience and discomfort is outweighed by the need to protect safety and welfare of the other detainees and staff.\textsuperscript{20}

Again, it might not be clear that these and similar treatments may never be deemed constitutionally impermissible outside the criminal context, including when such treatments are used upon enemy combatants or terrorist suspects who have not been charged with a criminal offense.

**Protection of U.S. Personnel Engaged in Authorized Interrogations.** The conference committees established to resolve differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions of the defense appropriations and authorization bills inserted an additional provision into the McCain amendment, providing certain legal protections and assistance to U.S. personnel engaged in authorized interrogations.\textsuperscript{21} As modified, the McCain amendment provides a legal defense to U.S. personnel in any civil or criminal action brought against them on account of their participation in the authorized interrogation of suspected foreign terrorists. The amendment specifies that a legal defense exists to civil action or criminal prosecution when the U.S. agent “did not know that the [interrogation] practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were unlawful.” A good faith reliance on the advice of counsel is specified to be “an important factor, among others, to consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the practices to be unlawful.” The McCain amendment further states that the specification of a “good-faith” defense neither extinguishes any other defenses available to U.S. personnel nor accords such personnel with immunity from criminal prosecution.

In addition, the McCain amendment permits the U.S. government to employ legal counsel for and pay the court costs of U.S. personnel in any legal actions brought against them in foreign judicial tribunals and administrative agencies on account of such persons’ participation in authorized interrogations, to the same extent such services and payments are authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 1037 (permitting DOD to employ counsel and pay court costs of armed forces and accompanying persons before foreign judicial tribunals and administrative agencies).

\textsuperscript{19} Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). The Court indicated that factors involved in the determination of constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” prohibition include the physical conditions of the cell and the length of time of confinement.


\textsuperscript{21} P.L. 109-148, Title X, § 1004; P.L. 109-163, Title XIV, § 1404.