State and Local Homeland Security: Unresolved Issues for the 109th Congress

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Summary


These key laws notwithstanding, a host of important state and local homeland security policy issues remain, which the 109th Congress might address. Some of the issues include reportedly unmet emergency responder needs; the proposed reduction in appropriations for federal homeland security assistance; the determination of state and local homeland security risk assessment factors; the absence of emergency responder equipment standards; the development of state and local homeland security strategies; and the limited number of state and local officials with security clearances.

A case could be made that the primary state and local homeland security issue is the reportedly unfair and inadequate distribution of federal homeland security assistance; this report, however, does not address that issue. For information concerning FY2005 homeland security grant allocations and a discussion of federal homeland security assistance distribution formulas, see CRS Report RL32696, Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program: State Allocations and Issues for Congressional Oversight. For a comparison of current legislative actions on homeland security distribution formulas, see CRS Report RL32892, Homeland Security Grant Formulas: A Comparison of Formula Provisions in S. 21 and H.R. 1544, 109th Congress.

The report will be updated as congressional actions warrant.
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Introduction


Numerous other recently enacted public laws address homeland security issues such as:

- Transportation security;¹
- Border security;²
- Bioterrorism;³
- Maritime security;⁴ and
- Terrorism insurance.⁵

These key laws notwithstanding, a host of important state and local homeland security policy issues remain, which the 109th Congress might address. Some of the issues include reportedly unmet emergency responder needs; the proposed reduction in appropriations for federal homeland security assistance; the determination of state and local homeland security risk assessment factors; the absence of emergency responder equipment standards; the development of state and local homeland security strategies; and the limited number of state and local officials with security clearances.

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The state and local homeland security issues may be deemed important because they arguably identify critical homeland security needs and policy questions that have not been fully addressed since September 2001.

One could argue that the primary state and local homeland security issue is the widely reported unfair and inadequate distribution of federal homeland security assistance; this report, however, does not address that issue. For information concerning FY2005 homeland security grant allocations and a discussion of federal homeland security assistance distribution formulas, see CRS Report RL32696, *Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program: State Allocations and Issues for Congressional Oversight*. For a comparison of current legislative actions on homeland security distribution formulas, see CRS Report RL32892, *Homeland Security Grant Formulas: A Comparison of Formula Provisions in S. 21 and H.R. 1544, 109th Congress*.

**Emergency Responder Needs**

The FY2005 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) guidelines, which include guidance for the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG), and the Citizen Corps Programs (CCP), provide a list of authorized equipment, training courses, exercises, and planning activities that states and localities can purchase with grant allocations.\(^6\) Observers note, however, that the list of authorized expenditures does not adequately address the two most important (according to emergency responders) needs — hiring and retention of personnel, and interoperable communications.

**Hiring and Retention of Personnel.** Hiring and retention of emergency responder personnel (including law enforcement personnel, fire and emergency medical service personnel, and emergency managers) is not an authorized HSGP expenditure. State and local law enforcement agencies receive federal hiring and retention funding, however, through the Department of Justice (DOJ) Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and Justice Assistance Grant Program (JAG).\(^7\) Fire departments receive hiring and retention funding through the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Grant Program (SAFER).\(^8\)

State and local government officials and emergency responders have stated that the hiring and retention of personnel is one of their principal homeland security needs. Ten months after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Alexander Knopp,


\(^7\) In FY2005, DOJ combined the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program and the Byrne Memorial Grant Program into JAG.

Mayor of Norwalk, Connecticut, testified before the House Committee on Government Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. Mayor Knopp stated that federal funding was needed to expand the number of firefighters and police officers to assist in terrorism preparedness and response. At the same hearing, Christopher J. Lynch, New Cannan, Connecticut, chief of police, stated that emergency responder agencies needed to increase volunteer staff due to the lack of funding for hiring new personnel. In January 2005, 50 House of Representatives Members sent a bipartisan letter to the President asking for a significant increase in the Administration’s FY2006 budget for the hiring of first responders.

On May 1, 2003, former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that it was not the federal government’s role to pay the salaries of state and local employees. Even with the testimony of state and local officials, DHS continues to prohibit the use of federal homeland security funding for the hiring and retention of emergency responder personnel.

With the increased role state and local personnel have in homeland security activities, Congress might consider authorizing the use of federal homeland security assistance funding for hiring and retaining emergency responders. One might argue that without a sufficient number of emergency responder personnel, states and localities might have difficulties performing day-to-day operations and responding to homeland security emergencies.

On the same subject, in February 2005, the Administration proposed in its FY2006 budget request to reduce funding for COPS and eliminate JAG. On February 7, 2005, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) released a press statement announcing its displeasure with the Administration’s proposal. The proposed cut in COPS funding and the elimination of JAG could further reduce state and local homeland security capabilities by reducing the amount of federal funding used to hire and retain emergency responders.

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10 Ibid., p. 48.


One bill in the 109th Congress, passed by the House on May 12, 2005, H.R. 1544, “Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act of 2005,” and another bill, reported on April 12, 2005, by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, S. 21, “Homeland Security Enhancement Act of 2005,” propose to provide funding for overtime expenses related to homeland security activities. Neither bill, however, authorizes federal homeland security funding to be used for the hiring and retention of emergency responders.

Interoperable Communications. According to a National Governors Association (NGA) survey conducted in August 2004, only 22% of the states that responded have developed statewide interoperability communications, while 73% of those that responded stated they are still in the process of developing interoperability. On June 15, 2003, IACP released a list of anti-terror needs, and stated that one of their priorities is interoperable communications among all emergency responder entities.

The FY2005 HSGP guidelines authorize states and localities to purchase communications equipment. Interoperable communications equipment, however, is but one of many types of equipment on the DHS Authorized Equipment List (AEL). Even with this funding source, NGA states:

Developing statewide interoperability for emergency responders is the chief priority, and states are working diligently to bolster this capacity. Many are struggling with the dual challenges of funding and time. States must either replace outdated equipment with new models, or install software that allows incompatible equipment throughout the state to communicate with each other.

Additionally, NGA stated that the survey respondents indicated that additional grant funding would facilitate the acquisition of new technology to enable interoperability.

One might assume that because DHS has not provided a separate funding source or a specific amount of grant funding for communications equipment, the department does not recognize the state and local need for interoperable communications. This assumption, however, does not address the issue of state and local governments’ responsibility for prioritizing their homeland security needs.

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19 Ibid., p. 4.
The House Appropriations Committee recommends, in H.R. 2360 (FY2006 DHS appropriations), a total of $3.19 billion for federal homeland security assistance, a reduction of $420 million from FY2005 funding (see Table 1). This proposed reduction includes $350 million less for SHSGP than was appropriated in FY2005.\(^\text{20}\) SHSGP is the primary program states use to fund interoperable communications. The ability of emergency responders to communicate has been identified as one of the primary national priorities in the *National Preparedness Goal.*\(^\text{21}\) The proposed reduction in funding could result in states and localities not funding interoperable communications at the level needed to meet the national priority of strengthening this capability.

**Reduction in Federal Homeland Security Assistance**

The reduction of federal homeland security assistance funding is another homeland security issue states and localities face. In FY2005, Congress appropriated approximately $3.61 billion for state and local homeland security assistance.\(^\text{22}\) In the FY2006 budget request, the Administration proposes a total of $3.36 billion for federal homeland security assistance, a reduction of $250 million from FY2005 funding. Additionally, the FY2006 budget request provides no line item funding for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP). It proposes, however, to direct states and localities to allocate no less than 20% of SHSGP and UASI funding for LETTP activities.\(^\text{23}\) Apparently, this would be a reduction in SHSGP and UASI funding for equipment, training, exercises, and planning, which states and localities were authorized to fund with 100% of their allocated amount in FY2005. One could argue that the proposed overall funding reduction of $250 million and the Administration’s requirement for states and localities to allocate no less than 20% of their SHSGP and UASI funding to LETTP activities would represent a further reduction of funding for state and local homeland security activities.

The Administration’s budget proposal requests $500 million for FIRE in FY2006, a cut of 30% from the FY2005 appropriated level. Priority would be given to grant applications enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities. Grants would be available only for training, vehicle acquisition, firefighting equipment, and personal protective equipment. Under the budget proposal, activities such as wellness/fitness and fire station modification would not be funded. Activities such as prevention, public fire safety education and awareness, and fire code enforcement would be funded under a separate fire prevention and firefighter safety grant program. For FY2006, the Administration is requesting no funding of the Staffing for Adequate


\(^{22}\) P.L. 108-334, Title III, FY2005 DHS appropriations.

Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grants, which provide assistance to fire departments for hiring personnel. The House Appropriations Committee recommends $600 million for firefighter assistance, including $550 million for fire grants and $50 million for SAFER Act grants. The committee does not agree with the Administration’s proposal to shift the program’s priority to terrorism or to limit the list of eligible activities. The following table compares funding for FY2003 through FY2005 with the FY2006 budget request and DHS appropriations bill (H.R. 2360). The House Appropriations Committee recommends a total of $3.19 billion for federal homeland security assistance, a reduction of $420 million from FY2005 funding.

Table 1. FY2005-FY2006 Federal Homeland Security Assistance
(Amounts in millions of dollars)

<table>
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<td>400</td>
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<tr>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistance to Firefighters</td>
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<td>Citizen Corps Programs</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,820</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,795</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,610</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,360</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,185</strong></td>
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Initially, following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, there may have been a need for a significant amount of funding for state and local homeland security. Some may argue, however, that now there is only a need to maintain state and local

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24 This information provided by Len Kruger, Specialist in Science and Technology, Research, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service.


26 This amount is not included in the total and is derived from the 20% of SHSGP and UASI to be used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities.
homeland security programs and activities. Nevertheless, some may argue that the initial attempt to create a base amount of homeland security funding may have been inadequate. As an example, states have identified a need for additional funding for interoperable communications systems. Additionally, the reduction of funding may impair state and local attempts to meet the National Preparedness Goal’s national priorities of implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP); expanding regional homeland security collaboration; implementing the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan; strengthening homeland security information sharing and collaboration capabilities; strengthening chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) detection, response, and decontamination capabilities; and strengthening medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities.27

**Determining State and Local Homeland Security Risk Assessment Factors**

Since DHS has yet to allocate funding to states and localities based on risk, another state and local homeland security issue remains: what risk factors to use in determining the allocation of federal homeland security assistance. The methods of threat and vulnerability assessment suggest a variety of factors which could be employed in devising a risk-based funding formula for allocating homeland security assistance to states and localities. In considering such factors, however, Congress will be faced with a question of what criteria to use when assessing potential formula risk factors or what factors to direct DHS to consider. Risk factors include threats, the entity threatened, and the consequences of the threat to the specified entity. For a risk factor to be a feasible variable in a statutory risk-based formula, it would need to satisfy the following criteria:28

1. **Validity.** A factor and its associated formula indicator are valid only to the extent that they reflect the concept to which they are intended to refer.

2. **Relevance.** A factor and its associated formula indicator are relevant only to the extent that a clear, logical relationship exists between them and what is to be measured.

3. **Reliability.** Data for the factor must come from a source that Congress, the executive branch, and grant recipients believe to be reliable. For example, population data from the U.S. Census Bureau are generally regarded as reliable and are used in a variety of formulas for allocating aid grants.

4. **Timeliness.** Data for allocating grants should be reasonably up to date so that the grant allocation formula can reasonably represent an eligible recipient’s

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current need for assistance. Thus, data that are regularly updated and reported are preferable to data that are collected irregularly.

(5) Availability. Data necessary to the factor’s use as a formula variable should, arguably, be readily and publicly available. Data that have been classified by the federal government would fail to satisfy this criterion, since they are not available for the states and localities — unless the states and localities were to have personnel with security clearances and DHS made this classified information available for review.

Examples of possible risk assessment factors include threats, homeland security capabilities, population factors, critical infrastructure assets, and transportation assets, among other factors. None of the possible risk factors can be assessed individually. To accurately evaluate the risk assessment factors, one would need to determine the threat to population factors, critical infrastructure, transportation, or other factors, and determine the consequences of such a threat. Additionally, the homeland security capabilities needed to prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks (and natural and technical disasters) would need to be assessed.

Two previously mentioned bills in the 109th Congress, H.R. 1544 and S. 21, propose that ODP use risk factors in determining state and locality homeland security assistance.

H.R. 1544, passed by the House on May 12, 2005, proposes to establish a First Responder Grants Board that would evaluate and prioritize state homeland security applications based on threats of terrorism to the agriculture, food, banking, and chemical industries; the defense industrial base; emergency services; energy; government facilities; postal, shipping, public health, health care, information technology, telecommunications, and transportation systems; water; dams; commercial facilities; and national monuments and icons. The Board would also consider the following types of threats: biological, nuclear, radiological, incendiary, chemical, explosive, suicide bombers, and cyber. Additionally, the Board would consider specific threats to population (including transient, commuting, or tourist), and greater weight would be given to specific and credible terrorism threats. H.R. 1544 proposes to allocate total federal homeland security assistance appropriations based on the First Responder Grants Board’s evaluation and prioritization of homeland security assistance applications and the DHS Secretary’s discretion.29

S. 21, reported by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on April 12, 2005, proposes to allocate 30% of total appropriations for a new grant program (Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program) to major metropolitan regions with the following risk criteria: target of prior terrorist attack; has had a higher Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat level than the nation as a whole; large population or high population density; high threat and risk related to critical infrastructure; international border or coastline; bordering at-risk

29 H.R. 1544, Sec. 3.
sites or activities in a nearby jurisdiction; unmet essential first responder capabilities; and any other threat factors as determined by the DHS Secretary.\textsuperscript{30}

Similarly, S. 21 proposes to allocate 30\% of total appropriations for the new Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program to states according to the following risk criteria: target of prior terrorist attack within or in part of state; state has had a higher Homeland Security Advisory System Threat level than the nation as whole; percent of state’s population residing in metropolitan statistical areas (as defined by the Office of Management and Budget); threat and risk related to critical infrastructure; international border or coastline; bordering at-risk sites or activities in a nearby jurisdiction; unmet essential first responder capabilities; and any other threat factors as determined by the DHS Secretary.\textsuperscript{31}

The remaining 40\% of total appropriations would be allocated as a guaranteed base amount to each state: either 0.55\% of total appropriations for the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program or a sliding-scale guaranteed amount based on each state’s population and population density.\textsuperscript{32}

Because of the aforementioned risk factor criterion of “availability,” Congress may not be in a position to accurately determine specific risk assessment factors. But because of Congress’s oversight responsibilities, it may want to review DHS’s risk assessment methodology and risk-based distribution formulas. The oversight could include a review of weights given to risk factors, threats to key assets and critical infrastructure, and plausible consequences of identified threats. The oversight could ensure that DHS considers risk factors which affect rural areas as well as urban areas.

\section*{Homeland Security Equipment Standards}

Another state and local homeland security issue concerns equipment standards. On December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8). Among other things, HSPD-8 directs the DHS Secretary, in coordination with state and local officials, to establish and implement procedures for developing and adopting first responder equipment standards that support a national preparedness capability.\textsuperscript{33} DHS, however, has so far issued standards only for two first responder equipment categories: personal protective gear, and radiation and nuclear detection equipment.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} S. 21, Sec. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{31} S. 21, Sec. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{32} S. 21, Sec. 4.
\end{itemize}
Presently, DHS has not provided standards for any other type of first responder equipment. A report prepared for the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the Department of Justice recommends that the federal government establish first responder equipment standards to assist in the nation’s preparedness for terrorist attacks. In February 2003, The National Task Force on Interoperability, a task force composed of representatives from professional emergency responder and government personnel associations, recommended the establishment of standards for interoperable communications. In a report on interoperable communications, the task force stated that the use of standards for equipment and software might alleviate many of the interoperability problems faced by emergency responders, and state and local governments.

In the FY2005 HSGP guidance, DHS provides an AEL that categorizes which equipment states and localities are authorized to purchase. The list, however, does not identify standards for equipment selection. H.R. 1544 and S. 21 either require a determination of the need for equipment standards or require DHS to provide information to states and localities on voluntary standards.

The lack of equipment standards may result in states and localities purchasing equipment which does not meet their homeland security needs. It may also result in states and localities purchasing equipment that is not compatible with other jurisdictions’ equipment. The need for multiple jurisdictions to use the same equipment or compatible equipment might become evident if multiple jurisdictions were to respond jointly to a homeland security emergency.

State Homeland Security Strategies

On May 17, 2005, IACP released a press statement critical of The National Homeland Security Strategy. The press release charged that the current strategy is flawed because it was developed federally — by federal departments and agencies

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— instead of nationally — by all levels of government (local, tribal, state, and federal).

A federally developed homeland security strategy, which does not reflect the advice, expertise, or consent of public safety organizations at levels of government other than federal, could be viewed as overly instructive and cumbersome, and possibly impractical. The IACP advocates solving the problem by adopting a national, rather than a federal, approach to future homeland security planning and strategy development.

*The National Homeland Security Strategy* was developed by the Office of Homeland Security, with post-development comments by advisory panels and working groups. The advisory panels and working groups consisted of members of the state, local, and tribal public safety community; but some have observed that this community had little impact on policy development. Since the release of the strategy, DHS has sought continued input from citizens, the public safety community, and state and local officials. The input, however, has been confined to comments on already developed policies and strategies. Observers note that the lack of greater state and local input seems to have contributed to a strategy which fails to reflect national homeland security needs, vulnerabilities, and risks. Furthermore, as with the proposed reduction in federal homeland security assistance funding, a national homeland security strategy which suffers from deficient state and local governments’ input may result in their failing to meet the *National Preparedness Goal*’s national priorities.

**State and Local Official Security Clearances**

Most information DHS provides to state and local government officials is unclassified. Nevertheless, these officials might need some access to classified information, for example, “real time” intelligence information concerning terrorism threats, to adequately plan, coordinate, and execute homeland security activities.

Presently, about 325 state and local government officials possess DHS-sponsored security clearances, and 250 state and local government officials are in the process of receiving DHS-sponsored security clearances. DHS continues to process additional clearances for state, local, territorial, and tribal officials whose requests are submitted through their states’ Office of Homeland Security. One mayor from New York State has a DHS-sponsored security clearance, and the State of

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40 Ibid.


42 For further information on state and local officials’ security clearances, contact Fred Kaiser, Specialist in American National Government, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service, at 7-8682.

Hawaii has recently submitted clearance requests for four mayors. DHS states that no other mayors have requested DHS-sponsored security clearances. Every Governor, however, is granted a security clearance after signing a non-disclosure agreement (Special Form-312).44

In addition to DHS, several other federal departments and agencies provide security clearances to state and local officials. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides numerous state and local law enforcement officials with security clearances. State and local officials may also possess security clearances provided by the Department of Defense, as a result of military (Reserves and National Guard) service.

While hundreds of state and local officials have federally sponsored security clearances, DHS is unable to provide an accurate number of them.45 This limited and uncertain number of state and local officials with security clearances might affect the ability of DHS (or other federal departments and agencies) to provide classified information to states and localities. They, in turn, might not be able to adequately prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks without access to classified information. Additionally, states and localities might not be able to coordinate with other government entities (federal or state and local) if information cannot be shared due to a lack of security clearances.

Security clearances are a problem not only for state and local officials, but also, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), for port security officials. GAO reported in April 2005 that port security officials are having difficulties getting homeland security information due to delays in obtaining security clearances. Delays, as determined by GAO, have occurred because U.S. Coast Guard field representatives did not know that the Coast Guard was responsible for contacting non-federal port security officials concerning security clearances, and Coast Guard field offices were not tracking submitted port security officials’ security clearance requests.46

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.